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Partisan?

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EMIRS AND CHIEFS



LEADERS OR LOOTERS?

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In this issue

The establishment view about so-called traditional rulers is that they are real leaders of their people and custodians of culture and tradition. But increasingly this view is being rejected by the majority of Nigerians, who see these chiefs as looters rather than leaders.....Page 19



On May 28 last year, the Emir's palace at Keffi was 'invaded' by scores of villagers carrying four dead bodies and demanding the Emir's head. *The Analyst* unearths the feudal intrigues, treachery and greed, and the collusion among powerful forces, that led to this incident. Page 17

With the Electoral Commission already in place and the Local Government polls around the corner, the political fever in the country is high, in spite of the all-encompassing Decree 19. But just when is politics partisan (and punishable under Decree 19), and when is it not?.....Page 25

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Cover illustration by Gani Odutokun

ABOLISH THEM

Since 1st July, traditional rulers from all over the country have been holding meetings all over the place. Top of their agenda is the question of what constitutional role they are to play in the Third Republic. It is an old question—one that has been asked and debated over the years. And, as we approach 1992, it is even tempting to see it as an urgent one, especially in view of the recommendation by the Political Bureau that traditional rulers should not be given any executive, judicial or legislative role, and should be restricted to their local government areas. But the fuss over what role traditional rulers should play in the scheme of things in Nigeria is somewhat diversionary, and has for long closed the eyes of many to one important fact, namely that the Emirs, Chiefs, Obas and Obis have never at anytime been without a role.

Of course, the array of legal powers they once directly commanded, which gave them considerable leverage in the control of affairs in the country, has now been lost due to the many reforms introduced over the years. They now no longer exercise formal control over the instruments of coercion: the courts, the police and the prisons. Informally, however, it is a different story; they still retain indirect control in most key areas. In the rural and urban areas, for instance, they still exercise great control over land, markets and the administration of justice. In addition, they have fashioned for themselves new roles. They are experts at political manipulation; they are big-time contractors and commission agents; they are fronts for multinational companies; they aid and abet organised crime; they promote moral decadence; they thwart every genuine move towards national cohesion and democracy; in short, theirs is, in many senses, a role actually subversive of the unity, progress and stability of this country.

This is why it is hard to understand why the Political Bureau did not go far enough in its recommendation on this issue. After correctly identifying the oppressive and retrograde role of traditional institutions in the country, the Political Bureau in its report came to the conclusion — correct in our view — that these institutions only constitute a clog in the wheel of the country's progress. Yet, the Bureau in the end somehow developed cold feet and shied away from giving the only recommendation consistent with its findings and conclusion: abolish these traditional institutions. To merely recommend, as did the Bureau, that the traditional rulers be given no executive, judicial or legislative role, is not enough. It is not consistent with what the Bureau found out regarding the views of the people of Nigeria towards these parasites and leeches.

We of *The Analyst* believe, and for very good reasons too, that nothing short of a complete scrapping of these institutions would do for the progress and stability of

Nigeria. For one, although the traditional rulers and their close associates and hangers-on may want to believe otherwise, the fact is, they are immensely unpopular with the masses of the Nigerian people — especially the majority living in the rural areas who, more than anyone else, have been, and continue to be, at the receiving end of feudal oppression, rapacity and greed. True, it is not every day that people carry placards or troop out to the streets to show their dislike for the traditional rulers. But the history of Nigeria is certainly full of instances of both silent and violent protests—most of the time unreported in the media—by the people against these traditional rulers. For another, the very existence of these traditional institutions is inconsistent with the main goal of our past and current struggles and efforts: building a united country, democracy, and a just, fair and stable political order. For, these traditional institutions, based as they are on inheritance, are not only thoroughly undemocratic, but most of those who man them are part of the tiny class of Nigerians whose greed and unpatriotic activities are some of the main causes of the country's perennial instability. There is no gainsaying the fact that if democracy is to grow and flourish, its roots must be planted in a healthy, vibrant soil, and not on a murky, parasitic and undemocratic foundation.

Which is why we of *The Analyst*, while welcoming the government's acceptance of the Political Bureau's recommendation on traditional rulers, very much share the popular concern all over the country that the White Paper on the Dasuki Report is going to be implemented together with the Political Bureau's recommendation. Our concern stems from the fact that the main thrust of the White Paper on the Dasuki Report is to seek to reverse the positive gains of the Murtala/Obasanjo local government reforms of 1976 and to entrench feudal power in the local government councils. This is fraught with danger, and is the surest way of sabotaging all our current efforts to build a progressive and stable political and social order. We feel that the Federal Military Government must now bow to the wishes of the Nigerian people as reported by the Political Bureau, and begin now to decisively free the local government councils from the clutches and influence of these feudal parasites. And clearly the only definitive way to do this is to abolish these feudal institutions once and for all.

At the grass-roots level, democratic structures, specifically democratically elected village, district, and local government councils and committees, manned by the elected representatives of the people, should be established to decide on such matters as land, justice, security, markets and stall allocation, taxation, community development and other matters of community concern. If the Federal Military Government cannot do this, the least the Nigerian people expect from it is that it should do nothing to obstruct the inevitable movement towards genuine and deep-rooted democracy in Nigeria. For, laying the foundations of a truly democratic, united and progressive Nigeria shall involve the abolishing of all traditional rulers.



LETTERS

Adamu Adamu Spoke the Truth

Your article "Sex and Violence, the Hidden Victim" made an important reading, not from its substance but rather from its ill-composition and callous, counterfeit and above all confusing conclusion.

Adamu Adamu had said the truth prevailing now, and while you seem to counter argue with him, you completely confused yourself.

One area is that you claimed Adamu denied the fact that Vesico Vaginal Fistula, VVF, is found as far back as during the days of Ibn Sina. He didn't say that after all. What he actually rejected was the assertion that early marriage causes VVF. It is more predominant these days and, as he rightly argued, it is caused by the crisis in modern medicine. I concur with Adamu on that, and everybody of a refined substance or mind would surely do so too.

Another area is that you quoted from Dan Fodio's book in order to strengthen your points, but funny enough the content was completely contrary to the argument and to the purpose for which it was quoted.

In the middle of the poor article some confusing figures were supplied and they even indicated that out of 100% of cases of VVF only less than 15% were caused by early marriage.

In fact, from an observer's standpoint, the article had a double face, one of them obscured. If closely examined, it may be seen that Asma'u has some scores to settle with the poor fellow Adamu, and therefore used the pages of *The Analyst* as a settling ground. That he supported early marriage and rejected the belief that early marriage causes VVF should not have earned him journalistic abuse.

I feel those in *The Analyst* and those who patronise it like Asma'u should be more objective, since people - the readers - take them as a new breed of journalists who through their writings expose certain baseless beliefs with the view of wiping them away. In fact, to winnow the truths from the falsehoods.

Please be more analytic next time.

Abubakar Danladi
Maiduguri

Your magazine has maintained its stand for change toward the course of justice and socialism for the masses of this country. You have enabled us to know how our so-called big men in government; civil, military, and religious leaders; traditional rulers; and business tycoons have been stealing our money and seizing out land, and how they then turn round to use tribal sentiment and religion to cover up their dubious acts.

In your Vol.2, No.4, two articles - on Dr. Chris Abashiya (The Judas Iscariot of CAN), and the Bakori Trials - raised issues that are touching. They seem like fiction but are facts. Dr. Chris Abashiya as seen from the *Land Investigation Report vol. VIII*, on Jema'a Local Government, conniving with the Emir of Jama'a to seize the farmlands of his fellow brothers, and his involvement in the Donli Committee Report; which CAN has

A Judas Iscariot Indeed

rejected, have clearly shown him as the Judas Iscariot. He acted contrary to the faith which he is pretending to represent.

The Bakori Trials again show us how the masses of this country are made orphans on their land. It also depicts how some judges sell their conscience because of worldly things.

We the masses of this great nation are all behind *The Analyst* magazine in the struggle to uproot the capitalists from controlling the affairs and the economy of this country

Mike B. Duniya,
Kano

A Mark of Courage

I find most interesting your write-up captioned "Selective Punishment, Twenty Years Jail for Barde" which appeared in your issue of Vol.2, No. 2.

In that piece, you mentioned some prominent leaders of the Second Republic who should be brought to trial, such as Shagari, Ekwueme, Jolly Tanko Yusuf, to mention just a few, plus all the Ministers, Advisers, Liaison Officers, who served directly or indirectly in the Shagari regime.

It is patently clear to every Nigerian that the suspected and jailed State Governors and their Commissioners are not the only ones who brought about the plundering and wrecking of the Nigerian economy between 1979-83.

Abubakar Usman Nyaja,
Jalingo, Gongola State

The text of the judgement given by the Special Military Tribunal, Kaduna Zone, in the case against *The Analyst*, published in Vol.2, No.4, is particularly interesting.

If anything, that trial and its outcome have important implications for the social development of this country at this time when many citizens deny themselves of their rights of freedom of speech, justice and public accountability due to fear or ignorance. Certainly, the conduct of the accused during the case shows a mark of courage and candour on their part.

Let Nigerians bear in mind that no nation should dream of achieving democracy if her citizens lack the courage to stand for social justice and truth.

Ben A. Mogbo,
Kaduna

Be More Comprehensive

I appreciate the rare courage which *The Analyst* collective has introduced into Nigerian journalism. It is my cherished hope that this medium of mass education of our people as to the evils being perpetrated by a few that have gotten rich from the government treasury wouldn't end up

as a futile exercise. Above all, I hope that your writings would transcend mere attack on certain named individuals or groups, and would be mainly objective and comprehensive in its outlook.

Nwachukwu Madukwe
Benin City

The *National Concord* of July 29, 1987, reported both the Chairman and a Director of the DFRRI, Air Commodore Larry Loinyan and Dr. Jerry Gana, as saying that 5 states, among which is Gongola, have "excelled in their efforts to achieve a concrete transformation of the rural areas in the country." The story went further to state that the "era of making promises without fulfilling same in the country has gone."

Judging from the above statements, any right thinking Nigerian — particularly those of us living within and around Dampar area of Wukari Local Government, Gongola State — will know these are mere political statements, meant to deceive the poor rural dwellers.

Was it not the same Directorate that recently carried out an assessment visit to the state and confirmed that the state officials were dodging them because they have done nothing to show, apart from those projects completed by the World Bank Rural Development Programmes which do not even reach every corner of the state? How come now

DFRRI's Death Traps

I write to elaborate on the activities of the DFRRI in Kanam Local Government, Plateau State. The DFRRI has awarded a contract for a rural feeder road from Dengi-Tuttung and Dengi to Kafel. Before the award of this contract, the roads to these villages were partially motorable in the rainy season. But as soon as the DFRRI contractors brought their caterpillars, gully erosion on these roads set in on a large scale.

The most painful case, is that of Dengi-Kafel road. Instead of them to continue with the abandoned road along which culverts have already been constructed, they embarked on a new one which is totally of no use to the community.

This new road is the one constructed along Kwal-Namaram to Kafel. This road, which is meant for Kafel, will not be motorable from Namaram-Kafel because of the swampy nature of the soil for about 5 kilometres.

That of Dengi to Garga is a complete mess, because the few vehicles that used to ply the road can no longer use it.

About water, light and food, Kanem Local Government doesn't know that it is part of the Directorate's responsibility, because at present nothing has been done in that respect.

Abdullahi Musa,
Dengi, Plateau State

Readers Write on DFRRI

Where's Our Share?

that the same Gongola State is receiving a pass mark? Have they developed their rural areas overnight?

As far as I am aware, no government functionaries from the state capital have ever visited Dampar town due to lack of motorable road. Most of them have always ended their official visits at the LG headquarters, Wukari, which is a long distance from Dampar. For instance when the Commissioner for Local Government, on an official visit in May this year, was told that he could not reach Dampar by road, but would have to go through the River Benue, he quickly dashed back to Yola.

If the state branch of DFRRI would like the rural dwellers of Dampar and Sarkin Kudu areas to taken them seriously, then there is an urgent need for them to mobilise all the huge resources at their disposal for the immediate construction of an all year access road between Dampar and Sarkin Kudu so as to make life better for the people. I demand this as part of our communities' share of the "N1 Billion Bonanza" from DFRRI, if I may quote *The Analyst*.

Atoshi G. Zaku,
Dampar, Gongola State



Going through your issue on DFRRI (Vol.2, No.3) and reading Dr. J. J. Gana's reaction and his mention of Ondo State as a success story in DFRRI rural road construction, I would like Nigerians and DFRRI to know that the following Federal roads in my Local Government Area are not yet constructed (tarred) as claimed by DFRRI officials:

1. Owo-Ikare road.
2. Ikare-Arigidi-Oke Agba-Omuo-Kabba road.

All the above named roads are 100% Federal roads, and DFRRI's claims in this part of Ondo are false. All the above named roads are death traps, and have been so for the past 15 years.

Therefore I would like Dr. Gana to go and see things for himself again in this area.

As one of *The Analyst's* many readers, I really appreciate the magazine's efforts in exposing DFRRI's shortcomings and failures.

J. A. Ayesa,
Kaduna

In your issue Vol.2, No.3, Dr. J. J. Gana made mention of some states in which the impact of DFRRI is said to be seriously felt. To me and other well-meaning citizens, his assessment of DFRRI is less than honest. In fact, to be sincere, the presence of DFRRI in some localities is not being felt at all.

For instance, we the people of Agatu community in Benue State haven't felt any activity of the DFRRI in our area since the inception of the programme. There was and is still not one kilometre of road that has been constructed in that corner of the country. The existing bad road leading to the place has not been rehabilitated, nor new ones opened up till today.

It seems that what DFRRI has been doing is that in a Local Government Area, it just singles out one particular village in which to concentrate its work and then it claims later that the whole LGA has been developed by DFRRI.

David Ubaba Egahi,
Otukpo, Benue State

EDITOR'S NOTE:

The letters published here are only a few of the many we've been getting from readers across the country in response to our invitation, contained in our last issue (Vol.2, No. 3), for people to write to us on how DFRRI is doing in their locality. Don't be left out. Write NOW to us and share your views and observations with others on DFRRI's performance, or lack of it, in your locality.

—Editor

LEADERS OR LOOTERS?

Traditional Rulers in Nigeria

In the heat of the Constituent Assembly debates of 1977-78, when the chieftaincy institutions in the country were under strong attack from popular and democratic forces, one of the leading royal personages of Sokoto, Alhaji Shehu Malami, the Sarkin Sudan of Wurno, was constrained to come to the defence of the decaying institutions. "As we progress to true nationhood," Shehu Malami argued on the floor of the Constituent Assembly, "let us not imagine that the future will be crisis-free. Crises and problems there will be. . . . Therefore, every institution that can contribute to stability and the speedy resolution of disputes and crises must be preserved. Over the years, whether it be under the British colonial rule, civilian rule after independence, or even under military

rule, with the strong weapon of coercion at its disposal, traditional rulers have been called upon and used to stabilise crisis situations."

