

Vol. 3, No. 6

says it, as it is

November -

CONNECONNE OSED



YOU...


AND

YOUR

FUTURE

REVOLUTIONARY HERITAGE

"Every onlooker is either a



is either a coward or a traitor."

-Frantz Fanon (1961)

NOTE: -

Frantz Fanon was born on 20th July, 1925, in Martinique. He died on 6th December, 1961. Although Fanon lived for only 36 years, he was undoubtably one of the most brilliant, prophetic and courageous revolutionary intellectuals in the struggle for the total liberation of Africa.



PUBLISHER/CHAIRMAN:

Abdulkadir Balarabe Musa

MANAGING EDITOR:

Richard Umaru

EDITOR:

Rufa'i Ibrahim

ASSOCIATE EDITOR:

Olu Yusuf

EDITORIAL ADVISORY

COMMITTEE-

Mahmud Tukur

Hauwa Mahdi

Tar Ahura

Onwudinjo Ude

Tunji Osobu

CONTRIBUTORS:

Alkasum Abba

Yahaya Abdullahi

Sanusi Abubakar

Sa'idu Adamu

Umaru Aii

Iyorchia Ayu

Mohammed Bello

Zuwaghu Bonat

Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe

Osita Eze

Monday Mangywat

Andy Okolie

Gyet Tagwai

Bala Usman

REPORTER/RESEARCHER:

Muhammed Hussain

ASS'T. REPORTER/RESEARCHER:

Rabi'u Hassan

GRAPHICS:

Adamu S. Yashim

Mohammed Ali

SECRETARY:

Rhoda Yakubu

EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENT:

Si ddique Abubakar

OVERSEAS DISTRIBUTOR:

New Beacon Books Ltd.,

76 Stroud Green Road,

London, N.4 3EN, U.K.

Telephone: 01-272-4889.

THE ANALYST is published monthly by DANSA PUBLICATIONS LTD., No. 1 and 2, Beks Street, Ungurer Sabon Yelve, Western Bye-Pass, Keduna South, P.O. Box 2736, Keduna, Nigeria.

In this issue

A FUTURE SO BLEAK

ONCE MORE. THE IMF



Of course, since 'The Debate' the IMF has become almost a household word in Nigeria. Government officials talk about it. Housewives discuss its impact on their shopping baskets. Even school children have to grapple with it in their term papers. Yet, we all knew little about the IMF's inner workings — until, that is, Davison Budhoo opened a can top full with worms. Turn to Page18

THE COCAINE CONNECTION

The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is the world's fastest growing multinational corporation. Its plush offices around the world and the high-living officials who run them leave no one in doubt about this. Enterprise and hard work used to be given as responsible for the bank's phenomenal growth. Now we know there is a cocaine connection. See page 25

CONTENTS

Comments	4
Letters	5
Your Future	7
Stranglehold of the IMF	10
Rawlings: IMF's Foreman	18
Nigeria: The Railways Was The Best Way	19
The NEPA Staff Trials	21
Spotlight: Enter The Money Bags	22
Update: The Cocaine Connection	25
Recovering The Loot	27
Review: Campaore Exposed	
Frontline: The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale	32

COMMENT

FACING THE FUTURE SQUARELY

Man lives in the present. But to really live his present, he must have a future to look forward to. This future cannot drop down to him like manna from heaven. It is also not something that he can see in a crystal ball. This future is something he has to prepare, plan, and work for, here and now. At no time is pondering about the future more appropriate than at the end of one year and the beginning of another.

Here in Nigeria, what does our future look like at the end of 1988? What can we realistically expect for our children in the coming years?

To face up to this, we must frankly and realistically admit our present condition and how we have come to be where we are today. Beating a chest full of medals and making empty boasts about 'our great country' will not get us anywhere. Neither would the pompous claims about 'our rich traditions and culture' serve any useful purpose.

Today, our individual and collective survival is being threatened in so many ways. Secure access to the bare essentials of life — food, water, housing, and clothing — is now a privilege for an increasingly tiny minority controlling the government and the economy. Even official statistics confirm that the daily food intake per person in this country is now lower than it was before independence, and it is getting worse. In the last two years, the price of staples like garri, maize, yams, millet and guinea corn has quadrupled, and continues to rise on an almost weekly basis. More than one in ten of all Nigerian babies born, die before they reach the age of one. Many of those who survive are mentally and physically damaged for life by the undernourishment of their parents and themselves.

In the area of housing, the conditions which were already bad, are now rapidly deteriorating. In 1985, about nine out of every ten urban families lived in single rooms — an increasing number of whom have no

toilet or kitchen facilities.

It is also becoming increasingly impossible in many parts of Nigeria to move or carry goods from one place to another. The railways and waterways have virtually closed up, and the roads and the vehicles are everyday crumbling.

Education and health services are increasingly getting beyond the reach of even the middle class because of the high charges.

Furthermore — in 1980, the percentage of the urban working population in full employment was 72%; in the rural areas it was 62%. By 1985, these had dropped to 57% and 54% respectively. Today, even conservative official estimates would concede that over half of the population in both urban and rural areas are not employed.

On top of all this, the country is being crushed under a heavy burden of external and internal debts, most of which are bogus. For example, the burden of external debt hanging on the neck of every Nigerian was only N25.00 in 1979. By 1984 it had gone up ten times, to N250,00. Today, it is N1,250.00.

We have found ourselves in this terrible state, not because our country has no natural endowments. We are in fact well endowed. We are in this mess because of the systematic exploitation and plunder of our human and natural resources by rapacious foreign and domestic forces. These forces have treated and continue to treat this country as one of the biggest milch cows in the world, and are determined to keep things that way, even if it means that most of us perish.

We must face the future squarely. To survive, we must dislodge these parasites. We can only meaningfully address ourselves to the future by facing up to this challenge.

...DISHONOURABLE MEN

Members of the Constituent Assembly would want to pose as honourable men. But happenings in that Assembly since its inauguration show that they are far from being honourable in their conduct as members of the Assembly. When they were directed by the President to keep off from discussing crucial areas of the draft constitution, like the two-party system, the federal structure, the presidential system, etc., they meekly surrendered to this diktat.

When the election of the Deputy Chairman of the Assembly by themselves came up, they split into ethnic, regional and religious factions, and would have been at each other's throats if the elections had gone ahead.

By the end of November, their activities had become completely paralysed by all sorts of political theatrics over Shari'a. When the Chief of General Staff, Vice-Admiral Aikhomu, flew to Abuja, warned them, and made the judicature another "no-go" area, all the noise and fury ended without even a whimper.

This is not the conduct of honourable men. Honourable men would have, in the first place, either refused to accept the dictates of the military over the "no-go" areas, or would have resigned. Honourable men would also have been able to elect from among themselves a deputy chairman. They would certainly have avoided the sordid wranglings over a diversionary issue like Shari'a.

But it is not surprising that such was their behaviour. They were not democratically elected.

Not having been democratically elected, they cannot be expected to stand by democratic principles by rejecting military diktats. They cannot also be responsive to the real needs and aspirations of the people of Nigeria. For as far as the majority of Nigerians are concerned, the issue over judiciary is not Shari'a or no Shari'a, but the fact that the whole system of justice in this country is a system of injustice. It is corrupt, repressive and nepotistic. The majority of Nigerians try as hard as they can to avoid any contact with the judiciary and the courts of every type. They know all too well that these have very little to do with true justice.

But instead of addressing themselves to this and other fundamental concerns of Nigerians, these Assembly men and women — who are already preening themselves to be the "honourables" in the Third Republic — are only wasting the nation's time and money on bogus issues. Given this, and their generally dishonourable conduct, it is little wonder that many Nigerians believe that the Third Republic is doomed before it is even born.

LETTERS

The difference is clear. Here comes the genuine THE ANALYST at last. The September-October issue is a testimony. Why not retitle our THE ANALYST as "The Original Analyst"?

Sule R.N., Jos.

For the first time, I bought a copy of the September-October issue of THE ANALYST, and knew what I have been missing before now.

I found of great interest the expose on the Nigerian wolves in religious garb, as well as your articles on dictators masquerading as saints, claiming to have been sent by the divine from on-high.

One of such self-proclaimed leaders was General Zia ul-Haq (or Zia ul-Kazzab?) who under the guise of religion not only tore Pakistan apart, but also perpetrated the most inhuman atrocities on the minority (religious) sects, notably the Ahmadiyya and Shiia, etc. Your failure to make a particular mention of Ahmadiyyas as the most dehumanised victims of Zia's machiavellian politics really made me sad.