As it eventually turned out, Malami's argument did not impress the majority of the Constituent Assembly members who went ahead to reject suggestions and recommendations made by many people, including even the C.D.C.'s sub-committee on the Executive and the Legislature, that these so-called traditional rulers be granted legislative and executive roles in the Senate and at the state level.

But if Malami's spectre of a crisis-bedevelled future for Nigeria without traditional rulers was not sufficient to frighten the members of the Constituent Assembly into conceding, formally at least, an important role for these feudal lords in the public life of the country, it was nonetheless taken very seriously by all succeeding Nigerian Heads of State beginning with Alhaji Shehu Shagari.

Shagari's policy towards these feudal institutions was clear enough right from the beginning. For instance, while paying a courtesy call on the Elegbe of Egbe in Kwara State in April 1979, the then NPN presidential candidate Alhaji Shehu Shagari, promised that "the position of traditional rulers in the country would be adequately promoted in order to enhance their dignity and control over their subjects." (*New Nigerian*, 2nd April, 1979) This policy of courting and buying traditional rulers was religiously pursued by the Shagari regime throughout its tenure.

But the Shagari regime was not alone in this. Shagari's successor, Major-General Muhammadu Buhari, may have looked tougher, more abrasive and unsmiling, but his was a toughness directed at the workers, peasants and other subordinate groups, and never at the traditional rulers. For instance, while swearing in his Military Governors, on 5th January 1984, Buhari told them that "you must make every effort to maintain a good relationship with traditional rulers in your states. Try to understand the system of traditional rulership which exists in your state. Whether you are an indigene of the state or not you will find that it is in your best interest to study the recognised system of traditional rulership."

This path of courting and promoting the interests of the Chiefs, Obas and Emirs has in essence continued to be followed by even the present administration, the noises by government officials to the contrary notwithstanding. It is true, of course, that President Ibrahim Babangida at the



"What a Father!"

swearing in of the new Military Governors on Monday, 2nd September 1985 did not make even a single reference to traditional rulers. But this was more a result of the popular struggles of the people against the oppressive tendencies of his predecessor than a mark of the anti-feudal commitments of the new set of leaders.

However, whatever claims are made for it by such millionaire princes like Shehu Malami, and no matter what support it receives from governments, the incontrovertible fact remains that for the vast majority of Nigerians, the traditional rulers are not only unpopular but constitute a source of oppression, exploitation and instability to the society and a drag on the progressive transformation and advance of the country, both socially and economically.

This much has been succinctly brought out by a one-time Military Governor of Oyo State, Major-General D. M. Jemibewon, in his book *A Combatant in Government*:

"... What makes the issue of chieftaincy so significant to any government is the fact that the disputes and wranglings that go with them produce sharp cleavages in the community, splitting the society into hostile and warring factions. From this situation it is a short step to the breakdown of law and order. Again a situation in which the actual breakdown of law and order is constantly almost a reality is not one conducive to the promotion of social and economic development." (pp. 132-133)

Indeed, Jemibewon's position has been reaffirmed by the findings of the Government-appointed Political Bureau, which after an extensive tour of the country, collecting and collating the opinions of a wide spectrum of the populace, reported thus:

"It is a misnomer, considering the scope and character of the contemporary Nigerian State to call them traditional 'rulers'. They possess no special qualities to enable them to be used in enriching the political system or instilling moral rectitude in public life. It will therefore make no sense to install in the political system, people whose primary qualification is ascribed to status at a time when the people are demanding a truly democratic polity."

Having thus reported, the Political Bureau went ahead to recommend that the role of these so-called traditional rulers should be "confined to the local government areas within their communities where they have relevance", adding that "even here, however, they should not be granted legislative, executive, or judicial functions." This recommendation has been accepted by the Government with the additional provision that the Constitution would be amended "to reflect the decisions contained in the White Paper on the Dasuki Report."

More on the implications of this additional provision soon. For now, it is sufficient to observe that the Political Bureau's Report on the role of traditional rulers, and Government's decision to accept the Report's recom-

mendation, have not only sent jitters down the spines of these so-called blue-blooded parasites, but have also elicited hot-headed reactions from some of them, and from their large retinue of palace courtiers, court servants, business clientele and other jesters.



Shehu Malami — millionaire prince.

Since the publication of the Bureau's Report and Government's views on same, these royal leeches have scurried to Kaduna, Ibadan, Lagos and Enugu to hold nocturnal meetings on what to do. They have used every excuse to go abroad to meet and discuss a plan of action. They have scoured hired megaphones to write in the press, extolling the noble virtues of Chiefs, Emirs and Obas and their role in social mobilization, economic recovery and political stability.

But what is the truth about the real role of chiefs in the social and political life of this country? To answer this question satisfactorily we have to go back a little bit into history.

HISTORY

Few people will deny that in their earliest beginnings, chiefs and kings and the feudal systems they headed constituted a major advance in the evolution of political communities. In most parts of this country where they evolved — like the *Kasar Hausa*, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Lower Niger — chiefs and kings were part of advanced social systems responsible for the settling down of formerly pastoral and nomadic people into farming communities; and for the organisation of society into larger political communities which transcended family and lineage groups, and encompassed a wide range of lineages, clans and other groupings knit together through marriage alliances and other forms of cooperation and linkages.

The role of Mai Ali Gaji Dunomami Zainami, who ruled in the Kanem-Borno kingdom between 1470 and 1503 is particularly remarkable in this respect. He founded the capital of the kingdom at Birni Ngazargamo by concentrating labour and capital, thus giving a basis for an advanced urban economy based on crafts, commerce and intensive agriculture.

Similarly, in the South Western part of present-day Nigeria, Oba Udagbedo of the Kingdom of Benin, who ruled between 1299 and 1334, promoted and encouraged agricultural cultivation through the mobilisation of people and labour concentrated in large and ethnically-varied settlements.

But even then, however, these same rulers were highly oppressive of the people they ruled. Not only did they coerce their subjects into forced labour — building palaces, walls, and working on the farms of these nobles, serving as cannon fodder in punitive wars and expeditions whose main aim was simply plunder — but the people were heavily burdened with various forms of taxes.

people — and almost everywhere their greed and self-centredness had led to civil strife and disorders. All these made the colonial conquest of Nigeria not only feasible, but an easy affair.

COLONIALISM

Ever since the colonial conquest of Nigeria, and the abject capitulation of these institutions to imperial forces, traditional rulers have ceased to have any legitimacy in the eyes of the people of this country. That they have all these years continued to exist, and to even be given key roles in the administration of the country, and to be paraded around as leaders of the people, is not because they are fathers of the nation or custodians of our culture



Sardauna — in jail in 1943 over cattle tax.



Ooni of Ife — in court over affair with mother and her daughter.



Shoun of Ogbomoso — still looking for his predecessor's head

By the beginning of the 17th century, most of these chiefs or traditional institutions had outlived their usefulness as forces for the advancement of society. As a result of a combination of factors — e.g., advances in the productive capacity of society, corruption of power, excessive repression, the enslavement of their own people, and narrow access to participation in public life — these rulers had lost their credibility in the eyes of their subjects, and the feudal institutions themselves had become incapable of advancing.

The extent of this degeneration in Hausaland has been aptly described by Shehu Usman dan Fodio in his book, *Kitab al-Farq*, where he described the system of rule in the region before the Jihad in these terms:

“One of the ways of their government is succession to the emirate by hereditary right and by force to the exclusion of consultation. And . . . the building of their sovereignty upon three things: the people’s persons, their honour, and their possessions; and whomsoever they wish to kill or exile or violate his honour or devour his wealth they do so in pursuit of their lust.”

The Jihad which Shehu Usman dan Fodio himself led was aimed at abolishing these obnoxious practices in the political life of the community. Its successes in this direction were however limited. By the end of the 19th century the Emirs, Obas and Chiefs in the Nigerian area had lost their credibility in the eyes of the ordinary

— as their apologists would want us to believe but rather because they have proved very useful stooges of the successive governments since the imposition of colonial rule up to the present.

Nothing better illustrates this than the Oath of Office which these chiefs gladly and obediently took on assumption of office during the colonial days. This Oath framed by Lord Lugard, read:

“I swear in the name of God to well and truly serve His Majesty, King George V and his representative the Governor-General of Nigeria, to obey the laws of Nigeria and the lawful commands of the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor . . . I will cherish in my heart no treachery or disloyalty . . .”

If this does not amount to a shameless betrayal of their peoples, and of the independence, self-respect and dignity of the Nigerian communities, then the English had better look for another word to describe betrayal.

LAND

But nowhere perhaps is this betrayal better seen than in their role over control of land. Chiefs and Emirs have since colonial imposition been made to service the interests of imperialism in many ways. One of these is through control over land. British colonialism needed the Chiefs to serve as overseers, policemen, and tax collectors for the colonial government and foreign business

COVER STORY

concerns. In order to make this possible, the British as conquerors took over all the land, but left direct supervision over it to the Chiefs and Emirs.

This new reality was clearly expressed in Lugard's Land and Native Rights Ordinance which, while vesting the control over all Native lands in the Governor, in practice left the control or occupation of these, in the Northern provinces at least, in the hands of the chiefs.

This colonial land situation still prevails — in spite of the attempts made in the Land Use Act of 1978 to establish the principle that land belongs to all Nigerians. The preamble to that Act reads, in part:

"... it is (also) in the public interest that the rights of all Nigerians to use and enjoy land in Nigeria and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves and their families should be assured, protected and preserved."

This principle has, of course, been observed more in the breach than otherwise, as several examples of the utter disregard of it by our so-called traditional rulers amply demonstrate. A few examples would suffice here.

A few years ago, for instance, an official investigation revealed that almost all the compensation of over five million naira paid by the Federal Government for land on which the Idah Polytechnic was built was cornered by the Attah of Igala, Alhaji Aliyu Obaje, on the dubious ground that the land was his own, although the people of the area were using it.

Similarly, in October 1986, one of the most popular Military Governors Nigeria has had, in almost seventeen years, Colonel Yohanna Madaki (rtd.) was sacked and dismissed from the Army principally because he dared to depose Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur as Emir of Muri. One of the reasons for the deposition was that Alhaji Umaru grabbed for himself N249,842.26 in compensation meant for 402 peasant farmers. This compensation had been paid by a foreign company called Al-Hilal Agric Processing Industries Ltd. for acquiring 25,000 hectares of peasant holdings in 1983, at Lau in Jalingo. This is in addition to the 95,000 hectares of land which the ex-Emir had personally acquired at Bakundi and Dakka districts of Bali L.G.A. in contemptuous disregard of the provisions of the Land Use Act.

The Land Investigation Committee set up by the Kaduna State Government in 1979 also reveals the extent to which these so-called traditional rulers go to subvert and undermine the very basis of the livelihood of the vast majority of peasant producers for their own selfish interests and the interests of multinational companies and Nigerian businessmen. One such example is the case of Usman Isa, Zubairu, Sallau, and Mallam Sanda of Daura Local Government Area. The four complained to the Committee that "their farmlands were seized in Daka and converted into *gandun sarki* (Emir's Estate)."

The *Sarki* (Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar) cultivated the farmland using the labour of the former owners. "Then after that he gave the farmlands to Alhaji Salisu Daura," (a big business man).

But this outrageous land robbery is not restricted to

"chiefs produce sharp cleavages in Nigeria."
Maj. Gen. Jemibewon

the past. It continues even today.

The on-going court revelations of how the District Head of Bakori, Alhaji Tukur Idris, in collusion with the Emir of Katsina, is desperately trying to dispossess the peasants of Dogon Dawa and Maiyadiya of their farmlands and hand these over to a rich businessman, Alhaji Hassan Alhassan (*The Analyst*, vol.2, nos. 1-4) further illustrates the ways in which these chiefs, by virtue of their control over land, loot resources which truly belong to the society at large.

Indeed, so central is this control over land to these chiefs that they fight like wildcats over it, even amongst themselves. Right now, Benin is being shaken by a dispute between the Oba of Benin, Omo N'oba N'Edo Oba Erediauwa and his mother, the Iyoba of Urelu, basically over the control of the allocation of titles and the land which goes with these.

TAXES AND LEVIES

But if land is a major source of the wealth, power and arrogance of these chiefs, so is their role as tax collectors. As early as the late 18th century, Usman dan Fodio listed about two hundred different types of taxes which the chiefs of *Kasar Hausa* extracted from their subjects. Taxes were levied even on windows, latrines, marriages and even palm trees and vegetables.

In spite of the feeble attempt made by British colonial rule to abolish some of the most irrational of these taxes, and to systematize their collection, taxes and levies remained a major pillar of the colonial administration, and chiefs and Emirs continued to be the actual collectors, in the process of which they made fortunes for themselves. In fact, the man who later became the Premier of Northern Nigeria and who is currently being glorified as the epitome of traditional integrity, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was charged and convicted for lining his pockets with the proceeds of *jangali* (cattle tax) in 1943 when he was in the Sokoto Native Administration. A high court later reversed the conviction.


This role of tax collection has continued into the present day, and it is indeed a key source not only of the wealth of those chiefs and Emirs, but also of their power to oppress the people.

But the role of the chiefs in the looting of the wealth of Nigeria does not end with the control over land or the extraction of unjust taxes from the poor and needy. In their intimate and self-serving collaboration with multinational corporations, and their rape of public treasuries through semi-legal and outright illegal acquisitions, the chiefs have played a leading role in sinking the country into its present travails, even though none of them has yet to be taken before any Special (or even ordinary) Military Tribunal for sabotage.

As far back as the early 1960's, for instance, a government White Paper on the reorganisation of the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation (presently called the New Nigeria Development Company, NNDC), showed that Emirs, princes, and members of the Emirate Councils had used their positions to acquire "loans" from the company through dubious procedures.

For example, the committee that looked into the affairs of the NNDC observed that the then Minister of Economic Planning, Alhaji Muhammadu Bashar (the present Emir of Daura) who was at the time the *Wamban Daura* "... personally engaged himself in transactions some of which have proved of little benefit either to the Region or to the Corporation."

More recently, we have seen how the Emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Sulu Gambari, was said to have been involved, along with a British-born Arab woman, Mrs. Mahmet Bahia Bin Chambi, in the incorporation of a company, Glauber Enterprises (Nig) Ltd., which was involved in an attempt to illegally transfer a whopping N98 million abroad. The company is a subsidiary of the New York-based company, Glauber of U.S.A. Chambi was found guilty and jailed; Sulu Gambari was not even asked to testify, by the "no-nonsense" Buhari/Idiagbon regime.



Mohammadu Bashar of Daura — granted NNDC loan to himself.