Nonetheless, I would like to appeal to every Nigerian to read the September-October 1988 issue of THE ANALYST, page by page, in order to comprehend the mischief of the so-called advocates of religion in the corridors of power.

R.A. Muhammad, Bauchi.

While other religious leaders, as revealed in your publication, have used their vantage position to better the lot of their followers and the society in which they live, for us in Nigeria the reverse is the case.

Our religious leaders are nothing but greedy elements, just like our political leaders. This has been the hallmark of our polity since independence.

Religion in Nigeria has been politicised, prostituted and commercialised for the self-interest of a few individuals who parade themselves as religious leaders.

We musn't allow these devils to

Isaac A. Abegye,
Numan,

DEVILS AT WORK

I have just completed reading your September-October, 1988 edition. As usual, I read it from cover to cover. The topic is very illuminating indeed. Please correct a mistake for the benefit of your readers.


In your article "A Theology for Liberation" on page 19 you referred to the Latin American Bishops Conference at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968. It was Pope Paul VI who went there, not Pope John Paul II. Pope John Paul II only became the pontiff in 1978 after the death, in rapid succession, of Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul I. I wonder why in your contribution on Liberation Theology you did not mention such giants as Leonardo Boff or Gustavo Guitierez.

Similarly, while referring to the Right Wing Churches in the West, you did not dwell attention on Jerry Falwell, who referred to apartheid as a system that implements God's will on earth, and to Archbishop Tutu as a "phoney priest".

Anyway, despite these, your edition was wonderful and marvellous. You should also concede a fact to Ayatollah Khomeini, who asked Iranians to vote for "Islam of the bare-footed", and not "American" or "capitalist" Islam in the last elections in Iran.

I wish you all success.

Abubakar Dungus, Maiduguri.



Richard Umaru's two articles (THE ANALYST, Vol. 3, No.5) were quite interesting. True christianity is certainly akin to socialism.

A christian should not only be a theoretical preacher, but should have a very strong, violent passion, directed by a very firm will and by ardent christian and revolutionary principles for the betterment of society and mankind.

Unless one takes up his sword to fight for not only peoples' salvation, but peoples' power, in the christian call, he is yet to be a born again christian.

> Atsevogo J.A. Tsanyu, Akwanga.

Your creative arts on the cover of your September-October 1988 issue really told the bitter truth. From the picture itself, one can see that the nation has been hanged, the chain running from Kano down to Gongola.

In the picture too, the cross was used to uproot the nation. It has already chopped off Kwara and Rivers States.

Like THE ANALYST rightly put is, everything should be done to avoid the impending doom of religious war. Over to IBB.

Paulingo C.D. Okoro Anumodu, Kano.

LIBYA

The way you wrote about Libya one would think she actually has no internal problems. And the manner Col. Gaddafi was portrayed, you would say he was a saint.

Unlike Gen. Zia ul-Haq, Col. Gaddafi was exonerated by you of every wrong doing. Were there no atrocities committed during the coup? What about his intervention in the fratricidal war in Chad, in Vietnam, in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, and in his call for foreeful annexation of Lebanon by Syria; not to talk of his conflicts with President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia? You concealed these facts just because you wanted to make him a saint.

Socialists are propagandists, and that is

what you are!

Aloysius D. Garba, Maiduguri.

IRANIAN REVOLUTION

Your magazine (Vol.3, No.5, 1988) criticises Iranian officials because of their strong and incessant efforts in bringing down socialism and what socialism has in store; and because of THE ANALYST magazine's strong support for socialism. You particularly attacked the Iranian Majlis Speaker, Hujjatul-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsaniani, because he in in the fore-front in denouncing this evil system (socialism) and exposing its hypocrisy to the muslim world, in which Bala Usman and his likes are hiding to achieve their nefarious and selfish ends. We are aware of the fact that THE ANALYST magazine wants to lead this satanic and hypocritical campaign in blackmailing Rafsanjani to mount pressure against him to quit from the Iranian political scene, so that the so-called selfish advocates of socialism will breathe free air to continue their devilish propaganda using the poor and innocent masses to achieve cheap victory for their lords in the far east of the world.



Rafsanjani: Moral double standards.

I would like to remind you that Iranian officials will, insha-Allah, forever remain steadfast in propagating Islamic ideology.

Ahmad Khadi Mumin, Bama, Borno State.

ONE COUNTRY, TWO NATIONS

The back cover cf your edition of September-October, 1988 (Vol.3, No.5) has clearly shown to us who the real extremists are in this country (Traditional rulers and Retired Generals) as against Mr. President's Kuru definition.

How can an individual ride a car worth N750,000.00 at this time, leaving the rest of us queing up all day long in government hospitals to end up being referred to chemists to purchase the prescribed drugs?

Umar Farouq Mayanchi,

Zuru, Sokoto State.

LANDLESSNESS

I read with enthusiasn the July-August issue of your publication. What interested me most in your articulate, fact-based articles was the one captioned "Landless-ness: Time Bomb of the Third Republic".

It gave a little more light into the treacherous and fraudulent manner those 'who have made it' in our society are robbing the hapless peasants of their legitimate rights to land, and the government's nonchalant, untowards attitude towards this retrogressive development.

I recall with sorrow the ordeal meted out to my people in Agenebode, Etsako Local Government Area of Bendel State, about three years ago.

A high-ranking military General (still in service) told the people that he needed a very fertile, arable land to establish a mechanised farm in preparation for when he retires from military service.

With the connivance of the District Head, who is now dead, and the Village Head, the hapless peasants were dispossessed of their land.

The worst happened when the farmers requested that they be allowed to harvest their crops. Instead of sympathising with these farmers, the General — then a Brigadier — sent down caterpillars, accompanied by armed soldiers, to destroy everything and beat the hell out of anybody who refused to co-operate.

Mustapha A. Amegbe,



Rotimi Williams

APOLOGY

In the July-August 1988 edition of THE ANALYST, we published, at page 22, an article titled "Imposing Two Parties: The Politics of Hypocrisy and Deceit". We published therein, above a photograph of Chief Rotimi Williams, S.A.N., certain statements referring to "Rotimi Williams". It has been drawn to our attention that Chief Rotimi Williams, S.A.N. whose photograph appears in the publication is playing no part in the activities to which we made reference. We accept that this is the position, and we are happy to take this opportunity to apologise to Chief Rotimi Williams S.A.N. for any distress or embarassment caused to him by the said publication.

YOUR FUTURE

As the curtain closes on the year Nineteen Hundred and Eighty Eight, and the lights come on to usher in another New Year, it has become imperative for you and me to pause a while and ponder over the future. Yes, the future! Of course not the future of this planet, or this continent, or even this country — important as these are. But your own future, and the future of those closest and dearest to you.

Just what does this future hold in store for you? What can you reasonably expect from the coming years, or even the coming months? The answer is: uncertainty, panic, suffering, and pain.

This is no exsggeration. Given the direction the rulers of this country have made her to take, your future—like that of the overwhelming majority of other fellow Nigerians—looks like a long, dark night.

This bicycle, motorcycle, or car that you are riding today is probably your last. That house that you have sweated so much to get may soon go to the auctioneer. The jewelry you are so proud of will probably soon end up with the pawn-broker's shop. Even that stereo set you are listening to now, you might not be able to keep. because you have to eat. Your children will not receive the education you so much desire to give them. Those of them lucky enough to have already finished schooling will find no jobs. That little farm you now cultivate shall be taken away from you. And there is nothing you can do about it.

As for food, this Christmas and New Year season is probably the last time you will eat rice and chicken. And there shall be no more having two square meals a day.

It is indeed that bad. Your future is indeed that bleak. Are you in any doubt? Consider the following government statistics for a moment. They are, of course, conservative — having been derived mainly from official sources, and covering, as they do, mainly the years 1979 - 1985. Nevertheless, they still paint a picture. And you should look at this picture very closely, because it is about your future.

Let us start with housing. Of course, everybody in this country



Star-gazing won't just do!

knows the sorry state of housing for most people. But perhaps only a few know that in reality these conditions have been progressively getting worse over the years. A national survey conducted by the Federal Office of Statistics, covering the period 1979 to 1985, has come out with quite revealing information on this.

In 1980, for instance, some 86% of urban households in the country lived in single rooms. By 1985 this percentage of urban households living in single-room facilities had jumped to 89%. Put differently, while in 1980 about every eight out of ten families in Nigeria's cities were living in one room, by 1985 it was about nine out of ten urban families that were so housed.