This close linkage between Emirs and Chiefs with imperialism and foreign businessmen may be further glimpsed from the directorships which almost all of them occupy in the boards of these powerful channels for the sucking of the products of the sweat of Nigerian workers and peasants, and from the abundant resources which God in his infinite mercy and wisdom has bestowed on our nation. Here is a random sampling of these directorships, which raises the question of who exactly are these traditional rulers ruling for? The people of Nigeria? Or foreign multinationals?

SOME NIGERIAN CHIEFS WHO ARE MAJOR DIRECTORS OF NIGERIAN SUBSIDIARIES OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES

<u>Foreign Multinational</u>	<u>Nigerian Subsidiary</u>	<u>Nigerian Chief</u>
Tate and Lyle of U.K.	Tate and Lyle (Nig) Ltd.	Solomon Akenzua, Oba of Benin
Unilever of U.K.	U.A.C. (Nig) Ltd.	Shehu Idris, Emir of Zaria
Mobil Inc. of U.S.A.	Mobil (Nig) Ltd.	Alphonsos Ofala Okagbuei, Obi of Onitsha
Inchape Holdings of U.K.	Bewac (Nig) Ltd.	Ado Bayero, Emir of Kano
Degremont of France	Degremont (Nig) Ltd.	A. A. Sijuade, Ooni of Ife
Henkel of W. Germany	Henkels Chemicals (Nig) Ltd	Umaru Ndayako, Etsu Nupe
Lennards of U.K.	Lennards (Nig) Ltd.	Nelson Asigharo Nene-Afejuku, Eson of Warri
Glauber of U.S.A.	Glauber Enterprises (Nig)	Sulu Gambari, Emir of Ilorin
Hoechst of W. Germany	Nigerian Hoechst (Ltd)	Abali Muhammadu, Emir of Fika

On the home front, these chiefs have tended to consolidate their influence and power through a complex and interlocking network of proteges in the local, state and federal government bureaucracies. Most senior police and military officers, judges, magistrates and *alkalai*, top permanent secretaries, directors of government corporations and companies, as well as prison superintendents, are either the sons of these chiefs and emirs, or the sons of their immediate subordinates or palace slaves and court jesters.

Even those few highly placed public officers who happen not to be in any way connected with the 'royal' households, have had to either marry from the right families, or have had their independence from these people subverted or compromised through all sorts of deals and favours received from these so-called traditional chiefs.

Perhaps the most graphic illustration of this interlocking linkage comes from the many instances of top-level civil servants retiring from the service only to become chiefs of this and that place, or an Emir of this or that locality.

Again, a few examples: The present Etsu Nupe, Alhaji Umaru Sanda Ndayako, was a Federal Deputy Permanent Secretary (Cabinet Office) and speech writer to the former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, before



Yohanna Madaki — sacked for deposing Emir of Muri.

retiring to become the Etsu Nupe. Similarly, the present Oba of Benin, Omo Erediauwa, was formerly an Oxford-trained Federal Permanent Secretary before retiring to Benin to wear some beads and feathers and parade himself around half-naked in public as the Chief of a long-defunct kingdom. Again, the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, was formerly a top ambassador of the country before electing to go back to the dark recesses of his ancestors bedecked in bandage-like turbans and cumbersome regalia. The Emir of Bauchi, Alhaji Suleiman Adamu Jumba, was also a top federal bureaucrat.

It is these types of linkages in the civil service, the

police, the military and the judiciary, which allow these so-called traditional rulers to exercise considerable power and influence in the affairs of state, and in public affairs. It is also these linkages which give them the arrogance and confidence to treat other Nigerians as if they are simply chattel — an arrogance which only recently was demonstrated by the unbelievable announcement by the Olubadan of Ibadan, Oba Oloyede Asanike I, that he had given former Governor of Oyo, Chief Bola Ige, up to the end of August to get out of Ibadan or be forcefully ejected!

WOMEN

They may like to pride themselves as the custodians of our traditions and culture. But the hard evidence before us does not support this. If anything, the destruction which these rulers do to our cultures and traditions, particularly in the ways they treat women, is everywhere evident. As early as the third quarter of the 18th century, the great jihadist scholar and reformer, Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, condemned their practices in this respect in *Kitab al-Farq* when he said: "... one of the ways of their government is to place many women in their houses until the number of women of some of them amounts to one thousand or more."

Today, more than two hundred years after Dan Fodio's criticism, the same retrograde practice continues unabated by even those of them who inherited their positions as a result of the Jihad which Dan Fodio led.

For instance, after the deposition of the Emir of Muri, Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur, last year, many parents in Muri and the surrounding areas rushed to the palace to retrieve their daughters who had been abducted and kept inside. Indeed, everyone who knows anything about these so-called traditional rulers knows very well that the case of Muri is no exception. Most of them have more than fifty young — often underage — girls, forcefully locked up in their harems. And in February 1985, Oba Sijuade Okunade, the Ooni of Ife, was sued by Chief Harold Sodipo for putting the latter's daughter in the family way, and he also accused the Ooni of having an affair with the mother of the girl as well.


CONCLUSION

It is obvious from the foregoing that traditional rulers in Nigeria are a major part of the problems of this country, both economically and socially. As a special group in Nigerian society and politics, they lost their legitimacy and historical relevance at least one hundred years ago. Their continued existence today as an institution is detrimental to the peace, progress, stability and democratic practice in this great country, as the Report of the Political Bureau has correctly pointed out.

The present administration should be commended for the patience and fortitude it has shown in accepting the Bureau's recommendation to limit their activities to their respective local governments, in spite of the persistent pressures which they and their apologists mounted on the federal authorities.



Bola Ige — ordered out of town.



Olubadan — law unto himself?



Emir of Ilorin — his company attempted illegal transfer of foreign exchange.

But having said so, we must nevertheless hurry to caution that by providing that the constitution shall be amended to reflect the Government's White Paper on the Dasuki Report on local governments, this administration is inadvertently subverting, compromising and contradicting this patriotic posture.

The Dasuki Report actually recommended the return of the appointment, remuneration and disciplining of village and district heads to the Emirate and Traditional Councils. This runs against the grain, not only of the government's own White Paper on the Political Bureau Report but even of the 1976 Local Government reforms, and against the general trend the world over towards more democratic and popular leadership.

Indeed, even the provisions in the Government's White Paper for the exclusion of traditional rulers from executive, judicial and legislative roles would become meaningless unless it is backed up with grass roots democracy and popular participation and control of all

the affairs of the communities.

In concrete terms, this popular and democratic control would have to involve the massive and genuine mobilisation of the workers, peasants and other oppressed classes, in both the rural and urban areas, into popularly-elected committees which would handle such crucial issues as land, security, supervision of the police and the judiciary, school administration, factories and other related matters which directly affect their lives.

It is the historic responsibility of workers, peasants, and all other oppressed classes to struggle, agitate, mobilise and organise to throw off the yoke of these traditional looters and their backers. But the military has a responsibility, if not to create the conditions which will allow this to happen, at least to refrain from obstructing it.

Richard Umaru and Alkassum Abba, with Bala Usman and Mohammed Ahmed Modibbo

Peasant Revolts Against Chiefs

'Blood is thicker than water', says an English proverb, indicating the importance of brotherhood and kinship bonds among people. However, in most societies, such brotherhood is not based on the conventional family relations, but on real and concrete class relations. This is why in such societies, there are two types of blood. There is the blood of the rich and powerful, which is being preserved and protected by all means and at all costs, because it is the one which is thicker than water! On the other hand, there is the blood

of the poor and weak — who labour and suffer to maintain the entire society which is given no respect or protection because it is seen by the rich and powerful as not being thicker than water!

Events at Rafin Gora in Bakori District of Katsina Province in the former Northern Region (now in Kaduna State) in 1964-65, and in the former Western State between 1968-70 aptly demonstrate the above contention, and are glaring examples of peasants' protest against, and rejection of, chiefs. From

appearances, the link between the peasants of Rafin Gora village and the peasants of the former Western State of Nigeria, particularly the members of the *Egbe Agbekoya*, may not be immediately obvious. Rafin Gora, for instance, is just a small village in the present Funtua Local Government Area of Kaduna State. The village is not just small in size, but it is also remote because of its inaccessibility by road in spite of being close to a highway, and despite the much publicised activities of the Directorate of Food, Roads and

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
Rural Infrastructure. *Egbe Agbekoya*, on the other hand, was a peasant movement in the former Western State of Nigeria, particularly in the cocoa-growing areas.

The link between Rafin Gora and *Egbe Agbekoya* is to be found in their militancy and struggle against social injustice and political repression. During the First Republic, the peasants of Rafin Gora joined a radical, anti-feudal political party, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), in order to fight, defend, and protect their major means of existence — farmlands — and to ensure social justice. But the local feudal lords, the Native Authority which they ran, and indeed their political party, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) and its government under the leadership of the Sokoto royal prince, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, which they imposed on Northern Nigeria, refused to allow the poor peasants of Rafin Gora to live in peace.

Their contempt, fear and hatred for these poor peasants of Rafin Gora was so intense, and so strong, that a whole fleet of Ferret armoured cars, with soldiers and police, was dispatched to this small village under the command of a royal prince from Katsina, the then Captain Hassan Usman Katsina. Under the guidance of the Village Head of Rafin Gora, Magajin Tandama, and a *Wakili* (Deputy) of the Bakori District Head, Alhaji Tukur Idris Bakori, (who became an N.P.N. legislator in the Kaduna State House of Assembly in the Second Republic, and who is presently the District Head of Bakori), Rafin Gora was razed to the ground during the two days of military operations. At least 70 houses were completely burnt down, and many people were savagely murdered, including women and children. The entire village was dispersed. Some of the villagers migrated to far away Borno Province to seek for shelter. It was not until 1967 that these peasants were granted permission to re-settle in their own village.

What is noteworthy in this

tragedy of the poor peasants of Rafin Gora is the fact that the village, and the people, were brutalized, ravaged, killed, maimed, and finally dispersed, in an attack by soldiers and police in which "their" traditional rulers played an active part, if not a decisive role. This is important because for many years now, lies have been dished out that the so-called traditional rulers are "fathers" of their people, their "real" representatives, and most "trusted" leaders, over and above even popularly elected leadership. Now we can see the type of "fathers" they are in real terms. Indeed, if blood is thicker than water, it is the blood of the rich, and not that of the poor! For, blood classification is done economically, socially and politically and not just biologically. This is why some people are called 'blue-blood' and royal, and some are called commoners, no matter the positions they hold in the land..



*Odemo of Ishara
— a taste of people's justice.*

So much for Rafin Gora. What about the *Egbe Agbekoya*? The rich and powerful in our society often say that peasants are a difficult people, or even that they are an ungrateful lot. Yes, they are correct -- if difficulty and ingratitude have to do with the peasants' defence of their cherished farmlands and rejection of harsh and unjustified taxes. This is what a large number of peasants in the former Western State did

between 1968-70. When poll tax was raised from 3 to 6 pounds per head, which amounted to a 100 per cent increase, in addition to other taxes; and the peasants were intimidated by tax collectors and the traditional rulers, they revolted. They formed a movement called *Egbe Agbekoya*, to defend their rights. "Agbekoya" in the Yoruba language simply means "farmers reject suffering." The activities of *Agbekoya* made it nearly impossible for both the Obas and their tax collectors to collect the various taxes imposed. For example, in 1969, the Ibadan District Council was able to collect only 8,938 pounds by the month of June, out of an estimated revenue of 94,581 pounds.

For standing firm on the tax issue, and staging demonstrations in front of the palaces of the Obas, these peasants were shot and killed. In Ibadan alone, 84 of them were killed, while 36 were killed at Egba and 25 at Ogbomosho. Given the advantage of their numbers and organisational strength, the peasants also inflicted devastating blows on their traditional oppressors, who are now being paraded around as "natural" rulers. For example, on 9th November, 1968, the peasants of Ishara attacked, beat up, and fired at the Odemo of Ishara, Oba Samuel Akinsanya. He was accused of travelling to Shagamu town to bring soldiers to forcefully collect taxes. His palace was burnt down, together with the property he amassed worth £12,139/14s/0 including his Mercedes Benz car with registration number WR 232. At Ogbomosho, the peasants killed the traditional ruler, the Shoun, Oba Lajide Layode. His head has never been seen since.

Such is the real relationship between traditional rulers and their peasant subjects. This relationship brings out more graphically than anything else, why these so-called traditional rulers have to be abolished if there is going to be any progress, peace and stability in this sleeping giant of Africa.

By Alkassum Abba

Chieftaincy in Igboland

In most parts of Igboland, prior to the British conquest, land — on which the lives of the people depended — was communally owned. Only the community had the right to allocate land to an individual for farming purposes. To be sure, there were some forms of exchange, but the people cultivated the land mainly to produce what they would eat and the remainder would then be put back into the soil during the next farming season. There were also blacksmiths, and other craftsmen who provided essential services.

Because of the communal ownership of the major means of production, decisions affecting the community were taken collectively. That is why there were in Igboland, lineage, clan and village assemblies where all adults of the right age sat and decided matters, including settling disputes between members or between lineages or clans as the case demanded.

Authority was therefore dispersed as there was no hierarchy. What existed was what has been called "democratic village republics". Secret Societies also helped in the regulation of political affairs.

These Igbo societies were, however, in transition as increase in population, improvements in the techniques of production and other developments had led to some people producing more than they needed to feed their families and other dependents. They deployed this surplus in acquiring titles and purchasing the membership of secret societies. These conferred greater political power on holders. In places like Onitsha, Oguta and Asaba, however, such internal factors like those mentioned above, plus external influences, probably from Benin, had led to the emergence of tiny groups who subjugated the majority and extorted taxes, tributes, tolls, forced labour, etc. from them. These groups set up relatively centralised political authorities (with army, police, courts, etc) to enable them to carry out this project and to prevent the oppressed majority organising to stop their privileges. Many of such oppressed people migrated outside the kingdoms due to these brutalities, which were legitimised with religious myths. But even in these latter places, owing to the large amounts of power wielded by the segments and age-grades, no thorough-going oligarchy emerged as was the case in the Northern emirates or the Yoruba and Benin kingdoms. In short, at the start of British colonial rule, no Igbo community had a ruler who would be made, without violating tradition, to play the role of a chief under the indirect rule system, whereby a chief became the source of executive authority in his community.

The economic foundation on which the British based their rule was one in which the means of production (land, factories, etc.) were no longer owned by the whole people but by a few non-producing members; in which

what was produced was mainly to be traded upon not used; and in which the making of profit (to be sent to Britain) governed production. To achieve these objectives, the then existing situation dictated that they use local agents. Hence the indirect rule system. Because of the absence of powerful, recognizable chiefs in Igbo land, they appointed "Warrant Chiefs".

Although their declared intention was to rule through the "traditional rulers", the manner of these appointments made nonsense of the declaration. They seemed, at times, to be interested in recruiting energetic and promising individuals who could secure the people's compliance with British policy. Some examples:

Anyigo Agwu was the first warrant chief in Ikwo clan in the Abakaliki Division. "Neither he nor his father", it was said, "was a village head before the coming of the whiteman". At a meeting of the representatives of the clan's villages, after the clan's subjugation by British forces, a whiteman just called him out and made him a chief believing he would be a courageous man, able to



Obi of Onitsha — Director of Mobil Oil (Nig) Ltd.

provide effective leadership. Also, two of those called out to be chiefs in Oraukwu had helped to induce the people to surrender their guns during the first visit of the soldiers. Similarly Okereke Udensi, an Aro, was made a warrant chief of Ihiala, a non-Aro community, because he helped induce the people to surrender.

Later, some of these warrant chiefs were made paramount chiefs, Sole Native Authorities and Permanent Presidents of native courts in order to achieve centralization. This had disastrous consequences. For example, Chief Walter Amobi of Ogidi Native Court District was said to have used his position as Native Authority to seize lands from his neighbours. So did many others.

“The intensification of the struggle over chieftaincy has been accompanied by increased exploitation and oppression of the poor in Igboland. Chiefs continue to grab the lands of the poor either for personal use or for allocation to wealthy businessmen and companies.”

Through these rulers, the British imposed and collected taxes, secured forced labour for constructing roads, bridges, railways, jails, rest houses, etc. The people resisted these repressive measures, the most explosive protest being the Aba women's uprising of 1929-30, when the Igbo women organised and resisted oppressive tax policies.

In 1960, the British handed over power to those Nigerians groomed to continue with these oppressive policies. On the face of it Nigeria became independent, but in reality, Britain particularly continued to exert a dominant control on the Nigerian economy, and, of course, to ensure that their companies operating here like U.A.C., Shell, First Bank, John Holt, etc. made huge profits. Just as the British did, the new leaders who took over power (the Awolowos, the Sardaunas, and the Azikiwes) continued to use the chiefs to oppress their people as well as to get political support. The chiefs became members of political parties in the new local government structure.

During the Nigeria-Biafra war, Igbo chiefs became even more powerful as the government of Biafra relied heavily on them. In fact, Ojukwu consulted influential ones before announcing secession. They spied on, and helped in conscripting 'able-bodied' men to fight the war. They appropriated a lot of relief materials meant for their kwashiorkor-ridden people. Some also seized material donations from their people (like clothes) meant for soldiers.

Apart from this, many chiefs also used their offices to seize communal lands, collect tolls from markets in their domain, evade taxes, rates and levies (they are rate agents anyway). Many of them also used their positions to: collect fees from those on whom they confer chieftaincy titles (which soon proliferated); collect levies from men who give their daughters out in marriage; collect fees and

finances from those who appear in the courts they set up and preside over; and appropriate scarce commodities meant for their people. On top of all this, they collect salaries from the government. The recent directive that university students should get letters from influential people who can vouch for their character has opened up another gold mine for the chiefs. Some charge as much as N10 to give such letters.

These material benefits and a lot more account for the present fierce and ruthless struggles to become chiefs in Igboland. These have been intensified by the new chieftaincy edicts which do not recognise automatic inheritance of a title by the son of a dead chief. Many

communities have been torn apart as a result. The edicts enabled retired top public servants, wealthy businessmen, contractors, lawyers and other professionals to grab the titles from less wealthy aspirants. Many of them secured these titles through the Chieftaincy Disputes Tribunal set up to resolve the most difficult cases.

The intensification of the struggle over chieftaincy has been accompanied by increased exploitation and oppression of the poor in Igboland. Chiefs continue to grab the lands of the poor either for personal use or for allocation to wealthy businessmen and companies. Chief Celestine Ezerioha of Iitewerri is alleged to be involved in the seizure of peasants' land in Oluoogu kindred by some wealthy people, among whom is his brother. It has become a court matter.

Although more and more people are becoming increasingly aware of the oppressive activities of these rulers, the end to this moribund institution will not come under the existing order of things. For one thing, an increasing number of wealthy and influential people are today taking all sorts of chieftaincy titles. These include university dons, professionals, big businessmen and even students of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Also accounting for the institution's persistence is the use to which our modern rulers, both in the economic and political spheres, put these 'traditional' rulers. Currently, chiefs in Imo State are compiling new lists of taxable adults (whether they have jobs or not), as directed by the state government.

The solution seems to lie in the oppressed people waging sustained popular struggles against the system that utilises the chieftaincy institution. This way, the 'Aba women' who were shot and killed by the colonial police would not have died in vain.

By Andy Okolie

Feudal Greed and Treachery at Keffi

Thursday, May 28th 1986. The Emir's palace at Keffi, Plateau State. For the Emir, Alhaji Chindo Yamusa II, the day started as any other day, his activities following the same age-old routine: an early morning breakfast in the inner chambers, a short walk to the main court to receive greetings from title holders, courtiers, friends and well-wishers, as well as attend to official and personal matters, a retreat back to the inner chambers in the early afternoon for lunch and rest. It would have ended as any normal day too, with another court session in the evening, dinner in the inner chambers and discussions with title holders and close friends till late in the night. But that was not to be.

For, in the afternoon of that day, as the palace slowly regained its peace and quiet after the usually noisy morning session, the Emir got a most unusual visit from the most unlikely quarters. The Emir's "visitors" — scores of his "subjects" from a nearby village called Unguwar Tudu — who literally stormed the palace, brought along with them four dead bodies — casualties of a police raid on their village earlier that day. Their mission: to show the bodies to the Emir and then take him with them back to the village, dead or alive.

In the pandemonium that ensued, Emir Chindo Yamusa managed to escape by, it is said, disguising himself as a palace courtier, climbing the high wall surrounding his palace and jumping down on the other side — and scrambling for dear life. After about an hour's occupation of the palace and the throne, the "visitors" left, carrying the four dead bodies with them, completely unchallenged by anyone in the palace or outside in the town — a measure of the Emir's

popularity.

This incident — which made the headlines and was a subject of an administrative probe by the Plateau State Government — had quite a story behind it. It is a story of the kind of intrigues, treachery, double-dealing, rapacious greed, and the incurable contempt for ordinary people that Nigeria's so-called traditional rulers are best known for; and of the usual collusion between the traditional rulers, law enforcement agencies and powerful forces to oppress and dupe the ordinary people. It is a story also of the growing unpopularity of traditional rulers with the Nigerian populace; and of the increasing awareness among the Nigerian people and of their determination to stand up for their rights.

demand in Europe and America, where they are used in costly rings, bracelets, necklaces, and other items of jewelry.

And this was when the Emir of Keffi, Alhaji Chindo Yamusa II, came into the picture. He was quick to see in this discovery of, and booming business that developed around, these stones in his own domain, a golden opportunity to make easy money. And he was determined to make the most of it. So, he planned and made his moves.

First, through his intermediary, one Maikasuwa Nakaka, he contacted the leading figures involved in the business at Unguwar Tudu and in the Beti community. Then, at a meeting with them, the Emir was said to have laid his cards clearly on the table and

"It is a story of the kind of intrigues, treachery, double-dealing, rapacious greed, and the incurable contempt for ordinary people that Nigeria's so-called traditional rulers are best known for."

The story began in the early 1980s, with the discovery in some villages within the Keffi Local Government Area (Unguwar Tudu in Uke District, Bakin Ayeni and Jenta and Rafin Gabas in Kokona District) of semi-precious and precious stones, like topaz, emerald and tourmaline. By 1984 there was already a "Gold Rush", with individual members of the village communities and mushroom, unlicensed companies scrambling and digging everywhere for the stones. And a booming trade — complete with its network of middlemen, pushers and smugglers — soon developed around these precious stones, which are in high

proposed a deal: his Highness's protection of, and cooperation with, the unlicensed local community miners in exchange for an amount of money and a regular supply from them of the high-quality stones won from the ground. The Emir, it was said, used to insist on being supplied with only the very clear and high quality stones, arguing to the villagers that he needed the stones not to sell out for money, but to keep in the palace as historical monuments. He wanted, it is believed he told the villagers, to go down in history as the Emir during whose tenure the stones were discovered.

This mutual relationship

COVER STORY

continued for some time. But while the villagers kept their part of the bargain, it soon became very clear that the Emir had much less respect for history than for naira. He didn't keep the stones given to him as monuments. He sold them as he sold the yams and corn from his farms. It is said, in fact, that at one time, the Emir made a clean N12,000 from the sale, at Keffi main market, of 130 precious stones given him by the Beti community. Said the White Paper on the Report of the administrative probe on the police/illegal miners' clash: "It could be concluded from the allegations against the Emir that he benefitted corruptly from the existence of illegal miners in the Emirate."

But in his dealings with the miners in the Bakin Ayeni and Jenta areas, where aquamarine is found, the Emir chose a different approach — less subtle but just as successful as the one he used in his relations with the Unguwar Tudu miners. What the Emir used to do, according to very reliable sources, was to send members of the royal family to go and extort money from the miners on the grounds that the lands belonged to his great, great-grandfathers. Failure to play ball was, said the sources, instantly punished by Police raids. So the miners always complied. And the Emir got richer.

Encouraged by this and especially by the high demand for the high quality tourmaline in Unguwar Tudu, the Emir soon began to have other ideas — ideas which were to add a new dimension to his well-oiled links with the illegal miners and to prepare the grounds for the police raid and deaths at Unguwar Tudu and the subsequent "invasion" of the Emir's palace by the villagers. Why not put up a more legitimate front, the Emir thought. He then called, and sold his idea to, the Ciroma of Keffi, Alhaji Hassan Mohammed, a one-time Minister for External Affairs under Shagari. Excited, the Ciroma moved fast, and managed to get a Sri Lankan partner, called Mr. V. Thramatto, and an Ibadan-based businessman, by name Mr. Oladipo, and a mining outfit

called ABDAMA Mining Company Ltd. was floated — with him (Ciroma) as Chairman, and his brother, Abubakar Mohammed as a director. It was incorporated on January 18, 1985.

The incorporation only gave the company permission to enter the mining industry, and NOT a licence to prospect for minerals in any specified area anywhere. To secure a right to prospect for minerals in a specified area, the company must apply for and obtain from the Ministry of Mines, Power and Steel, an EPL (Exclusive Prospecting Licence). ABDAMA put in its application for EPLs on April 7, 1986. But these it never got — at least up to the time of the incident at Unguwar Tudu. Which put ABDAMA in the category of illegal miners.

Although the Emir of Keffi was not officially on the Board of Directors of ABDAMA, he was clearly the company's live wire. For all the contacts with the villagers (the land owners), the Police and the Local Government were done through him. From the comfort of his palace, Emir Chindo Yamusa pulled on the wires, playing on the villagers' intelligence, making the road smooth for ABDAMA, and

lining his pockets in the process, but, at the same time, knocking one head against another in order to gain even more — until, in the end, he outwitted himself and put himself and the company in trouble.

It was especially the high quality tourmaline at Unguwar Tudu that ABDAMA had its greedy eyes on. Unguwar Tudu was, however, under the Exclusive Prospecting Licence of KMS Nig. Lts., one of the many mushroom companies set up purposely for speculating in gem stones. What do to then? The Emir and Ciroma put their heads together and managed to get KMS to transfer its EPL to ABDAMA. But this transfer was done unilaterally, without the necessary approval of the Minister of Mines, which made it illegal.

But with this illegally assigned ELP, ABDAMA set to work. Proceeding in a way that showed their contempt for the ordinary people, ABDAMA owners refused to contact the villagers directly to discuss and negotiate for compensation. Instead they went through the Emir, who, it is said, then sent the District Head of Uke to discuss the issue of compensation with the villagers. The villagers refused to deal. They would not part with their land, they insisted, arguing that it was their lifeline.



Emir in le illeg



Oba of Benin — quarrels with mum over land.

CHIEFS OR

The popular picture of traditional rulers in Nigeria is that of people who are custodians of culture, maintainers of peace, law and order, and upholders of morality. At least this is what the establishment media and other establishment spokespersons would like the world to believe.

Only occasionally do we hear of abuses of power by traditional rulers. Even then, it is presented as the exception rather than the rule. Yet, there are numerous documented cases of Emirs, Chiefs, and Village Heads who, apart from exploiting and repressing their people, have embezzled taxes, embezzled land compensation meant for their subjects, seized land, houses and wives of their subjects, and have committed a host of other crimes against the people.

Below, we present to you a selection of these criminal



of Keffi
ague with
al miners.

The villagers' refusal drew a swift and crude response from the powers that be: a police raid. The Emir and ABDAMA owners were believed to be behind this raid, the purpose of which was to "pacify" the villagers and pave the way for the occupation of their land by ABDAMA. Unaware of the Emir's role in this, the villagers went to lodge a complaint with him, and, it is said, he quickly arranged a meeting of the land owners in his palace. At the meeting, the Emir, according to sources, told the villagers that he had demarcated the land into two parts — one for them and the other for ABDAMA. Again, the villagers refused, arguing that since ABDAMA was going to mine on their lands and farms, they too should be part of the business. Better still, the villagers suggested that a new mining company be floated, with them as shareholders. But the Emir and the others would have none of this. The Emir was said to have told the villagers that the government had already given their land to ABDAMA. The Keffi DPO (Divisional Police Officer), Mr. Ishaya Ki, was in attendance at this meeting, and sanctioned all that the Emir said and did.

But, unknown to both the Police and ABDAMA owners, the Emir

called the villagers for another meeting. At this secret meeting, the Emir told the villagers that the Police was behind ABDAMA because the latter had given them money, and so, if the villagers too wanted support they should contribute money to be taken to the members of the Police Force and the NSO as bribe or "kola". The villagers agreed, and on the spot collected the sum of N4,000 which was given to the Emir. Both the administrative probe referred to above, and the Special Military Tribunal that tried and acquitted six Keffi people charged with illegal possession of the precious stones, were agreed and satisfied that the Emir did hold the secret meeting with the villagers and that the N4,000 collected as "Police Comfort Fund", was at his own urging or instruction.

In the end, anyway, only N2,000 (half of the amount collected) actually went out as bribe to the Police, out of which amount the DPO, Mr. Ishaya Ki, was believed to have cornered for himself N1,500. (Mr. Ishaya Ki it was who single-handedly inspected ABDAMA's illegal papers, certified them O.K. knowing they were not, and went on to dispatch policemen to protect the company's illegal operations). What happened to the other half of the N4,000 given to the Emir is still a mystery, a subject of claims and counter-claims between the Emir and those to whom he claimed he gave the money to take to the Police.