Similarly, while in 1979 some 7% of these urban families lived in flats and duplexes, by 1985 the number of families living in such flats and duplexes had dropped to only 4%.

But it is not just the rooms housing these urban families that are so cramped. Even the facilities available are terrible. In 1980, 17% of all urban families, i.e., about two families in every ten, had no toilet facilities at all—not even a pit latrine. By 1985, the percentage of these urban families without a toilet had risen to 21%. Also, by 1985, less than 15% of urban families had access to a water closet toilet.

Now, if this was the situation in 1985 when the retrenchment fever was just taking root, and when SAP had not fully begun its sapping of our pockets, you can imagine what the situation is like today. Add to this the rate at which inflation has inflated the prices of basic building materials like cement, iron rods, roofing sheets, etc., and it will become obvious that if, before now, you had dreamt of one day building your own house, you might as well forget it. Indeed, the

way rents are going up, you might very soon not even be able to pay for the 'hole' you are now living in.

If we turn to agriculture and food supply, the situation is no less grim. In the period since independence, the quality and quantity of food consumed by most Nigerians has been reducing instead of increasing. For instance, whereas in 1965 the daily per capita calorie supply in the country was - on the average -2,185, this had declined to 2,139 by 1985. Of course, this poor nutrition shows its effects on the health of the population. In 1984 about 25%, i.e., one in every four, of all babies born in the country were born underweight because their mothers were underfed during pregnancy. Similarly, in 1986 out of every 1,000 born in the country, 104 died before they were five years old.

Today, this poor nutrition is being further compounded by the stagnation, and even decline, in agricultural production - a decline which has been guaranteed by government policies which, for instance, the prices of such basic agricultural inputs as fertilizers and insecticides rise beyond the reach of all but the few wealthy big farmers. This year, a 50kg. bag of fertilizer in many parts of the country sold for between N40.00 and N60.00. Next year it will undoubtedly be much higher. So, if you had thought that "going back to the land" is the solution to your problems, then you had better think twice. It is not your solution!

But clinging on to your 'white collar' job is no solution either. For



The Nigerian Child: What hope for the future?



Houses of The Poor: Homes or holes?

not only have the jobs become more and more insecure, but the income levels - in real terms as well as in appearance - have also been declining. For instance, whereas government statistics give the per capita monthly income of urban families as N64.30 in 1982, by 1984 this had declined to N56.37. Similarly, whereas the per capita monthly income for rural families was N45.62 in 1982, by 1984 this had dropped to N38.84. Now, this was 1984 - some four years back - before SFEM/FEM had wreaked their full havoc and the value of the naira had received a buffetting. You can imagine what the per capita income is today and, more seriously, what it is likely to become if the trend continues in the coming years.

And this is against the background of rising unemployment. Official unemployment statistics in country are grossly unreliable. But even as unreliable as they are, they give a very sorry picture. In 1980, the percentage of the urban working population in full employment was 72%. By 1985, this had gone down to just 57%. In other words, in 1985 about half of all those people residing in our urban areas who could work were out of jobs! The situation in the rural areas - known for their high levels of under-employment - was hardly brighter. By 1980, the percentage of ruralites in employment was 62%. By 1985 this had dropped to 54%. Of course, these are very conservative figures.

What is quite clear, however, is that many more Nigerians are getting thrown out of work, and many more are finding it difficult to find any work to do at all. The number of the jobless can, however, only continue to increase, given the current economic and social policies being pursued by government. The impact of bodies and schemes like the National Directorate for Employment (NDE), where they are not fraudulent, are just like drops of water in the sea.

So — watch it! That job you are holding now may not be there tomorrow. With the on-going privatization and commercialization, your job is threatened on a daily basis. For once a venture is sold or commercialized, the new 'owners' would want to 'rationalize' their new possessions. Invariably that, of course, means that you — or your brother, or your friend — will be sacked.

But then, you may shrug your shoulders and say: "well, if the future is bleak for me, it is at least not bleak for my children. I will work hard to ensure that they get a better deal".

Fine. But hold on for just a moment Do you know that as of 1979 the total amount of external debt hanging around the neck of every Nigerian was N25.00; that by 1984 this had gone up by more than ten times to N250.00; and that by 1988 this has multiplied five times to N1,250.00? By the year 1992, this is likely to double to around N2,500, and the country would have been completely mortgaged to the IMF and other foreign interests.

After considering all these, do you still believe that your child has a future?

The fact is that even right now you can just barely maintain him or

her in school. For every child you have in secondary school, for instance, you must be spending not less than N300.00 a term for tuition, feeding, uniforms, books, transport, games, levies, etc. In a year, that is, you have to cough up no less than N900.00 just for one child in school. Of course most parents have at least three such school-age children. Thus, inevitably, even right now some of your children will not receive adequate education simply because you cannot afford it. Indeed, the official figures show quite clearly that there has, of recent, been a stagnation, and even a decline, in school enrolment.

While enrolment in primary one in Nigeria in 1979 was 2.8 million, by 1983 it had dropped to 2.7 million. Similarly, total enrolment in primary schools in the country declined from 15,210,481 in 1981 to 14,674,539 in 1985. Again, enrolment in secondary/technical and vocational schools slumped from 3,015,777 in 1982 to 2,999,088 in 1984. Furthermore, between 1980 and 1983, admissions to first degree courses in the universities increased by no more than 2,000 — from 20,429 to 22,049.

But these figures do not even begin to tell the whole story of the shadow that now hangs over the future of your child. Because even if this child is lucky to complete his/ her education, the nature of the tutoring he or she has received is such that it would hardly prepare him



Black Maria: Home for an increasing number of Nigerians

for the challenges he would face in life. Besides, even if the education he receives is good, chances are that he would only end up roaming the streets searching for jobs that are just simply not there.

Given such gloomy realities it is little wonder that the incidence of frustration-related crimes are daily rising throughout the country. In 1981 only 2,483 people were sent to prison for affray. By 1983 the figure had jumped to 3,242. While in 1981 some 14,769 were convicted for assault, by 1984 this had risen to 19, 196. Again, while in 1981 some 38,888 were convicted for stealing, in 1984 the number had risen to 63,174.

The figures for the more recent years have not yet been published. But

there can be no doubt that the crime wave in the country is mounting.

But even as you mark the end of 1988 and the dawn of 1989, you should spare a moment to think about the future — your own future, and the future of your children. You know that your country is well-endowed. You know that you, and millions of others, have been working hard. You know that you deserve a better deal than you have been getting. You know that your child deserves a future.

Are you going to continue sauntering along, arms akimbo, while a few people feed fat on you? Are you going to continue twiddling your thumbs idly while some blood-thirsty goons toy with your future and that of your children? Are you going to allow some seasoned crooks and religious charlatans to go on pulling you by the nose?

Or are you — finally — going to wake up to your responsibility, and stand up to be counted in the struggles that must be waged to stop the rot, and to turn things around?

Your life, and the lives of future generations, are in your hands to make or mar. As the saying goes, "if you are not part of the solution, then you are part of the problem". Your children, and future generations, will judge you by how you live up to this challenge.

Happy New Year!

By:Richard Umaru.

LET ME SPEAK:

Sapping The Eggs

One of the major claims made by government for SAP is that it will boost production. But as everybody knows, this has not been the case. In fact, the middle-men who we are told SAP will eliminate, are the ones who are actually flourishing. In the area of

THE ANALYST: When did you start poultry farming?

HAJIYA KANDE: I started poultry farming five years ago.

THE ANALYST: Can you tell us how many chickens you started with?

HAJIYA KANDE: From the beginning, I started with thirty chickens. But the number kept on increasing until it reached a time when I had 1,200 chicks. That was one year

poultry production, where over N300 million has been disbursed as loans by the banks, the actual producers are going under, the banks are raking in huge interest payments, and the middle-men are walking all the way to the banks smiling.

after starting.

THE ANALYST: What kind of difficulties do you usually encounter in the course of your raising the chickens?

HAJIYA KANDE: Most of the difficulties I encounter relate to getting the feed for the birds. The price of the feeds increases on a daily basis. If you go out today to buy the feed at a certain price, tomorrow when

Although the prices of chicken and eggs are well beyond the reach of most Nigerians — with an egg now selling for 60 kobo and a chicken for N20 — the actual producers themselves are being sapped out of business. The experience of Hajia Kande Mohammed in Jos is very revealing. Read on:

you go to buy it, the price will be something different. But when you increase the price of your eggs to reflect the increase in production cost, you drive away many of your customers. And, you see, it is only from selling the eggs that I make my money; I don't sell the chickens. This problem of feeds is the biggest one I have been facing.

THE ANALYST: When you started

this business, how much were you buying a bag of feed?

HAJIYA KANDE: When I started, I used to buy a bag of feed for N8.

THE ANALYST: How much is it now?

HAJIYA KANDE: Now, a bag of feed costs N40.

THE ANALYST: What, in your opinion, is the cause of such phenomenal increase in the price of feeds? HAJIYA KANDE: In my opinion, one of the main causes of such price hike is hoarding by some people. You see, such people buy these feeds, but instead of selling it straight to poultry farmers and at reasonable prices, they would rather hoard it and keep it for such a long time as to create artificial scarcity of the feeds, so that they can then dictate a very high price. This is

the main cause of the price hike.

THE ANALYST: Are all the raw materials used in making the feeds obtained locally?

HAJIYA KANDE: No, some of them have to be imported, And this fact partly explains why layer chicken fed on the feed sold nowadays do not lay as many eggs as they normally should. The reason is that most of the feeds now do not contain all the ingredients that are supposed to be mixed in them because these have to be imported and it's not easy to do so for most of the producers of these feeds. You see, most of the feeds now are made only from ingredients that can be obtained locally.

THE ANALYST: How many birds do you have right now?

HAJIYA KANDE: Right now I have

only 600 birds.

THE ANALYST: That's exactly half the number you had before. Why is this?

HAJIYA KANDE: The main problem, as I said before, is the feed. I can't cope with the price hikes and the attendant problems. You see, the 600 layers I have should, under normal circumstances, give me over 10 crates of eggs daily, but now I get from them only 7 to 8 crates in a day. So, you see, the daily production of eggs does not cover the cost of feeding them. My chickens now consume three bags of feed daily, which means N120 per day. So, any day that they produce only 7 crates, this means that they are run at a loss, because now a crate is sold at N13.50, and 7 crates of eggs will fetch you only N94.50.

STRANGLEHOLD OF THE I.M.F.

You must by now be fed up with hearing about the IMF. This is understandable. Since 1982, all talks about reviving the economy have revolved around the IMF and its 'conditionalities'.

Whether imposed directly by the IMF or indirectly through the World Bank, the Paris Club, the London

Mr. Camdessus,
Managing Director,
International Monetary Fund,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Camdessus,

Today I resigned from the staff of the International Monetary Fund after over twelve years, and after 1,000 days of official Fund work in the field, hawking your medicine and your bag of tricks to governments and to peoples in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. To me resignation is a priceless liberation, for with it I have taken the first big step to that place where I may hope to wash my hands of what in my mind's eye is the blood of millions of poor and starving peoples. Mr. Camdessus, the blood is so much, you know, it runs in rivers. It dries up too; it cakes all over me; sometimes I feel that there is not enough soap in the whole world to cleanse me from the things that I did Club, etc., these 'conditionalities' have meant only one thing: greater suffering for you, and a bleak future.

But bored with the mention of the name of the IMF as you might be, you cannot afford not to properly understand what it really is and how it works. Nobody has ever revealed the inner workings of the IMF since its

do in your name and in the names of your predecessors, and under official

But I can hope, can't I? Certainly I can hope. I can hope that there is compassion and indignation in the heart of my world, and that people



Mr Camdessus: I.M.F. Managing Director.

establishment in 1944. It has been a closely guarded secret. But for the first time, in 1988, a high level official who has worked for many years with the IMF spilled the beans. This man, Mr. Davison Budhoo, a 48 year old Grenadian economist, had headed IMF missions to a number of Third World countries. His testimony is chilling.

can stand up and take notice of what I have to say, and listen to your reply. For you will have to reply, because the charges that I make are not light charges - they are charges that touch at the very heart of western society and western morality and post-war inter-governmental institutionalism that have degenerated into fake and sham under the pretext of establishing international and maintaining economic order and global efficiency....

I hereby file accusation against the Fund in its dealings with Trinidad and Tobago on six counts, viz:

i. We manipulated, blatently and systematically, certain key statistical indices so as to put ourselves in a position where we could make very false pronouncements about economic and financial performance of that country. In doing so, we created a situation whereby the country was repeatedly denied access to international

commercial and official sources of financing that otherwise would have been readily available. Our deliberate blocking of an economic lifeline to the country

through subterfuge served to accentuate tremendously the internal and external financial imbalances within the economy springing from the dramatic downturn in the price of oil;

- ii. The nature of our ill-will, and the depth of our determination to continue on a course of gross irregularities, irrespective of economic consequences for the country and its peoples, are clearly shown by the fact your senior staff bluntly refused in 1987 to correct even one iota of the wrong that we had done over 1985/86;
- iii. Congruent with action outlined in

 (i) and (ii), the staff has waged within the Fund an aggressive campaign of misinformation and derision about economic performance in Trinidad and Tobago. The insidiousness of that campaign is dramatically highlighted in the deliberately wild allegations made in the Briefing Paper to the last consultation mission a paper that was cleared and approved by your good self in late June, 1987;
- iv. As the country continues to resist our Deadliest Medicine that would put it in a position to enter into a formal stand-by arrangement with us, we continue to resort to statistical malpractices and unabashed misinformation so as to bring it to heel. Among several misdeeds, we have influenced the World Bank, apparently against the better judgement of its own mission staff, to come out in support of our trumped-up policies and stances for the country;
- v. In our seemingly inexplicable drive to see Trinidad and Tobago destroyed economically first, and converted thereafter into a bastion of Fund orthodoxy, we have applied, and are applying, intolerable pressures on the government to take action to negate certain vital aspects of the arrangements, as enshrined in the constitution of the country, through which the government functions, and within whose framework fundamental

- rights of the people are recognised and protected, and norms of social justice and economic equity maintained;
- vi. Our policy package for Trinidad and Tobago—i.e. the conditionality that we are demanding for any Fund program, and the measures that we are asking the authorities to implement as a necessary precondition for a loosening of the iron grip that we how hold on the fortunes of the country in so far as its recourse to international capital markets and official bilateral donors are concerned—can be shown, even in a half-objective analysis, to be self-defeating and unworkable. That policy package



Davison Budhoo

can never serve, under any set of circumstances, the cause of financial balance and economic growth. Rather, what, in effect, we are asking the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to do is to self-destruct itself and unleash unstoppable economic and social chaos. In this respect, this letter invites you to appoint urgently an independent expert group to look into all aspects of the charges made in Parts II and III of the Letter.

Self-defeating and unethical as it may seem, what we have done and are doing in Trinidad and Tobago is being repeated in scores of countries around the world, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. Sometimes we operate with greater restraint, sometimes with less, but the process and the result are always the same: a standard, pompous recital of

given doctrinaire Fund "advice" uncompromisingly and often contemptuously and in utter disregard to local conditions and concerns and susceptibilities. It is the norm now rather than the exception, that when our "one-for-all and all-for-one" Fund cap doesn't fit the head for which it is intended, we cut and shave and mangle the head so as to give the semblance of a fit. Maybe we bust up the head too much in Trinidad and Tobago, but have no illusions that the way we operate throughout the world - the narrow and irrelevant epistemology underlying our work, the airs and affectations and biases and illusions of superiority of our staff vis-a-vis government officials and politicians in the developing world, our outrageous salaries and perks and diplomatic immunities and multiple "entitlements", the ill-gotten, inadvertent power that we revel in wielding over prostrate governments and peoples can only serve to accentuate world tensions, expand even further the already bulging ranks of the povertystriken and destitute of the South, and stunt, worldwide, the human soul, and the human capacity for caring and upholding norms of justice and fairplay....

Over and over again I've been told by people whose judgement I respect that the Fund will do everything in its power to decimate me as an individual, and to destroy me as a professional economist, in the wake of this Letter. The overwhelming advice of those with my interests at heart is that I had better resist all dictates of conscience and keep my mouth shut. I refuse to do that; I will not be muzzled one iota; I will speak up; I have taken meticulous care in writing what I write; I am prepared to prove everything that I say - send me before the harshest judge and see what you will see. In any event, in the broad sweep, important; individuals are not Davison Budhoo is of no consequence. I'm a vessel and the message that I carry will get through; that's the only thing that matters; irrespective of may happen to Davison Budhoo, the message, the whole message, will get through. And this Letter does not define anything close to the whole message; it is only the tip of an iceberg. And as to what lies beneath - well, time will tell. Soon enough, time will tell. . . .