Not long after this, the Police raided Unguwar Tudu again. This time killing four people. This enraged the villagers. But what enraged them just as much, or even more, was their own perception, or understanding, of the Emir's real role in this whole affair. The Emir, it has been established, had sent word to the village before the raid asking both ABDAMA staff and the illegal miners to leave the scene. ABDAMA staff left, but the message never got to the villagers before the raid. Worse, it is said that when the Police arrived at the scene, they announced through their loud-speaker that they were there on the instruction of the Emir

— the same Emir that all along the villagers had thought and believed was behind them in their struggles. They felt betrayed, cheated and used.

So, when the police shooting stopped and there were four of their men lying on the ground, dead as stone, the villagers thought Emir Chindo Yamusa II should be held personally responsible for the loss. Hence, their long trek to the town, carrying the four dead bodies, and their invasion of the Emir's palace.

But the Emir managed to escape the wrath of the villagers. And may well escape that of the Plateau State Government. The panel that probed the Unguwar Tudu incident recommended, and the Government, in its White Paper, accepted, that Emir Chindo Yamusa II should:

" be publicly reprimanded for his corrupt role of receiving stones, collection of some money (N4,000) from the community to bribe the Police in order to prevent further Police harassment and collusion with ABDAMA Mining Company Ltd. and the Police to purchase the community's land or to compulsory eliminate the community from their birth place. . . " (Page 8 of the *Government White Paper on the Report of the Administrative Panel to look into the clash between the Police and Illegal Miners in Keffi Local Government Area.*)

But up till this minute nothing has been done to the Emir. Nor has ABDAMA been prosecuted in a court of law in keeping with the accepted recommendation of the probe panel. Nor, yet, is it known if the other principal actor in the affair, Mr. Ishaya Ki, Keffi DPO, has been down-graded one step below his substantive rank, as recommended by the Panel and accepted by the Government.

But the people are watching, keenly, to see what happens to the *dramatis personae* in this sordid game of intrigues, corruption, extortion, bribery, cheating and death, involving traditional rulers, law enforcement agents and businessmen.

THIEVES?

acts by our so-called custodians of culture and morality, together with a number of other benefits that attract members of the ruling class to scramble and even kill each other over these positions:

THEFTS OF TAX MONEY

In 1931-32, tax arrears in Northern Nigeria were £88,405. Out of this amount, £12,936 was due in Zaria, but £9,361 had already been collected and embezzled by the chiefs and District Heads.

In 1937-38, Sarkin Kufena embezzled £5:8:6d of tax money. The same year, the Village Head of Kwarri in Ikara District "lost" £79:4:6d,

In 1938, the District Head of Makafi could not account for £134:6:3d of tax money. After £87:00 was recovered, he was sacked.

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*Emir of Keffi
in league with
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*Oba of Benin — quarrels
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COVER STORY

"All this income going to the Oba is for doing no productive labour, but simply for making an occasional public appearance, and for draping himself in the regalia of office inherited through accident of birth."

In 1945, the Sarkin Kwoi in Jema'a Local Government stole £15:10:8d.

In 1946, Sarkin Birnin Gwari was found to have consistently levied on the poor *talakawa*, "Harajin Masu Arziki" (tax on the rich), for which they were given no receipts. The tax almost led to a revolt. When an inquiry was instituted, the Sarki pleaded with the people of Kuyello, Mahuta, Tabauni and Kazage not to expose him.

In 1949, the Village Head of Zuturing (Kaduna State) stole £16:1:9d of tax money.

AYOOLA COMMISSION REPORT

The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Civil Disturbances which occurred in certain parts of the Western State of Nigeria in the month of December 1968 — The Ayoola Report — showed that:

a. The Odemo of Ishara, Oba Samuel Akinsanya, had embezzled proceeds of the sale of community land, being the percentage due to the Local Government Council, on November 24, 1968.

Because of this and his support for oppressive taxes, the people of Ishara attacked him, burnt his house and destroyed his car.

b. The same report shows the oppressive rulership of the Olubadan of Ibadan and his Chiefs, which enlisted the violent reaction of his people. The Oba's senior Chiefs and lieutenants were attacked, and a senior Head Councillor, Mr. Elekuru Akoda, was killed on 16th December, 1968. Very tragically, the army reacted and killed 10 anti-tax demonstrators on 26th December 1968.

c. Similarly, Oba Sami, the Orimolusi of Ijebu-Igbo's house was attacked by his people for supporting tax legislation. His house, Pontiac car, and livestock were destroyed; and the business premises of his wife burnt.

BENDEL STATE

Other reports, such as the 1966 Report on the NNDC, and the *Kaduna State Lands Investigation Commission Report* of 1981, document such sordid acts by Chiefs and Emirs. But it is to the Bendel State Government views on the *Report of an Investigation into the Role of Chiefs in Bendel State, 1976*, that we will now turn to see why chieftaincy attracts so many candidates.

By 1976, Bendel State had 185 traditional rulers and chiefs (excluding minor clan heads). Each of these was entitled to a salary, the minimum of which was N1,200 and the maximum of which was N12,600.

But more significant and far more attractive are the "fringe benefits" attached to these positions, a selection of which we reproduce below:

i. Supplementation Allowance of 1% of the tax collected in the preceding year in the domain of the traditional ruler, provided that no traditional ruler earns less than N1,200.

ii. Sitting Allowance

a. State

Chairman	N50 per session
Vice-chairman	N40 per session
Member	N30 per session

b. Local Government Advisory Council

Chairman	N30 per session
Member	N20 per session

iii. Transport Allowance

- 30 kobo per kilometer for traditional rulers who are members of the State Advisory Council
- 10 kobo per kilometer for chiefs who are members of the Local Government Advisory Councils.

iv. Entertainment/Hospitality Allowance

- Oba of Benin N200 per month
- Olu of Warri N100 per month
- Traditional rulers of Local Government Areas, Urban areas N50 per month
- Other traditional rulers N25 per month

v. 1/3 of proceeds of all lands sold in his domain. Hence they must approve every C. of O.

With such generous allowances, this parasitic institution has become most lucrative for its incumbents and hangers-on.

Consider the income of the Oba of Benin as of 1977, that is ten years ago:

Salary	N12,600
1% of total tax of N248,443 + N1,200 State Government supplementation of income	N 3,684
Entertainment allowance	N 2,400
TOTAL	N18,684 p.a.

Plus — free palace with a rental value of a about N40,000. And, 1/3 of the proceeds of all communal lands sold in his domain!

All this income for doing no productive labour, but simply for making an occasional public appearance, and for draping himself in the regalia of office, inherited through accident of birth.

By Zuwaqhu Bonat and Iyorchia Ayu

Chiefs in Uganda

In May 1967 President Milton Obote announced to a bewildered Ugandan Parliament that he had abolished the old constitution, and like a generous political God, given them a new one. Members of Parliament, he said (with loud arrogance), could leave their seats and pick up their personal copies of the document from their pigeon holes in the corridor. The new constitution, he informed them, had just elevated him from the rank of Prime Minister to that of President (a position which had previously been occupied by Sir Edward Mutesa, the Kabaka of Buganda, who was then running by road and bush through Rwanda in search of safety and exile in England).

That Obote constitution had also abolished all the posts of traditional rulers in Uganda, an act which a bitter Mutesa was to call "the desecration of my Kingdom". No successive government from Idi Amin in 1971 to Museveni in 1986 has reversed this 'political revolution' of creating a republic by a *constitutional coup* against Uganda's Parliament.

For a small country, slightly bigger than Ghana, Obote's Uganda had had one of the highest number of monarchies per capita in the world. Those which had existed before the British came to snatch political force were the Kingdoms of Bunyoro-Kitara, Ankole, Toro, Buganda and Busoga. One version of oral history held it that they all shared geographical neighbourliness precisely because their ruling castes all trace their origins to wandering Luo colonising migrators coming from as far away as Ancient Egypt over the years in search of the source of the Nile River. Presumably in reference to this historical legend, Obote is reported to have told a newspaper reporter who queried him over the deposition of the Kabaka of Buganda that he had merely followed in the footsteps of his Luo ancestors.

The British on arrival invented chiefs for those societies which had rejected royal, one-man dictatorships. These included the districts of Teso, Lango, Acholi, West Nile, Bukedi, Bugisu and Kigezi. People in these areas called the chiefs derisively as the 'tax dogs' of the British for the unflinching loyalty and cruelty with which they collected taxes for the colonial government.

"With President Museveni now setting up people's defence committees and village consultative assemblies, it is unlikely that the chiefs in Uganda will rise again from the ashes of their history."

Outside of Buganda, the abolition of traditional rulers in the rest of Uganda was received with amazing indifference by the population. No spontaneous popular outrage exploded across the land. No incidences of mass hysteria and suicides were reported. The traditional rulers had long been sitting gods with legs of cotton thread. Worse than that, most of them had amassed mortal enemies in important sections of their subjects.

In Buganda, for example, the King, his ministers and local chiefs had, with Lugard's blessing in 1900, grabbed vast tracts of what came to be known as 'mailo land' from their rural subjects. Under the cynical cover of the whisks of the British Residents, they had proceeded with devastating alacrity to round up thousands of these same subjects every year to work for long hours without pay on their farms. Bitterness had become a major chord linking the Lugard rulers with their dispossessed peoples.

In Ankole, a Hima cattle keeping aristocracy did not only exploit a Mwiru farming peasantry, but also subjected them to numerous humiliations and brutalities including

that of having a Mwiru subject sit and hold on his chest a hot pot of millet beer while the aristocrats sucked from it with long tubes at their callous leisure. In Toro, a Bwamba-Bakonjo peasantry was equally degraded and exerted in the service of a Toro ruling feudal lot. In each of these cases the British had added their own burdens such as building roads, government buildings, planting cotton, and collecting taxes — and the chiefs had been their obedient 'tax dogs.'

The traditional rulers had long changed from being custodians of their people's culture to being custodians of their pains. When Obote hit them with a constitutional bomb in 1967 they collapsed and lay shattered without the support and protection of popular anger.

Obote did not act alone. He was the 'Head Prefect' of a new class of politicians, civil servants, military officers, professionals, and traders, who in the 1960s wanted to seize the machinery of the national government and use it for administration, prestige, and making a little personal wealth without the feudalists asking them for their own share of the booty. For the socialists around Obote, they wanted to stop the feudalists from continuing to dip their already greasy fingers into the treasuries of their Kingdoms and that of the Central government. Having come out of political rallies in which they had been calling British colonial rulers 'thieves', 'looters', and 'oppressors', they had the wave of people's expectations behind them, and they used it to chop off the rotten political feet of the monarchs of Uganda.

And with President Museveni now setting up people's defence committees and village consultative assemblies, it is unlikely that the chiefs of Uganda will rise again from the ashes of their history.

By Okello Oculi

The British Chiefs

Charles Windsor — better known as Prince Charles — who will almost certainly be the next King of England, quoted an epistle of St. Paul to warn the rebellious people of Bougainville Island in Papua New Guinea, in 1975:

“Everyone must obey the state authorities, for no authority exists without God’s permission, and the existing authorities have been put there by God. Whoever opposes the existing authority, opposes what God has ordered and anyone who does so will bring judgement on himself.”

The Islanders had declared their own independence in an attempt to end the stranglehold of Rio-Tinto-Zinc, the mining giant. There is no record of what the Islanders told him in reply.

Claims to divine right to rule is not something new. Nor is threatening rebellious underprivileged with God’s wrath. Certainly not new to the English. It is no news either to the English that the heir to the British throne earns about 45 thousand pounds per annum tax free, besides his personal income from dividends and rents, and does not pay a penny for rent, transportation, electricity, heating, food, drinks or any of the “necessities” or luxuries of life. The State picks up all the bills.

All these for being his Mummy’s son. As for the Queen of England, her salary amounts to almost 2 million pounds a year. Her husband, the Duke of Edinburgh, is paid another 85 thousand pounds per annum by the Government, “simply for being his wife’s husband”.

All their children, servants, etc. are taken care of by the British State. This is apart from supporting the “upkeep” of her various palaces, planes, helicopters, train, yacht and the rest, which cost nothing less than 10 million pounds every year, as per 1976 estimates.

Consider the cost of housing the Windsor family — the Queen, her husband and four children. The Buckingham Palace has 600 rooms and in 1971/72, 385,887 pounds was set aside for its maintenance and upkeep. It takes 500 people to run it — all paid for by the government.

Birkhall and Royal Lodge are all her other “homes”.

The Queen Mother lives in Clarence House. Chevening House was Prince Charles’ bachelor pad. Princess Anne has Gatcombe Park as a present from Mummy. And many, many more. Their upkeep



Charles Windsor — heir to billions.

The Windsor Castle, another palace next to London airport, with walls as thick as the room in which you are reading this article, to lessen the noise of the aircraft, cost another 377,584 pounds to maintain in that same year (1971/72). The upkeep of other castles — Hampton Court and Holyrood House, came to 265,766 and 101,104 pounds respectively.

These are not all. Balmoral Castle is there with its 80,000 acres for hunting, horse riding and resting. Sandringham, Kensington Palace, St. James Palace, Dutch House,

comes to over 2.5 million pounds annually, as per 1975/76.

Why does the British State pay all these — and more — for the “upkeep” of the Windsor family? The Queen and her family are after all not exactly poor. The exact size of their wealth is not easy to determine. Besides their various homes and properties, the Queen “owns the finest collection of works of art to be found anywhere in the world.” They still have the millions they got from pirates and scavengers like Walter Raleigh and others, who

ravaged and looted the treasures of other countries and returned to be knighted (after giving her ancestors their share of the loot) — very much like Nigeria today where you loot the public treasury and then go back to your village to be given a “chieftaincy” title. If you are as rich as Abiola you can even buy titles from Borno!

The royal wealth is exempted from the disclosure provision of the Companies Act. But we do know that she has substantial shareholding through the Bank of England Nominees Ltd., which has shares in 19 British companies worth 94.85 million pounds. She gets well over 5 million pounds per year as dividends from this alone. The firm has shares in the following major companies:

Company	Value in millions
Unilever	20.3
B.P.	13.9
E.M.T.	8.0
Barclays Bank	6.9
Lloyds Bank	6.9
Imperial Group	6.7
Pilkington Glass	5.5
Land Securities	5.0
Tube Investments	4.4
Reed Int.	4.4
Boots	3.0
Twiner and Newwall	2.6
S. Pearson	2.0
Prudential	1.8
Ass. Portland Cement	1.6
Hawker Siddley	.8
Cavenham	.6
Nat West Bank	.4
Glaxo	.05
Guinness	undisclosed
House of Fraser	undisclosed
Plessey	undisclosed

To put it bluntly, the Queen is a shareholder, a landowner, a landlord. She has — like all major company directors — allowances, cars, coaches, airplanes, yachts and houses. She has inherited wealth, colonial loot, government subsidies and massive tax bonuses. She is inflation-proof.