I want to go on now to the glib way in which we go about undermining people's fundamental rights as protected by the constitution of the country. Of course, once we set ourselves up as part of the State Machinery that would deny benefaction to certain groups while promoting the welfare of others - and we necessarily do this when we force the government to bite our bullet - we become, by definition, a domestic political force in the job of redistributing national wealth among social groups in a particular way that can enhance the effectiveness of our "program". We may say that we are merely out to ensure that adequate adjustment occurs in the economy - i.e. that "economic and financial balance" is restored - but that's only a fancy way of saying that we are taking a direct hand in reallocating the national cake to suit our own purpose and that we are punishing certain groups and rewarding others so as to further our own cause.

You know, not so long ago, the colonial power, in circumstances where the colony concerned was perceived to be errant, would just go ahead and suspend the constitution and take over power directly and brazenly and unceremoniously. We don't operate that way today; internationally that is unacceptable, and logistically it is impossible, but we get the same results through other means. And unlike the colonial power of yesteryear, we can fine-tune our intervention so that we take away today only those rights constitutional guarantees that it is necessary to take away in order to achieve our immediate ends (which of course may change from time to time). In other words, we undermine constitutional rights gradually, and in a non-visible sort of way. And before we know it (if our relationship with the country concerned is intensive and sustained enough, and if we perceive that Great Things are at stake for us) we render the government naked and defenceless and on its knees before us, and we go about our business of doing absolutely as we please. And nobody, in retrospect, would seem to know how on earth we could have managed to subjugate both government and peoples thus, and how such a state of affairs could ever have been made to exist in the

first instance.

Well, as I said before, how far we are prepared to go in this neo-colonialist game depends on our vested interest in the country concerned. Because that differs tremendously from one place to another, our tampering with constitutional guarantees runs the whole gamut, from Jamaica to Zambia to India to China. Given this fact, one would have thought that Trinidad and Tobago would have been relatively safe and tamper-free, for it has never used our resources, or been involved in any Fund "arrangement". But surprise, surprise! Trinidad and Tobago was not allowed to remain virginal; over the years 1985-88 we tried to dig our tendrils into the constitution of the country and relieve certain sectors of the population from some of their most cherished rights.

I will confine my remarks on the subject of our miniaturisation of constitutional rights to two matters.

The first relates to our concerted attempt over three years, to make the Public Utilities Commission a rubber stamp of a particular brand of government policy that we wanted to see implemented — a brand of policy that serves exclusively the interests of the shareholders of the companies, and which, demonstrably, is anathema to the interests of the people of Trinidad and Tobago — themselves the raison d'etre, as consumers, for public utility services.

The controversy between the Government and the Fund on public utilities pricing stemmed basically from our policy stance that cost

increases should be passed on automatically and unexceptionally to the consumer, irrespective of the cause of such increases, or the technical and managerial efficiency of the company concerned. In 1986 the matter was discussed extensively during the course of our mission.

The position that we developed after listening to the views of the Commission was that cost inefficiencies were not immediately verifiable, and their removal, or partial removal, could not be guaranteed in the short term, and should not be a consideration in deciding whether or not to grant a price increase. We felt, moreover, that "social policy objectives" which implied elements of subsidy for the poor were inappropriate in the aftermath of the 1986 oil price collapse and the growing fiscal crunch of the Government. During the course of the 1987 mission, we debated extensively whether we should make a formal request to the Government to force the Commission to award immediate and substantial rate increases across the whole gamut of public utility services within its purview. In this debate, the plea of some mission members that the Commission was an independent body established by constitutional convention and could not, or should not, be "forced" by the government to implement a Fund policy based simplistically on marginal pricing and blissfully unaware of broader social considerations, was vehemently rejected. Instead, the mission took the view that irrespective of constitutional propriety,



Central Bank: Where's IMF's invisible hands?

Commission must be made to toe our policy line, and that responsibility for making it to become as a captive instrument was Fund government's. While the final version of our statement of "advice" to the government on the role of the Commission was toned down somewhat (presumably in deference to internal mission dissent), the message that it conveyed, and the implications that it carried for formal constitutional guarantees, were straightforward enough. Certainly, there can be little room for equivocation when you tell a government that public utilities' finances must be improved "by means of a more flexible and automatic processing of tariff adjustment by the Public Utilities Commission", while ignoring entirely the other very wide range of cost increase inducement factors, apart from our pet theme of "over-staffing", and the imperatives of "retrenchment".

Yes, Sir. Just establish that costs have increased and the Commission, foregoing its constitutional responsibility and bending to the will of the Fund, will do an "automatic processing" — i.e., will come up with an identical, or near identical, percentage increase in user prices. Matter closed. Next utility take the stand. The Fund is in control here. . . .

The second area of "constitution busting" that I want to highlight touches on the role of the Industrial Court — another creature of constitutional convention — in awarding wage and "pay package" settlements after established procedures for arbitrating industrial disputes had become exhausted.

Again, as in the case of the Public Utilities Commission, there was a heated discussion among mission members on the propriety of action by the Fund to 'request' the government to refuse to abide by the judgement of the Industrial Court in the event that the court ruled against the government. Sadly, in this case too, those who pleaded for respect of the constitution and for the laws and legal conventions of the country were overruled. Although the wording of the instruction in the Briefing Paper was softened somewhat, Fund staff was given explicit authorization to 'encourage' the government to ignore constitutional propriety and legal authority in its dealings with the





Kalu I. Kalu, Chu Okongwu: Any goodies from the Fund's honeypot?

public sector unions. Specifically, the mission's mandate was to encourage the authorities to implement fully the changes in wage policy introduced in the 1987 budget, although these revisions have been challenged on legal grounds by the public sector unions.

Need more be said? I think not; the implications are clear enough. . . .

I want to get on now with the juicy details of the Honeypot. And in doing that I will refer to my own situation. Admittedly that is not a very good example, for my Fund career has been punctuated with rebelliousness and non-conformity. Certainly, I have incurred the wrath of your High Priests; I have been put on short rations and my access to Honeypot's voluptuousness has been calculatingly restrictive. But given the fact that I do not want to reveal the Salaries and Allowances and privileges of others, I will have to speak about myself. So for what it is worth, here's my salary and benefits package as I leave the Fund, (excluding all benefits and emoluments on official travel and on mission and Fund representation work):

Total salary/benefits package = \$143,000

Breakdown:

Basic Annual Salary = 114,000

Other emoluments and subsidies
(gross, calculated on base of \$114,000,
annual rate, inclusive of education,
family and home-leave travel and
allowances, interest subsidy on loans
for allowable purposes and other
subsidies) = 29,000

Sir, I want you to note that I am being specific, so that the figures I give can be checked. If I am wrong in any detail, please issue a statement of denial; I shall be pleased to correct certain technicalities if I have to. But I suspect not. I suspect that I will not have to revise anything downwards. In fact, I may have to augment, perhaps significantly, my estimated figures of our Honeypot's largesse to our 'missionary staff'.

A word of caution is necessary as one tries to interpret the above package in relation to norms for other Fund staff members. That word of caution is as follows: my allowances are relatively modest because my family group is small. So let's increase the size of my family group and see what happens. Assume, for instance, that I had my grandmother residing with me in Washington, and I had chosen to have five children attend school/college in say, Geneva. In such circumstances, my gross package would shoot up towards the U.S. \$200,000 mark per annum. If, in addition, I was on field assignment in say, Guyana, as Fund Resident Representative (I was, you know, some years back) I would have earned close to U.S. \$300,000 per year.

My annual package, much less that of Big Family Man in Washington, or on assignment overseas, is more than the annual budgeted salary of almost every Head of State in the world; it is anything from five to ten times more than what virtually every President or Prime Minister of the Third World would get on his basic pay check. The Big Family Man with my identical basic

pay but on assignment in the Third World even as his five kids learn social graces in Geneva, compliments of our Honeypot, would receive more than the basic pay of every head of state in the world, including the President of the United States and the President or Chancellor or Prime Minister of every West European country. In relation to the developing world, his gross earnings would probably be about ten to fifteen times more than the budgeted salary of a typical African, or Latin American or Caribbean or Asian Head of State, and about one thousand times more than the per capita income enjoyed by two thirds of mankind.

Well, that's a handy little package of gold, you know. It is, indeed, a very handy little package of gold for a very handy job well done. You see how lightning did strike one day, several years ago, and brought me a-rushing unto Honeypot's ample bosom for a milk?

Oops! I forgot to mention the intangibles that come with the job. Like diplomatic immunities and our United Nations Laissez Passer that we flash before the eves of cowering custom officers of Third World nations, even as officials from Foreign Affairs Ministries whisk us from VIP airport lounges to our Twenty Star Hotel in the capital city of the particular fiefdom that we are visiting. Like Royalty Class and First Class travel everywhere we go, and generous subsistence allowances for overnight stavs in London and Paris and Copenhagen and Frankfurt and Rome and Rio de Janeiro and Caracas on our way to bust up the natives in Africa and Asia and elsewhere. Like high class nightclubbing and suchlike follies in Sin Cities, Compliments of Honeypot - always compliments of our Lustful Honeypot. Like personal secretaries on each and every one of our "missions". Like maids that we bring into the United States on G-5 Visas, and at our pleasure, from Paraguay and Mexico and Jamaica and Greece and India and the Philippines and everywhere else. Like the very generous medical benefits plan and the Group Life Insurance Plan and the even more generous Pensions Scheme. Like the realization dawning upon us that we have finally made it to Ultimate Paradise.

I've spoken so far of Our Honeypot for Fund staff, and indeed the staff had always been the core recipient of All That There Is To Offer. But Our Pot transcends the staff; she radiates like a Glowing Flame from our headquarters in Washington; she is seen throughout the world as the Emblem of Easy Money, and High Living, and Exclusive Jet-Setting for Faceless People with Pretensions to Economic Technocracy. As such, she draws into her orbit pentup hopes and aspirations and way-out fantasies of bureaucrats, and has-been politicians, and self-seekers from all around the world. They hope and aspire, and fantasize about getting a piece of the action, and a select few achieve their goal of consumation at least at that minimal level that serves to tickle the palate and make them ask for more.

You lift your eyebrow, Sir, and you ask: "Just how generous is Our Honeypot to her myriad suitors of every creed and nationality?"


My answer, simple and straightforward, is as follows: "Exceedingly Generous, Sir, exceedingly generous indeed."

Our Executive Board and their staff - and both Board and staff sit permanently at our headquarters in Washington - are as equally subject to the Charms of Our Pot as we are, and she, in return, is generous to them to a fault. All the goodies that she bestows on us she gives to them, and more. Many years ago, as staff salaries became unrealistically inflated, salaries of Executive Directors and their staff became even more so, given the Fund's policy of maintaining percentage differentials between the emoluments of the faceless bureaucrats and those of our political directorate. Thus was the Board drawn into the fragrant bosom of beloved Honeypot, seemingly Very Pleased with Everything pertaining to her Form and Style and substance. The Board remains in general a happy but quiescent, almost anesthetised body. At any rate, it seems to operate today as a rubber stamp for action and initiatives of the staff, especially in relation to our Third World role.

You know, Sir, let me tell you something. One of the most depressing experiences you can have as a Fund staff member is attending Executive Board meetings to hear Executive

Directors singing staff praises and going through motions and repeating uncritically the data and conclusions that we serve up to them in RED and Staff Reports.

Sir, while I'm at it I should make another observation, it is this: even as the Board is becoming more and more immobilized as an effective decision making body, and as the monitor of Fund staff activities, Board staff members (who normally would serve for fixed and relatively short periods in Washington on nomination of their governments), seem to be aspiring more and more to remain in their present Glorious State, drinking ever more from the Honeypot. Indeed, a casual enquiry will show that the incidence of formal and informal applications from Executive Board staff for regular or fixed term Fund staff employment is increasing alarmingly; several members of the politically appointed staff of the Board have in fact been placed in the bureaucracy of the Fund, Of course, if you are supposed to be serving your government but are at the same time looking over your shoulder for a job in the Fund, invariably you will begin to play up to those High Priests who hold the power to give or to deny you the job; you will tend to butter them up and bend down to them even while you sit on the Board, or prepare policy positions for those who sit on the Board. Well, perhaps you'll tend to do even more than play up to them perhaps you'll find it right to grovel at their feet and clap your hands in delight even as they rape the country that you represent, or otherwise



Connable: The other co-conspirator at the World Bank headquarters.

distort the policies and the credibility of the government that had elected you to the Board Staff in the first instance. What I'm saying is that a clear and easy identifiable conflict of interest is inherent in the current practice of recruiting Fund 'technical' staff from the ranks of aspiring Board staff members, and it is surprising that nothing has been done to halt this trend.

In scores of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks around the world. the hearts of aspiring 'technocrats' flutter when a Fund mission is accounced, for hope springs eternal in the human breast - hope to gain access to the Honeypot's Lusciousness by picking-up a 'big work' in Washington. The means to achieve this dream, of course, is by being 'nice' to and by 'cooperating' with Fund missions, or to call a spade a spade by doing all the things our Visiting Priests would have them do. Put another way, it can be said that active and 'I-scratch-your-back-andyou-scratch-mine' collusion between national government officials and Fund mission staff is becoming more and more prevalent. The purpose of such collusion is to set the stage and pave the way for All the Nasty Games We Love to Play. The modus operandi for this relatively new dimension of our operations in the Third World is to identify beforehand those key officials who are most vulnerable and influential (in the sense of aspiring to Honeypot's goodies and of having 'clout' with the political directorate). Thus preselected, we make it clear to them that their cooperation and ability to 'deliver the goods' could conceivably make them to win friends and influence people in High and Mighty Places. They come like moths to the candle: they can never fight her irresistibility. . . .

How on earth could we ever have got ourselves in a position where, with a straight face and without the batting of an eye, we could ever offer this brand of professional 'advice' to the myriad of developing member countries in our midst? My God, my God, what have we wrought unto ourselves and unto the world?

Frankly, Mr. Camdessus, I don't have a clean and clearcut answer; I don't know exacely how our dogma did crystalize into such monstrosity. But I do have some ideas of why we

are what we are, and how we did become that way, and I want to pass on these ideas to you. Probably you will find them worthwhile, probably not, I don't know. What I do know is that we cannot continue to sidestep the issue anymore; we cannot keep sweeping it underneath the carpet, pretending that it doesn't exist. We cannot continue to ignore the howls of pain of those in the developing world who drink our senseless medicine of death and destruction every hour of everyday. We cannot continue to mete out our own brand of punishment and justice to leaders who have the guts to stand up to us and say 'no'. We cannot continue to hold the whole world and its people to ransom to satisfy some undefined, and catalytically destructive quirk in our nature.



De Gaulle in 1967.

One of the authors of Bretton-Woods.

The first question I want to ask is perhaps a shocking question; at least you will think so, so let me ask it quickly, and get it over with. It is this:

Is the Fund staff running amok with the wholly unexpected and unexceptional authority that they wield? Are they churning out despair after despair, hunger after hunger, death after death in the name of Bretton Woods epistemology merely to satisfy their lust for power and punish those who run against their personal political ideology, and reward those who think as they do? Or maybe the creation of that despair and that hunger and that death is the way to promotion and personal aggrandisement within the Fund? Maybe it is the passport to an office as big as a church, and stuffed sofas to sit on

there, and high heeled secretaries constantly in attendance; and Young Economists listening gratefully to advice on how 'to make it' in the Fund? Or maybe it's a combination of all these things?

Be that as it may, I am firmly convinced that there is a close, and indeed watertight, link between our perverse role in developing countries and the epistemology that guides our action and the personal aspirations of our staff. More specifically, there is a widespread perception among Fund staff that personal progress and career advancement can best be served - indeed, can only be served by an attitude that would deny, as being legitimate or valid the aspiration of 'the teeming masses' of the South for a better life. Thus in our day-today work we must trump up a missionary zeal to put the skids, carte blanche, on any effort of any government to alleviate destitution or to redistribute the gains of economic advances or to lighten, for the poor, the burden of economic adjustment. Put differently the staff through time has twisted and changed whatever may have been the original epistemology of the Fund into a dogma that says that irrespective of reason, or necessity, conscience, or professional etiquette, Fund staff has an inherent right, springing from the Bretton Woods philosophy of 1944, to emasculate the Third World, and particularly the economically underprivileged of the Third World, and to wield unholy power there, and to line their pockets with the good things of life for doing so, and to solidify the myth that they are above the law and that they are The New Nobility on

. . . For Forty years, we chased that western dream of more and more prosperity and economic hegemony for North America and Western Europe. We chased it in the most unlikely places and at incalculable cost to hundreds of millions of hapless people in the South. And we knew no justice or fairplay, and we had no conscience or soul. And today, still in pursuit of that dream, we point our loaded gun at the Trinidad and Tobago economy and at the economies of scores of other hapless Third World countries, and commit statistical malpractices, and cheat and lie and wheel and deal on the rationale

that this is the only way that can safely allow us to plug in 'right' figures in our 'financial program' — 'right' figures that in turn will place us in a position to sing our theme song and fool ourselves that the nostalgic dream of our forebears may yet become a reality.