What does she do and exactly what does she represent to warrant such wealth and power in a country

with well over 3 million unemployed?

First, as head of the British State she represents all that is British — at least the wealthier part. She is constitutionally allowed to have the police forces, the armed services, the legal structures which protect privilege in the U.K. from the unprivileged masses. She symbolises the economic system, so that a wealthy privileged elite is seen as a legitimate phenomenon. She also, strangely enough, is said to “represent” the people —

those poor, faceless crowds that line the street waving the Union Jack.

Secondly, she is the head of the Commonwealth — the club of former British subjects to which Nigeria belongs. This club, like the monarch herself, reminds the British upper classes of their former glory and present wealth.

(Extracted and edited from *Highness: Jubilee Anti-Report*, published in London by Counter Information Services.)



Queen Elizabeth — over £7 billion in a country of 4 million unemployed.

BILLIONAIRE QUEEN

The Crown Estate Commissioners have for the first time set a public valuation of £1,227 million [£1.227 billion] on the property they manage on behalf of the Queen.

Some of the property defies proper valuation. The foreshore and seabed of the United Kingdom, for instance, has been excluded although it can provide an increasingly valuable site for fish farms and yacht marinas.

Of the rest, two-thirds by value consists of property in central London, and includes swathes of Regent Street and Oxford Street, the City, Trafalgar Square, Whitehall, Hyde Park and Regent's Park, the Strand, and sizeable tracts in


Kensington, Fulham, Haymarket, and Pall Mall, all of which are let.

Elsewhere the Crown owns 171,814 acres of farmland and forest in England, 95,706 acres in Scotland, and 871 acres of cultivated land in Wales, together with a further 67,000 acres of “unenclosed waste of ancient manors”.

The income from agricultural land and the seashore is falling fast in proportion to the rest, and now amounts only to 10% of the Crown Estate's total income of £55.9 million last year.

[The above article, written by Rosemary Collins, is culled from *The Guardian Weekly*, July 26, 1987.]

PHOTOSPEAK



What you see above is not one of our airforce radar installations. Nor is it one of NITEL's satellite receiving stations at Kujama or Lanlate. It is not even one of NTA's transmitters at Jaji, near Kaduna. If it were any of these, it wouldn't be a cause for concern or even of much interest to you. This sophisticated communications disc with transmitting facilities is a private property, installed in the private home of a prominent Nigerian. The house is situated in the heart of the G.R.A. Kaduna, at No.3 Kinshasa Road, Anguwar Rimi. In a country where there is such a craze among the rich for electronic gadgets and for foreign television programmes, you may be tempted to think that all the owner of this disc wants is to receive foreign television broadcasts or maintain direct and quick communication with his business branches within the country. But take a closer look at the picture again, and you will be convinced that this antenna with its three metre diameter and a 2.5 metre high supporting tower, is much, much more than just catering for such indulgences of the rich. Technical experts say, in fact, that the disc's antenna is dedicated to satellite communications, and is quite capable of receiving international signals reflected

back to earth by a communications pay-load (satellite) situated as far up in the sky as 22,000 miles. The antenna, which clearly has many channels, is also capable of transmitting and receiving signals, and intercepting any messages, on a world-wide scale – depending, of course, on the ground processing electronic equipment attached to it. Some of the ground processing equipment attached to this kind of antenna can cost as much as N160,000. We are not privileged to know what kind of ground processing equipment this man attached to his antenna. But we do know one thing: only in Nigeria can an individual install and operate such a piece of equipment. And now we ask: What are the security agencies doing about this? Nigerians want to know. Because Nigerians know that when trade unions or student unions make contact with other such organisations in progressive countries these same security agencies jump on them and grab them as “subversive” and what have you. But when a rich individual like the owner of No. 3 Kinshasa Road, Kaduna, establishes a permanent private satellite contact with foreign countries, nothing is done. Is there one national security for the rich and one for the poor? The answer is to be found at Kinshasa Road, Kaduna!

UPDATE

When is Politics Partisan?

Local government elections are now only a few months away. The National Electoral Commission has been sworn in and the government has already approved the appointment of twenty resident electoral commissioners in all the nineteen states and in Abuja. Electoral officers in each of the 301 local governments with their offices and staff are now taking off.

The transition decree to punish those who obstruct or hinder the Federal Military Government's transition programme or engage in party or partisan politics has been promulgated, but has not yet been made available to the public. The promulgation of the decree follows upon what President Ibrahim Babangida said in his nation-wide broadcast on Wednesday 2nd July 1987 that:

"For the avoidance of doubt, let me make it absolutely clear that government's human rights policy should not be mistaken for weakness. This administration is committed to the successful implementation of this political programme. Therefore let me warn that attempts by any individuals or groups to distract us or put obstacles in the path of a planned and effectively supervised return to a democratic civic order, shall be treated as sabotage. For this purpose government is immediately promulgating a decree to provide legal backing to the political transition period and the behaviour of citizens within that period. In pursuit of this orderly return to civil rule, government is setting up a

standing special tribunal to deal with despatch any violation of the transition decree. Government does not recognise any sacred cow and would like to remind politicians that the ban on party or partisan politics is still very much in force."

In our comment on the political programme in *The Analyst*, vol.2, no. 4, we pointed out that:

"... we would like to register our serious objections to the proposed decree and tribunal



Yahaya Gusau

to control political activities between now and the time the ban on partisan politics will be lifted. We are of course not unaware of the dirty and unhealthy politicking going on in certain quarters in the country and we share the government's concern to ensure that peace prevails during the transition. But we believe that a decree and the tribunal like the ones proposed shall become a handy tool for muzzling popular opinion and organisations.

Worse, the decree cannot stop and would in fact even encourage, some sinister forces and interests mobilising under all sorts of guises like religion, regionalism and ethnicity. And the result of this will be to threaten the peace and unity of the country and prevent the emergence of a solid popular basis for political stability and progress."

Since coming out with this position in our last issue, some documents made available to us have confirmed our position. They have also confirmed the anxiety of many patriotic Nigerians who are keen that genuinely democratic governments are established for the progress and stability of the country. These patriotic Nigerians see the issue of when politics may be considered partisan as very pertinent to the achievement of unity and democracy.

The facts available to us are as follows:

I. Kaduna, Saturday 15th February 1986:

At a meeting in Kaduna on Saturday 15th February 1986 an organisation known as the Constitution Consultative Committee on the Political Future of Nigeria was formally established with the following stated objectives:

"... to get the North to generally and in a concerted manner articulate the form of constitution that would provide stability and project the interests of the North as well as Nigeria. The need for the North as far as possible to speak with one voice

UPDATE

was now greater than ever in view of the disadvantageous position the North has been pushed into, especially as regards the press . . . the idea was to mobilise all shades of opinion from the North so as to adopt the same options thus making it possible for northern views to be properly heard by the Bureau set up by the Federal Military Government."


The Constitution Consultative Committee, or C.C.C. as it has come to be known, is made up of four committees. These are: the Elders Consultative Committee, made up of 57 members; the Traditional Rulers Contact Committee of 37 members; the Interim Coordinating Committee of 35 members; and a Religious Leaders Contact Committee of 5 members. This gives the Committee a membership of 129 members, although we have reliably learnt that about 10 per cent of those initially invited have now dropped out. The list of the members are:

- Sokoto - Sokoto
- 5. Alhaji Musa Yar Adu'a, Tafidan Katsina - Kaduna
- 6. Alhaji Yahaya Gusau, Shettiman Sokoto - Sokoto
- 7. Alhaji Ahmed Talib - Kaduna
- 8. Alhaji Nuhu Bamalli, Magajin Garin Zazzau - Kaduna
- 9. Alhaji Inuwa Wada, Magajin Garin Kano - Kano
- 10. Alhaji Jalo Waziri - Bauchi
- 11. Alhaji Umaru, Wazirin Gwandu - Sokoto
- 12. Alhaji Sule Katagum - Bauchi
- 13. Alhaji Ahmadu Kari, Garkuwan Bauchi - Bauchi
- 14. Alhaji Muhammadu Gauyama, Madawakin Hadejia - Kano
- 15. Alhaji Shehu Musa, Makaman Bida - Niger
- 16. Mallam Michael Audu Buba, Wazirin Shendam - Plateau
- 17. Alhaji Abdurahman Okene - Kwara
- 18. Alhaji Abdurahman Mora - Kaduna
- 19. Rev. Wilson Sabia - Gongola
- 20. Alhaji Maina Waziri - Borno
- 21. Alhaji Abba Habib - Borno

- 26. Madawakin Adamawa - Gongola
- 27. Mr. J. C. Obande - Benue
- 28. Mr. J. A. Acka - Benue
- 29. Alhaji Yahaya, Madawakin Ilorin - Kwara
- 30. Alhaji Yahaya, Sardaunan Lokoja - Kwara
- 31. Alhaji Maccido Dalhat - Kaduna
- 32. Lt. General (Rtd) Y. Danjuma - Gongola
- 33. Lt. General (Rtd) E. S. Jalo - Gongola
- 34. Alhaji Muhammad, Magajin Garin Kazaure - Kano
- 35. Lt. General (Rtd) M. I. Wushishi - Niger
- 36. Alhaji Msitama Sule, Dan Masanin Kano - Kano
- 37. Alhaji Salihi Iliyasu - Kano
- 38. Brig. (Rtd) Abba Kyari - Borno
- 39. Ambassador Edwin Ogbu - Benue
- 40. Group Capt. Usman Jibrin (Rtd) - Plateau
- 41. Pastor David Lot - Plateau
- 42. Alhaji Danburan Jada - Gongola
- 43. Alhaji Ibrahim Damcida -



Sunday Awoniyi



Gen. T. Y. Danjuma



Liman Ciroma



Prof. Awa - NEC boss.

- Elders Consultative Committee:*
- 1. Alhaji Sir Kashim Ibrahim - Borno
 - 2. Major General (Rtd) Hassan Usman Katsina - Kaduna
 - 3. Alhaji Isa Kaita, Wazirin Katsina - Kaduna
 - 4. Alhaji Aliyu, Magajin Garin

- 22. Alhaji Yahaya Sabo, Marafan Lafia - Plateau
- 23. Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi, Marafan Sokoto - Sokoto
- 24. Alhaji Shuaibu Naibi, Madawakin Suleja - Niger
- 25. Alhaji Liman Ciroma - Borno

- Borno
- 44. Alhaji Ibrahim Biu - Borno
- 45. Alhaji Ahmadu Fatika, S/Fada Zazzau - Kaduna
- 46. Mr. Tilley Gyado (Senior) Benue
- 47. Alhaji A. D. Rufai - Bauchi
- 48. Alhaji Ahmadu Ribadu, Dan

Galadima Adamawa —
Gongola

49. Alhaji Adamu T/Balewa,
Ajiyan Bauchi — Bauchi
50. Alhaji Garba Aminu —
Bauchi
51. Dr. Alex Fom — Plateau
52. Mallam Victor Gwani —
Kaduna
53. Mr. Selcan Maina — Plateau
54. Mallam Madaki Auta, Biu —
Borno
55. Alhaji Shettima Ali
Monguno — Borno
56. Yarima Balla — Gongola
57. Sulaiman Daniya Illo —
Sokoto

*Traditional Rulers Contact
Committee:*

SOKOTO:

1. Sultan of Sokoto
2. Emir of Gwandu
3. Emir of Argungu
4. Emir of Yawuri
5. Sarkin Dabai

BORNO:

1. Muhammadu Mustafa Ibn
Umar Alkanemi, Shehu of
Borno
2. Alhaji Aliyu, Emir of Biu
3. Sarkin Gwoza

KANO:

1. Emir of Kano
2. Emir of Hadejia
3. Emir of Gumel
4. Emir of Kazaure

BAUCHI:

1. Sarkin Bauchi
2. Sarkin Gombe
3. Sarkin Katagum
4. Sarkin Misau

GONGOLA:

1. Lamido of Adamawa
2. Emir of Muri
3. Aku Uka

KADUNA:

1. Emir of Katsina
2. Emir of Zaria
3. Emir of Daura
4. Chief of Marwa

KWARA:

1. Emir of Ilorin

2. Ohinoyi of Igbira Land
3. Emir of Borgu
4. Etsu Pategi

NIGER:

1. Etsu of Nupe
2. Sarkin Sudan of Kontagora
3. Sarkin Minna

BENUE:

1. Tor Tiv
2. Atta of Igala
3. Ochi Idoma

PLATEAU:

1. Gbong Gwom of Jos
2. Emir of Wase
3. Emir of Keffi
4. Long Gomei of Shendam

*Interim Co-ordinating Com-
mittee:*

1. Alhaji Yusuf Dantsoho
2. Mallam Maccido Muhammad
3. Alhaji Zakari Yakubu
4. Alhaji Usman Goji
5. Alhaji Sani Z/Daura
6. Alhaji Usman Sani
7. Alhaji Aminu Tijjani Turaki
8. Alhaji Umaru Baba M/Gari
9. Alhaji Haliru Dantoro
10. Dr. Christopher Abashiya
11. Mr. Isiah Balat
12. Alhaji Muazu Aliyu Ahmed
13. Mr. Mataimaki Tom
Maiyashi
14. Alhaji Musa Musawa
15. Alhaji Kaloma Ali
16. Alhaji Bala Kuki
17. Alhaji Shehu Tsoho
18. Ambassador Rhoda
Mohammed
19. Mrs. Helen Akilu
20. Alhajiya Amina Yahya
21. Prof. Ango Abdullahi
22. Mallam Bitrus Bijimi Yahya
23. Mallam Musa Bello
24. Mallam Mamman Daura
25. Dr. Mahmoud Tukur
26. Alhaji Garba Abdullahi
27. Alhaji Ismaila Funtua
28. Alhaji Sani Aminu
29. Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim
(SAN)
30. Shettima Kidaji
31. Mr. Sunday Awoniyi
32. Alhaji Sabi Idris
33. Alhaji Samaila Saddiq
34. Chief Otaru Ogidi

35. Alhaji Umar Faruk Kaoje

*Religious Leaders Contact
Committee:*

1. Alhaji Abubakar Mahmud
Gumi
2. Alhaji Dahiru Bauchi
3. Alhaji Sani Kabara
4. Bishop Jatau
5. Canon H. O. Mohammed

*II. Kaduna, 2nd and 16th March
1986:*

A body set up by the C.C.C. which included, among others, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma and Maj. General I.B.M. Haruna (Rtd) met and came out with a recommendation that:

“The Constitution should opt for a two-party democracy based on the economic philosophy of mixed economy.”

III. Kaduna, Saturday 6th June:

At a meeting at Lugard Hall, Kaduna on Saturday 6th June 1987, a *Committee of Elders of the North* was set up with the following stated objectives:

“... monitor significant developments that can lead to conflict or disharmony. It will call attention to them and devise or suggest to the appropriate level of authority ways of diffusing and resolving the issues at stake before the situation gets out of hand.”

The members of the C.E.N. were listed as follows:

1. Alhaji Yahaya Gusau - Chair-
man.
2. Alhaji Jalo Waziri
3. Mr. Ako Dzungwe Shande
4. Alhaji Abba Habib
5. Mr. Gayus Gilama
6. Alhaji Musa Yar'adua
7. Alhaji Inuwa Wada
8. Chief S. B. Awoniyi
9. Alhaji Shehu Lemu
10. Mr. V. G. Sanda
11. Alhaji Aliyu Magajin Garin
Sokoto
12. Alhaji Liman Ciroma
13. Alhaji M. I. Attah
14. Mr. John Jatau Kadiya
15. Alhaji Abu Ibrahim

UPDATE

16. M. Mansur Ahmed
17. Alhaji Adamu Tafawa Balewa
18. Alhaji Sule Katagum
19. Mr. J. C. Obande
20. Alhaji Ahmadu Negedu
21. Alhaji Maina Waziri
22. Alhaji Baba Kura Imam
23. Ibrahim Usman Sangari
24. Alhaji Ahmadu Ribadu
25. Alhaji Nuhu Bamali
26. Mr. Victor Gwani
27. Alhaji Yusuf Maitama Sule
28. Alhaji Muhammadu Magajin Garin Kazaure
29. Alhaji Abdulkadir Dan Iyan Hadejia
30. Alhaji Abdurrahman Okene
31. Chief Ade John
32. Alhaji Sa'adu Alanamu
33. Alhaji Muhammadu King
34. Alhaji Shuaibu Madawakin Suleja
35. Mr. D. B. Zang
36. Alhaji Inuwa Ali
37. Alhaji Yahaya Sabo
38. Wazirin Gwandu
39. Alhaji Ladan Zuru
40. Alhaji Idrisu Koko
41. Alhaji Ahmed Talib
42. Alhaji Isa Kaita
43. Cannon H. O. Mohammed
44. Mr. Haruna Dandaura
45. Lt. General G. S. Jalo (rtd)
46. Major-General Hassan Usman Katsina (Ptd)
47. Major-General Shehu M. Yaradua (Rtd)
48. Brigadier Musa Usman (Rtd)
49. Alhaji Aliko Mohammed
50. Alhaji Abdullahi Ibrahim
51. Alhaji Ali Baba
52. Alhaji Halilu Dantoro
53. Alhaji Adamu Ciroma
54. Alhaji Yayaha Kwande
55. Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi

Linked to the C.F.N. is a committee of 10 traditional rulers from the north under the chairmanship of the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero.


The public purpose of the body is to avert religious disturbances by monitoring developments which can cause it. But observers note that not only are many of the members active in the very organisations which

generate the religious conflicts like C.A.N., J.N.I., Council of the Ulema, etc., but they are not physically in a position to monitor anything, as those of them who are not largely living abroad in London, Paris, Jeddah or West Germany, live together in their swank mansions in Kaduna, Ikoyi or Victoria Island. Moreover about 50 per cent actually are domiciled in a few streets in Kaduna. So who are they going to monitor? Each other?


Moreover, observers note



Selcan Miner



Sarkin Kano



Etsu Nupe

that the C.C.C. list and the C.E.N. list read like the N.P.C. executive council in joint session with the Northern Regional Ministers and their top civil servants, together with the N.P.N. executive council from the ten northern states, with their bureaucratic and military satraps. They constitute the core of the N.P.C./N.P.N. rump with a sprinkling of U.M.B.C./N.P.P. elements. So even if they are meeting over the constitution and religious disturbances, they have a distinct political identity which cannot be anything but *partisan*.

IV. Lagos, Wednesday 1st July 1987:

The last stage in this saga was in Lagos on Wednesday 1st July 1987 when the Federal Military Government released its White Paper on the Report of the Political Bureau. In this White Paper, the Armed Forces Ruling Council prescribes a mixed economy and a two party system for Nigeria, exactly as the C.C.C. had recommended in March 1986. So who is fooling who?

CONCLUSION

The three questions that immediately arise from all these are: Firstly, is the C.C.C., which metamorphosed into the C.E.N. now in the process of metamorphosing into one of the two political parties of a "mixed economy" Nigeria? Secondly, is the C.C.C./C.E.N. together with the rump of the P.P.P. of 1982-83 likely also to give birth to the other of the two political parties? Thirdly, if these metamorphoses are taking place, as all moves from Kaduna to Jos to Makurdi to Ishan to Benin to Owerri and right down to Lagos indicate, when is politics partisan and when is it not partisan? Is it partisan only when it is patriotic and popular, and non-partisan when it is sectional and elitist?

EARSHOT

Gowonian Games

Last month, Governor Ahmed Daku of Sokoto State travelled, by road, half-way through the length of Nigeria, from the ancient city of Sokoto, through Kaduna State, to the Tin City, Jos, to be the guest of the government and people of Plateau State. Given the speed at which gubernatorial convoys travel, and the priority given them everywhere along the road, the journey must have taken the young Governor less time than it would have taken an ordinary Nigerian. But it must have been a hectic journey nonetheless. As hectic as the visit itself, with its crowded programme that took the visiting Governor, and the host, to most corners of Plateau State. And, of course, expensive it must have been too.

True, Governor Ahmed Daku is not known for drollery. Or for being wasteful. Or for condoning wastefulness. Which was largely why he was very unpopular with the wealthy and powerful in Kano, where he was before he moved to Sokoto exactly one year ago. But Governor Daku came to Plateau with, it seemed, truck loads of gifts. At every Palace he visited — and he visited many of Plateau's Royal Highnesses — he gave gifts, and was given gifts in return. At every cocktail party or reception — and there were many of such during the visit — he gave gifts and was given gifts in return. He had gifts — of the best Sokoto hand-sewn flowing robes and caps to match — for every member of Governor Onoja's cabinet. In turn, Col. Onoja had gifts — of the best Plateau could offer in terms of clothings and handicrafts — for every official in Governor Daku's entourage. It was gift for gift. Naira for Naira. No winner, no loser. A real draw game it was, even in terms of the losses incurred — one PLSG Peugeot 504 car and one Sokoto Peugeot 504 car,

jammed, with equal damage to either side.

But all this is by the way. What's really important to know about the visit is that it was undertaken in keeping with a Federal Government directive — that their excellencies visit each other in their turfs in order to get to know this vast country better and to help promote unity in the land. Governor Daku was thus the first to follow the directive from the General Staff Headquarters, and this should earn him some good marks in the Chief of General Staff's assessment register. The second position went to Governor Onoja with his visit to Ogun. Soon, anyway, there will be a flurry of such gubernatorial visits in the country, in line with the directive,

The last time Nigerians saw such exchange of visits between governors was, you may recall, during Gowon's time. Then too, it was a Federal Government directive, direct from the then Supreme Headquarters. But Gowon himself encouraged it — as a way to promote unity. Which, in a way, was understandable. The country had just emerged from a 30-month civil war. And the expenses involved in such visits were no problem then — there was so much petro-naira around that the problem, as Gowon himself said, was how to spend it.

Gowon's twelve governors, however, had a different idea of the purpose of the visits, which they quickly turned into jamborees. They used the visits as opportunities to: compare notes, not on the problems of administering their states but on how best to corner and accumulate state funds and resources; get plot allocations of their choice in each other's state; exchange gifts; and get to find out for themselves if there was any new furniture, or new

pet, or an extension made, in each other's official residence, the likes of which could be bought or made. For instance, all the governors who visited Kano and saw the kangaroos imported from Australia by the then Governor of the state, late Alhaji Audu Bako for the Kano zoo, could hardly wait to return to their states before giving out executive orders for kangaroos to be purchased for their own states. The orders were obeyed, of course. But Their Excellencies were soon left with dead kangaroos.

But pardon the long digression. The point though, is to draw attention to a kind of a throw-back to those Gowon days. Gowonism creeping back in, you may say. And of this new development, there is even more concrete evidence than Chief of General Staff Rear Admiral Aikhomu's directive to state governors to exchange visits. Consider, first, the much publicised but vapid phrases and cliches of the later years of the Gowon regime. These, having now been resurrected and dusted off, have found their way into the Babangida administration's White Paper on the Report of the Political Bureau, where they are extolled as the lofty objectives of our current struggles to make Nigeria a better place for all. Then, of course, there is the impression one gets, and the distinct smell in the air, of Gowonian games being played on so many fronts by this administration. We could go on and on citing examples of this till the cows come home. But just one will suffice for now: the somewhat opaque definition of especially the political situation in the country today. The off-shoot of the Gowon regime you may want to call the Babangida administration.

Sure, Professor, General Gowon (has the rank been officially restored or not?), ousted and discredited twelve good years ago, is still very much with us even today. And not only physically as a Visiting Research Professor in Political Science at the University of Jos. But in spirit. And in ideas too. Which makes you wonder whether we, as a country, aren't moving one step forward and twelve steps backward. Or is someone somewhere up to something?

SOUTH AFRICA: The Truth About Inkatha

Who is Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi? Who is this Zulu chief and Chief Minister of a South African Bantustan who is also a friend of P. W. Botha, of Jimmy Carter, of Ronald Reagan, and of Bolaji Akinyemi and Joseph Garba? Who is this winner of the 1983 George Meany Human Rights Award from the right-wing American Federation of Labour/ Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), who in November of the same year warned students of the University of Zululand that:

"Continuing labelling me as a sell-out is going to have ugly repercussions. We know just how powerful we are. We know we can walk into the campus any day of the week and do whatever we want to . . . whoever challenges me, challenges the people and the people will deal with them"; and had five students killed and 100 injured on that campus?

The answer to these questions is to be found in the nature, present activities and future rule of an organisation in South Africa called the Inkatha, which is led by Gatsha Buthelezi.

We have, in our last two issues, brought to you the real facts regarding the origin, nature and roles of two organisations used in Southern Africa to attack the frontline states of Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola, namely Renamo and Unita. We have taken you behind the lies, half truths, and disinformation of the BBC, VOA, Radio France International and the whole imperialist media apparatus and their Nigerian megaphones.

In this issue we take a look at the Inkatha, whose leader Gatsha Buthelezi has visited Nigeria several times, although he is already playing the role of Savimbi in the struggle in South Africa. We shall see later what and who brought him to Nigeria.

REVIVAL

The Inkatha had been founded in 1928 as a tribalistic cultural movement by the paramount Zulu Chief Solomon Ka Zulu. Its role was to promote the political and cultural interests of the Zulu chiefs serving the white settler government. By the early 1930's the organisation had died out.

Its revival came about forty years later in the early 1970's, in response to the political and cultural radicalisation taking place among the African people in South Africa.

Inkatha was revived in the early 1970s specifically in response to the growing nationalist militancy and radicalisation among the workers in Natal Province, many of whom were Zulu. This growing radicalisation and militancy expressed itself in the great Durban strikes of January-February 1973, which at their height involved up to 100,000 workers. These set off a wave of strikes and boycotts and other mass actions which in June 1976 led to the great Soweto uprising.

DIVIDE AND RULE

In order to undermine the unity of the African workers, peasants, students and other black rural and township dwellers, the white settler racist regime was then establishing its

"The Inkatha is not a Zulu or African cultural organisation, nor a representative of the Zulus, the people of Durban, Natal or South Africa. Its games of negotiations with white groups to propose federal solutions for South Africa are mere public relations gimmicks."

bantustans. In 1970 the Kwazulu Territorial Authority was established by the Vorster regime with Gatsha Buthelezi as its Chief Executive. In 1972 he became Chief Executive Councillor of the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly.

But it became clear with the Durban strikes of 1973 and other militant action that these divide-and-rule tactics of the racist regime had not succeeded in stopping the growth of the national liberation struggle in South Africa led by the African National Congress. Therefore the divide-and-rule tactics had to be deepened. It was clearly not enough to create bantustans to undermine the national liberation struggle. A much more clear-cut form of tribalistic mobilisation had to be started, which would try to compete with the nationalistic and radical mobilisation of the national liberation organisations. Hence the Inkatha was revived and its name changed from simply 'Inkatha Ka Zulu' to 'Inkatha yeNkululeko ye Sizwe' (Freedom of the Nation). The Chief Executive Councillor of the Kwazulu bantustan Legislative Assembly, Gatsha Buthelezi, became its president.

The father of Gatsha was the chief of the Buthelezi section of the Zulu. His mother claimed to be the granddaughter of Cetshawayo, the 19th century Zulu King.

By March 1976 the Inkatha was organising huge rallies in the townships, with the tacit support of the racist regime.

AFTER SOWETO

Although the Inkatha remained a tribal organisation, Gatsha started to say that it was open to all Africans. It claimed a membership of 30,000 in 1976, 300,000 in 1980 and 985,000 in 1984. Its actual membership is probably not more

than 50,000, made up mostly of those who are employed by or are somehow patronised by the Kwazulu bantustan authorities. For, in the 1978 "elections" to the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly, the Inkatha won all the 65 seats.

As the armed and mass struggle against apartheid developed, the sinister nature of the Inkatha revealed itself. When on 23rd-25th August 1976, the wave of militancy set off by Soweto produced a huge stay-at-home, Inkatha mobilised some of the migrant Zulu workers from the huge Mzimphole hostel and armed with *pangas* (machetes), *insthumentsu* (sharpened spikes), and knobkerries (clubs) they attacked and killed some of the black youths organising the stay-at-home, protected by the armed racist police standing by. The posturing of Buthelezi as a nationalist leader began to be exposed. He was clearly leading an organisation of reactionary, tribalist thugs, sustained by their control of the Kwazulu bantustan authority and the crumbs given to it by the white settler regime.

NIGERIA

It was after this sinister and vicious role of Inkatha and its leader Gatsha Buthelezi had become very clear that Bolaji Akinyemi, then Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, invited Buthelezi to visit Nigeria in 1977. He hired for him a private plane to carry him around the country. One of the places he visited and gave a lecture was the Ahmadu Bello University main campus, at Samaru, Zaria. But unfortunately for Buthelezi and Akinyemi, the then Administrative Secretary of the Institute of International Affairs, Muhammadu Abubakar Rimi (later P.R.P. Governor of Kano State), saw through Buthelezi, and telephoned some people in A.B.U. warning them in advance that he was coming with this bantustan stooge in a private plane to deliver an officially sponsored lecture. Some of the militant anti-apartheid students, at a very short notice, mobilised and prepared a lot of questions for Buthelezi, and distributed them at

the lecture. He was, for example, asked how many anti-apartheid militants were there being tortured in the jails of his Kwazulu bantustan, and how much were the crumbs Vorster was paying him for that, and for other services as a stooge. Buthelezi was thoroughly embarrassed and exposed, and had to run back to Bolaji Akinyemi in Lagos with his tail tucked in between his legs.