Devalue! Tax the poor! Remove all transfers and subsidies to the underprivileged! Fire the people! Cut out social services! Let the children starve! Let malnutrition of all in the shanty town be our performance criteria! Increase prices of bread and yams and soap and water! Negate the constitution! Kill all hope and aspiration from the heart of the downtrodden! Go back again to saying your prayers in the mosque, and begging in the street, and dancing in the jungle! Turn back the clock two hundred years and let us again be the masters and you the slaves!. . . .

You know, Mr. Camdessus, the 'core' of our staff, and the overwhelming majority of our High Priests, are still 'technocrats' from the developed world, 'trained' at 'prestigious' North American and European Universities, or their mimics from the developing world who aspire to be just like them. It is these people who, two centuries ago, would have gone into the Colonial Service of their respective countries as colonial administrators, or would have migrated to 'their' colonies as entrepreneurs or plantation managers or slave owners. Times and employment opportunities have changed, but ingrained attitudes after hundreds of years of ruling the developing world as vassal states, and as contemptible



George C. Marshall

Another founding father of the IMF.

appendages of the metropole, have not. In more explicit terms, a lot of the seething contempt, and the 'higher than thou' and 'better than thou' and 'natural right to rule thou' attitude of our staff vis-a-vis our developing member countries, have their origin in the history and national mores, and pre-conceived expectations of our 'core' staff. I hesitate to say it,

Department — a Department, as you well know, that remains highly segregated along racial lines, in total contradiction to the international nature of the Fund?

You know, Sir, I don't know if our Founding Fathers in 1944 did ever envisage emergence of us as a New Nobility drinking endlessly from a Honeypot; I suspect that they didn't.

"Why is South Africa classified as a European entity in Fund organisational structure and operational modalities? Is it not in Africa?"

but the 'white man's burden' mentality that is the root cause of so much of the troubles of our age, is as evident in the Fund today as it must have been in the United Kingdom, or France, or Holland or any western colonial power three hundred years

Of course it goes without saying that service in the colonies meant privilege and social status and high emoluments and perks - extremely high emoluments and perks - for material gratification was the motivation for everything. So it was then and so it is today. Within the Fund itself, as you must be aware, there is a very underhand and unwritten, yet highly operative and effective system for promotion and career advancement contrasts starkly with the formalized and written one; unfortunately racial considerations have played a very dominant role in superimposing the former system on the latter. Nor must it remain unsaid that certain Departments of the Fund are virtually segregated along racial lines, and 'internal' race relations are deteriorating further, even as our relations with 'black' and 'brown' countries seem to worsen. And if you want to go further into an internal worm that's eating at our soul, I will ask one simple question: Why is South Africa classified as a European entity in Fund organisational structure operational modalities? Is is not in Africa? Shouldn't it be within the African Department? Why is it administered by the European

They failed entirely to grapple with problems of internal organisational balance; certainly they never conceived that the nondescript and 'neutralised' army of neo-colonial civil servants that they were creating could ever dare to 'steal' the institution and wear its spoils on their chests, as Knights of an Equally Dark Age would wear Orders of Merit and Baubles of Exclusivity.

Not only were our Founding Fathers preoccupied with the foolish and wholly unworthy vision of Pax Atlantica - of western aggrandisement to maintain and increase western prosperity at the expense of all else but in the process of trying to weave that vision into the warp and woof of post-war world institutional structures. they left the door wide open for the faceless bureaucrat, ignored by everyone at the beginning, to slink in unobserved and take charge and transform everything into a credo of Massive Personal Power and Massive Personal Material Advancement. With the Fund mask on our face, and your approved Briefing Paper in our hand, we roam through the world in our hundreds. We roam like Caesars and Gengis Khans and Hitlers. We roam, from one fiefdom of our creation to the next, dispensing harsh and summary justice on the poor and the defenceless and the underprivileged.

[Signed]
Davison Budhoo.

...And Budhoo Speaks



Davison Budhoo

On receiving Davison Budhoo's letter of resignation, our European correspondent, Abubakar Siddique, traced him to his Hampstead flat in London and had a chat with him, Budhoo spoke for hours on his experiences in the IMF and how, with the connivance of some Third World leaders and officials, that monster has messed up our future.

Below are excerpts from the interview:

THE ANALYST: Why did you resign from the IMF? BUDHOO: The immediate reason for my resignation was my total indignation about what we were doing in Trinidad and Tobago. I was a member of the missions in 1985, 1986 and 1987 to Trinidad for the annual consultation meetings. By 1987 I became very indignant for the way we were manipulating statistics of the country to get the results that we wanted to get. To have a particular programme for Trinidad and Tobago, rather than making a very hard objective evaluation of the conditions of the country, and trying to structure the organisation to those conditions. We did a tremendous amount of statistical manipulation that are documented fairly explicitly in my letter of resignation to the IMF. By 1987, I realized that we have gone to the extent that we lost all our professionalism as economists, and we were doing a very subjective thing based on the dogmas of the institution, rather than the needs and the realities of the country. And I really could not stand that any

But beyond that, working all these years with the IMF, I came to the conclusion that, really, the epistemology of the Fund, the dogma, the method and the approach, of the Fund to the problems of the developing world, were not only inappropriate but irrelevant. And it made a massive economic retrogression in the Third World and created unnecessary economic sufferings to their people.

THE ANALYST: Can you please elaborate on these?
BUDHOO: First of all the Fund was not established to serve the Third World. The Fund was established to serve the developed countries. It was established in 1944 by the Bretton Woods Conference, in the United States, before the World War II ended. The war had messed up the whole financial and economic system of the West, and the Fund was an instrument established to restore currency convertibility in Western economies, and to set the stage again for serious international



Abubakar Siddique

trade between Western countries. The problems of the Third World were never envisaged at the time of the Bretton Woods Conference. The need for economic development over the whole spectrum of social change, was never perceived, as well as the whole question of poverty and destitution. The purpose of the Bretton Woods Conference was to discuss the West. And whatever programme is undertaken in the developing countries, must a priori advance economic conditions in the West.

THE ANALYST: You said in your letter of resignation that during one of the visits to Trinidad, you found out that the Government had already implemented some of the decisions which the Fund intended to advise it to implement, yet the technical committee went ahead to advise the Board on some other things.

BUDHOO: Yes! Yes! We went there and that was at about the end of our mission. What we wanted in a sense was to take control of the fiscal deficits of the Central Government in order to reduce it to 9%. But when we went there, we found out that the government had already taken measures to reduce the deficits to 6%. So, in a sense we had already achieved what we wanted to achieve. But that didn't deter us from saying, 'Okay, the 9% was an error, but after looking carefully at the situation, it must be reduced further'. We told them other things that they must do, although they had already done more than we had expected in the first instance.

THE ANALYST: In Nigeria, the decision to accept or reject the IMF loan was opened to a public debate. The people rejected the loan from the Fund and the Government accepted that verdict. It then decided to implement the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme. Is there any link between the IMF programme and the World Bank's SAP?

BUDHOO: Yes there is. The Structural Adjustment Loan of the World Bank is already a compliment of the Structural Adjustment of the IMF. What is even significant is that there is a common conditionality between these two facilities. As I know, the conditionality is identical. I think it is unprecedented for a country to take a Structural Adjustment Loan from the World Bank without taking a Structural Adjustment Facility from the IMF. What I am saying is that, although the Fund is not involved in this, it will expect that after a year or so Nigeria will come to ask for a Structural Adjustment Facility from the Fund.

RAWLINGS THE IMF'S FOREMAN

Ghana in the late 1950s represented for most African countries the mirror of their future, the "political kingdom" that Nkrumah urged others to seek. Decades later, Nkrumah himself realised that, with independence, imperialism merely granted political power, but retained economic control. In other words, independence political not mean real power, but an eleaborate state machinery designed to facilitate the continued expolitation of the masses, mediated by a bureaucratic and trading class who could be bought for

It is against this background that the coming to power of Ft. Lt. Jerry Rawlings, on December 31 1981, 25 years after Ghana's independence, rekindled fresh hopes in the hearts of millions of Africa's workers, students and peasants.