The links between the Inkatha and the Kwazulu bantustan and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs under Bolaji Akinyemi passed through the Jimmy Carter White House, and particularly the office of Andrew Young. It was all part of the attempt under Obasanjo, Shehu Yar Adua and Joe Garba to undermine the A.N.C. and create a so-called "Third Force" in South Africa acceptable to the United States and controlled by Nigeria. A team in the Federal Cabinet Office which included the current Nigerian ambassador to Brazil, Chief Dele Cole; Alhaji Yaya Abubakar, the then Permanent Secretary (Political) in the Federal Cabinet Office; Dr.



Oliver Tambo — ANC President.


Otunla, one of the recently-appointed ambassadors; and Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe, Shagari's ambassador to Greece and Pakistan and now a Federal Permanent Secretary (Security), were organising this using some of the Soweto youths like Tsietsi Mashinini, whom they ended in thoroughly corrupting. The visit of Gatsha Buthelezi was another aspect of this "Third Force" fiasco, this part handled by Bolaji Akinyemi at the N.I.I.A.

RAMPAGE

The attempt to build up Gatsha Buthelezi continued with greater intensity by the U.S. and Britain. The A.N.C. leadership even arranged some private talks with him in London in November 1979, but Oliver Tambo, the President of the A.N.C., explicitly repudiated the claims of Buthelezi that the A.N.C. recognised the Inkatha because of these discreet contacts.

This repudiation did not prevent the Inkatha from continuing to use A.N.C. colours and symbols, and use Buthelezi's past membership in the A.N.C. when he was a student at Fort Hare in the late 1940's.

But as the liberation struggle intensified from about 1982, the racist regime unleashed the Inkatha in a virtual rampage, particularly in the Durban area and in Kwazulu against the United Democratic Front, COSATU and all genuine anti-apartheid organisations. One of the most important cases of this role of the Inkatha as an auxiliary paramilitary organisation of the white settler regime was shown in the



Nelson Mandela

violence its thugs unleashed against the Joint Rent Committee (JORAC) of the five black townships in Natal.

In these black townships, namely Shakaville, Lamontville, Chesterville, Hambanathi and Klairwater, the JORAC emerged in April 1983 as a popular community organisation to fight for lower rents and better housing conditions against the Port Natal Administrative Board, which controlled the houses in these townships. The JORAC became the

STRUGGLES IN THE FRONTLINE

organiser of the communities, and rendered the Inkatha-controlled Ningizimu Community Council impotent, even though it had the legal backing of the apartheid authorities.

The racist regime saw the Durban area again slipping out of its control and unleashed the Inkatha on the UDF, the trade unions, student and youth associations, and JORAC.


A leading Inkatha thug called Moonlight Gasa, chairman of the Ningizimu Community Council, shot dead the leader of JORAC, Msize Dube. He carried out this assassination so brazenly that the apartheid courts were compelled to convict

him. But they only sent him to jail.

In July-August 1984, the violence of the Inkatha in the Durban area reached the scale of a war. They attacked memorial services and nineteen people were killed at the funeral of the leading UDF lawyer Victor Mxenge. On August 27th a Prince Gideon Zulu led a group of Inkatha thugs from Umlazi to kill six people in Lamontville. The popular organisations of course fought back, and in spite of police protection for the Inkatha they punished the Inkatha 'hit squads' (called *impis* in a disgraceful attempt to evoke the heroic Zulu military regiments established by the great Shaka early in the 19th

century.)

The *impis* of Shaka and his two successors fought imperialism and the white racists. The *impis* of Buthelezi are paramilitary auxiliaries of imperialism and the white racists.



Bolaji Akinyemi — organised
"Third Force" fiasco.

The truth about the Inkatha is clear. It is not a Zulu or African cultural organisation in South Africa. It is not representative of the Zulus, the people of Durban, Natal or South Africa. Its games of "negotiations" with various white groups to propose federal solutions for South Africa are merely public relations gimmicks. In the nature and basis of Inkatha; in the repeated commitment of Buthelezi to free enterprise and more foreign investment in South Africa; in his financing and grooming by Carter and Andrew Young and now by Reagan and Chester Crocker; we can clearly see a full-fledged Unita in the making. Now they are fighting the A,N.C., U.D.F. and the forces of liberation with pangas and knobkerries. Soon they will be using machine guns and bazookas. By knowing the truth about them and their international links, including their links with powerful members of the Nigerian establishment, we should be better prepared to give the people of South Africa the required support and solidarity with which to decisively deal with them and prevent them from becoming another Unita.

STRIKE SHAKES APARTHEID

One of the largest strikes in history has shaken the foundations of the apartheid regime in South Africa. The National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa recently led a three week strike of over 300,000 workers in the gold, diamond, platinum and other mines which form the bedrock of the South African economy. The NUM is one of the leading trade unions in South Africa, affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which, at its second annual convention recently, adopted the *Freedom Charter* of the African National Congress (ANC) — the heroic national liberation movement of South Africa — as its programme.

What has been taking place in South Africa is of great historic significance to the workers and all the toiling people of South Africa, Nigeria, Africa and the rest of the world. The imperialist media and its megaphones of lies and disinformation in Nigeria have been trying to cover up and distort its fundamental importance. *The Analyst* shall soon bring to you, as usual, the truth behind the headlines. But meanwhile, we send our fraternal solidarity to all our comrades, brothers and sisters, who toil in the belly of the earth, and who are fighting for all of us. We say to all of them: *Amandla! A luta continua! Vitoria a certa!*

Cold Feet at Bakori

The month of August can hardly be said to be the coldest in the northern parts of the country. That dubious honour is reserved for January. But August 19th 1987 was not only cold for Alkali (Judge) Shehu Mu'azu of the Bakori Area Court, it was indeed chilly. The learned judge must have entered this day in his diary as one of his worst.

The trouble started in an apparently innocuous manner. The Alkali had at an earlier hearing on the 12th of August, in the continuing case of the Commissioner of Police versus Yakubu Maidaji and 16 others of Maidaji village, near Bakori, agreed to inspect the peasant farm lands under dispute (See *The Analyst*, Vol.2, nos. 1-4). August 19th was the appointed day for the inspection. However, when the defence counsel and pressmen gathered in front of the court in the morning of that day, the Alkali was nowhere to be seen. When he finally arrived, at about 11A.M., the prosecuting police officer who had earlier been at the court, also disappeared. It was not until about 1 P.M. that he arrived. But by this time Alkali Shehu Muazu was already beginning to have second thoughts. He told the defence counsel that he was reluctant to go to the village because he feared for his personal safety:

"These villagers are wild and unruly. Even when they are in this court they are uncontrollable. What more when we go to the bush. They will beat me up."

Defence counsel Simon Maikudi did everything to persuade the Alkali to go, assuring him that he would ensure that nothing happens to him. Alkali Shehu Muazu reluctantly agreed to go, but insisted that the defence provides the transportation. This was readily offered. He drove his own car to the Bakori Police Station and parked it there. But just as they were about to set off, the Alkali, noticing that another vehicle carrying press men was about to follow them, stopped and insisted

that he was not going to allow press coverage of the inspection. He said:

"These people are biased and the law empowers me to bar them from covering the inspection. Mr. Maikudi, I will not go if these people follow. No, I tell you."

At this point one of the reporters pointed out to Alkali Shehu that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees his right to freedom of movement and the legitimate pursuit of his business. Thus, nobody was going to stop him from going to Maiyadiya village.

This sent Alkali Shehu into a fit of anger and soon he was roaring:

"I don't need to go for the inspection to write my judgement. I will not go anywhere. You people can go and write whatever you want. The Area Court Edict empowers me to bar people. This village is now my court."

After consulting with the police personnel around, he drove back to his chambers.

At an earlier sitting of the court on 12th August, five key defence witnesses testified. Among them were the Chairman of the Funtua Local Government Sub-advisory Committee on Land and Survey, Alhaji Bello Organiser, and the Hamlet Head of Maiyadia, Mai Anguwa Na Mata. Alhaji Bello Organiser told the court that his Committee investigated the ownership of the farms long before the accused were charged to court for trespass and assault. His Committee established the fact that the farm lands on which the accused were charged for criminal trespass belonged to them, and that the peasants had inherited them from their grandparents. He further told the court that there was no evidence before his Committee that the peasants had sold the said farm lands to anybody. The report of the Committee was tendered and accepted.

When the Hamlet Head, Mai

Anguwa Na Mata, took the witness stand, the following dialogue ensued between him and the prosecutor:

PROSECUTOR: Which is the village?

WITNESS: Maiyadiya.

PROSECUTOR: You told the court that the land belongs to the accused. How do you know?

WITNESS: I was born there. I am the Hamlet Head. There is no way any land transaction can take place in the village without my knowledge — even if it is for 50 kobo.

PROSECUTOR: Did you visit the site?

WITNESS: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: Who did you see?

WITNESS: Who did I see other than the surveyors (brought by Alhaji Hassan)? By the way, who gave him the land? The farms do not belong to Alhaji Hassan Alhassan. Who gave him?

At this stage the over 500 people who had thronged the Area Court to support the peasants got excited. Alkali Shehu Muazu stopped proceedings and ordered everybody except reporters out. The crowd went out, but did not go away from the court premises. They stood by the windows and doors to witness the continuation of the trial. Outside one could hear some people murmuring: "*Barawo, ba su gonakinsu*" (Thief, give them back their farm lands.) "*Mun gaji da mulkin danna*" (We are tired of oppression.)

Addressing the court, the defence counsel Mr. Dogara Mallam, leading Simon Maikudi, submitted that for the accused peasants to be convicted for criminal trespass, the prosecutor would have to prove that the farm lands belonged to the complainants. On the other hand, if the complainants are claiming ownership of the farm lands, then the court should first establish the true state of the ownership in accordance with the proper legal procedures. Mr. Dogara Mallam argued further that in this case the

OBITUARY

J. B. MAIGIDA:



Echoes of a Fallen Patriot

Mr. J. B. Maigida (simply called 'J.B.' by friends and relations), former Solicitor-General and Commissioner for Justice of Kaduna State, whose sad and untimely death occurred on 1st August 1987, was in

complainant had tendered exhibit I.A, an Upper Area Court judgement which purports to have awarded the farmland to them. He drew the attention of the court to the fact that the judgement had details of all the parcels of land bought by the Kano businessman Alhaji Hassan Alhassan, and how he came to buy them. No mention was made of any of the accused peasants as having sold land to the businessman. In fact, names of those who sold their farm lands to him and how much each and every one of them was paid, were listed in the last page of the copy of the judgement. Mr. Dogara Mallam further reminded the Court that "there is no evidence before it" to show that "any court of law had handed over the accused peasants' lands to the complainant." For the court to convict, the prosecution will have to prove that the accused peasants had sold their farmlands. In this case the prosecutor had failed to do so. "How then can a person criminally trespass on his own farmland?" he wondered. Mr. Dogara argued that those who should have been brought to trial were Alhaji Hassan Alhassan and his agent, Alhaji Badamasi.

On the second count of assault, defence counsel submitted that even if the accused peasants had actually assaulted the complainant, they were protected by the law which allows them to protect their property. In this case, that did not happen. There was therefore no evidence before the court to prove assault, he concluded.

Judgement has been reserved for the 27th of August, 1987.

By *Abubakar Siddique and Richard Umaru, in Bakori*

life quite a remarkable man. As lawyer and magistrate, he practised his chosen profession with a candour, a forthrightness and a fearlessness that was as outstanding as it was unusual for his times. In all he did in his public and official life, his unimpeachable patriotism and irrepressible humanism shone like a beaming beacon in a world desecrated by self-serving greed and unrelieved calousness.

Perhaps nowhere was the patriotism and fearlessness of the late J. B. brought out as graphically as in the one-man campaign he conducted against the appointment of Mr. Justice Wheeler (rtd) by the Attorneys General of the Northern States to review the laws of Northern Nigeria. J.B. opposed the appointment of Mr. Wheeler (a Briton) to do the job for a fee of 100,000 pounds sterling, on three grounds: first, on the ground that Wheeler as a foreigner was incompetent to do the job; secondly, on the ground that the cost was prohibitive, particularly considering that Wheeler was to conduct the review in Ireland where his wife was also to serve as his secretary; and thirdly that there were many Nigerians who were competent and capable of carrying out the review.

On these grounds, the late J.B. refused to authorise the payment of the Kaduna State Government's share of the fee. So angered were his colleagues that they reported him to the then Secretary to the State Government and eventually even to the Governor. But recent developments, particularly the decision of the Attorneys-General of the northern states to re-award the same job to three other Britons in spite of the huge amounts already expended and the bitter opposition of the public, only go to vindicate the bold, fearless and patriotic position taken by the late J.B. as far back as 1981-82.

But the case of the review of the laws of Northern Nigeria is just one

of the many instances in which the late J.B. Maigida proved his mettle as a patriot, a nationalist and a humanist. There is perhaps no better way in which *The Analyst* can honour the memory of this remarkable man than to publish here brief excerpts from a few of the public statements which he made in the course of his rather brief but notable and tumultuous public life:

From a speech at a Public Lecture at A.B.U. Zaria on "The Independence of the Judiciary"

"... Judicial independence was seriously eroded by the military in our present constitution, yet it is my considered view that there is enough safeguards in our constitution to make our judiciary all over the country independent. . . . If all judges in this country can take a stand and be firm in their conviction over any issue before them and damn any politician and also shelve their political leanings and give our people justice and when our people see justice they will not allow any politician to interfere or meddle with our judicial system. And since the politician survives on public opinions they will just have to respect the judiciary and leave them alone. Unfortunately, some very few members of our judiciary have aligned our judiciary to politics. Take for example the episode of impeachments in Kaduna and Kano States

From a speech at the 1983 Post-graduation Seminar of Command and Staff College, Jaji:

"... You must make sure that the Government you are going to change is not popular; do not change governments simply because you have grudge against certain members of the government or because of inordinate ambition to rule. . . . So, gentlemen, if you topple a popular government people will spontaneously run to the street and chase you away. You cannot kill every one because you have a gun. If you shoot everybody, who will you rule then, yourselves?"


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
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Well documented, analytical and factual, this book, published by the Bala Mohammed Memorial Committee, and with an incisive introduction by Yusufu Bala Usman of the History Department, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, gives an insight into the nature and extent of political repression in Nigeria during the first two years of the Second Republic.

It contains basic documents on three cases of violent political repression, involving the killings of hundreds of innocent people, for which the lawless and corrupt N.P.N. (National Party of Nigeria), in power at that time under the leadership of Shehu Shagari, must bear full responsibility:

1. The Black Maria Killings (Lagos, March 1980).
2. The Peasant Massacre (Bakalori, Sokoto State, April 1980).
3. The Assassination of Bala Mohammed (Kano, July 10th, 1981).



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