When Rawlings and his team overthrew the corrupt Liman regime in 1981, they symbolized hope to the suffering masses in Africa, while at the same time sending fear into the hearts of many African leaders who use their position to plunder the wealth of their nation in collaboration with their foreign masters. In Nigeria, for instance, President Shehu Shagari immediately stopped petroleum delivery to Ghana on the pretext that she was behind in payment. Later in the year, Rawlings was even barred from attending an ECOWAS Conference in Nigeria, and Shagari even went as far as expelling thousands of Ghanaians from the country.

This was hardly surprising, given Rawlings' slogans of "Down with Imperialism" and "Power to the People", and the establishment of organisations with names like the "Workers Defence Councils" (WDCs) and the "Peoples Defence Councils" (PDCs), etc.

But the genuine popular euphoria the Rawlings coup generated was soon dashed. From a virulent antiimperialist militant, backed by workers and students, Rawlings metamorphosed, in just under two years, into an imperialist foreman. The stage for this transfiguration of Rawlings was set when, addressing workers at the Tema Dockyards, who were angry at the direction the movement was going, 'Junior Jesus' — as he is commonly called —said "You are shouting, 'Down with imperialism', 'No to IMF' — who gave you that shirt you are wearing? Is it not imperialism?" He then slammed the microphone down on the ground, disappeared into the turret of his ever-present armoured car, and ran to the safety of The Castle.

Immediately after, Rawlings and his band of 'revolutionaries' rolled out the red carpet, removed the 'No Entry' signs on their beaches and airports,



Rawlings: What happened to the revolution?

called in the IMF and begged for the full dose of its potion.

Ghana has now become a model and show case of the IMF in Africa. In December 1985, Meave Fort, head of the West Africa Department at the Foreign Office in London, said that Britain wanted other debtor nations to do what Ghana has been doing since 1983. She then went on to describe Ghana as "possibly the best example in Africa", praising the "courage and realism" of the Rawlings' foremanship.

This accolade poured on the Rawlings' regime by Meave Fort was not done for charity. Ghana is the U.K.'s fourth largest market in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the IMF insists on the elimination of import restrictions, Fort knew whose interest

this would serve. Britain had also enormously benefited from the 500 million dollars paid by Ghana to her foreign creditors.

The basis for Ghana being held up as a model for the so-called economic results she achieved rests on the claims that, between 1984 and 1986, its GDP grew at an average of 6%; that inflation, which was over 120% in 1983, has fallen to 39% in 1988; and that she has managed to pay off 500 million dollars in debts owed as far back as 1966.

THE COST OF GROWTH

This apparently impressive showing of Ghana's economy has been arrived at not through any genuine improvement of the economy, but by the super-exploitation of the workers, peasants, and other classes of Ghanaian people through the harsh Economic Recovery Programme (ERP).

For instance, the Ghanaian cedi, which was officially valued at 2.74 cedi to one U.S. dollar in 1982, fell to 30 cedi in 1983 and further slumped to 186 cedi to the dollar in 1988. By April 1988, the black market value of one U.S. dollar was 270 cedis. The cedi has now been devalued to a worthless piece of paper.

Apart from this assault on the Ghanaian cedi, cuts in public spending have resulted in a severe decline in social services. Price control and subsidies have been removed, accompanied by massive retrenchments.

This does not mean that life is any better for those who are lucky to remain in employment. A study by the World Bank in 1984 brought out the fact that the cost of a minimum nutrition diet for an individual was 168 cedis a day. In the same year, the minimum daily wage was 35 cedis a day!

The peasants who produce the cocoa responsible for the sharp increase in export earnings are in no better shape. Their lot is that of increasing destitution a d rising indebtedness to middle-men. It was reported in 1987 that cocoa producers

in Eastern Ghana, on the borders of Togo, are indebted to middle-men to the tune of over 2 million cedis. Thus, any illusion that favourable produce prices are benefiting the direct producers is baseless. They are merely producing to pay for loans which they did not contract, and forced by worsening conditions of existence to mortgage their cocoa for a morsel.

Other social groups are equally affected. Recently, universities in Ghana were shut down because students were demanding for an increase in their food allowance, from 52 cedis to 156 cedis. This is still below the cost of feeding for an individual in a single day. Even full Professors in Ghana now operate 'kabu-kabu', with their rickety cars,

in order to barely survive. The Ghanaian education system that once held pride of place in West Africa is now in total shambles. All in the name of ERP.

That the ERP is actually destroying the economy rather than reforming it can also be seen from its effect on business. On 10th July 1985, the Central Revenue Department announced huge increases in taxes and fees on small businesses like tailors, shoe repairing, and hair-dressing. These increases are so large that on restaurants, for example, the tax was raised from 600 to 100,000 cedis.

THE FUTURE

Earlier this year, Ghana launched PAMSCAD (The Programme of

Actions to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment), which has become the latest buzzword among international technocrats. Its main function is to create public support for the ERP.

PAMSCAD aims to achieve: a public works programme; a credit scheme for small farmers and civil servants which would render assistance to about 3,200 families a year; and a small-scale enterprises scheme that would involve between 200-300 projects. But all this does not amount to more than a drop of water in the turbulent sea of suffering, misery and degradation that Ghana has now become.

By: Pius Gbasha.

LABOUR

The Railways Was The Best Way

The simmering crisis in the Nigerian Railways Corporation (NRC) between the management and the workers' union finally exploded on the 28th of November, 1988. On that day, the Nigerian Union of Railwaymen (NUR) called out its members on an industrial action. The immediate cause of the strike is the failure of the corporation to pay the salary of its workers for four months, as well as the retrenchment of about 8,000 of the workers in the past two months. Those retrenched have not even been paid their benefits and gratuities. The NUR insists, that its members will not go back to work until all the arears of salaries and allowances for September, October and November have been paid. The Government, through the Ministry of Transport, has on the other hand made available only N24 million to the corporation to pay staff salaries. However, this would only pay two months salaries and allowances.

It is estimated that the management of the corporation needs about N77 million to settle arears of staff salaries and allowances and to carry out other operations. The Analyst understands that the Government has flatly refused to grant this amount, argueing that the Corporation has first to account for how some grants made to it earlier were spent.

However, the question is: should this be at the expense of workers' wages? should workers be made to suffer on account of management's lapses? At a press conference held early December, the Executive Secretary of NUR, Akin Oduwole argued that the workers have infact been the ones who have kept the NRC afloat. Argued Oduwole: "We are, as a matter of fact, subsidising the management of the corporation by their withholding our legitimate earnings. Where there is justice and equity, we could have demanded appropriate interests on the delayed salaries."

Another railway worker with 2 wives and 8 children, who gave his name as Ben, said that he had sent his wives and children home because the market women have stopped selling food to them on credit.

As a result of the industrial action by the railwaymen, the rail transport sub-sector has been paralysed. In effect, a great pressure has been put on the road transport sub-sector. Not unexpectedly, road transport fares have skyrocketed. For example, bus fares from Kaduna to Ibadan have jumped from N20 to N40 Similarly, taxi fares from Kaduna to Ilorin, which before the strike was N30 is now N60. Kaduna to Funtua is now N10.00 instead of the previous

At the time of going to press, other unions had started reacting against the slipshod handling of the workers' grievances by the authorities. The Senior Staff Association of Statutory Corporations and government-owned Companies had placed its members on the alert. In a statement jointly signed by its President and Secretary. Messrs C. O. Nwagbara and M. A. Babayemi respectively, the Association gave the Federal Government a 21-days ultimatum within which to meet NUR's demands.

The present crisis in the NRC is a reflection of the neglect



Kaduna Junction: Passengers everywhere, but no train to board

and attendant decay of the rail transport system in the country. In 1987, the NRC spent 10.6 million monthly on salaries and allowances. In the 1988 Federal budget, N50 million was approved as "Operating Deficit" for the NRC. While it was estimated that the monthly salary bill might rise to between N15-20 million, only N8 million was available monthly to the corporation to meet its expenditure. Government stipulates that the corporation must generate at least N72.6 million, annually. However, the Managing Director of the corporation, Major-General Paul Tarfa (rtd.) believes the corporation cannot generate more than fifty percent of this.

The tracks themselves are archaic, being of only 3'6" gauge. These tracks cover a mere 3,505 kilometres. The rolling stock are also largely out-moded. Consequent upon all these, the maximum speed permitted on the tracks is 65 km/hr even though the locomotive engines in use are meant to make 110 km/hr. This situation is compounded by the prevalence of curves and severe gradients and old equipments for signalling. Needless to say, all these are unacceptable features of modern railway operations.

In 1963/64, the total number of locomotives in the fleet of the corporation was 307. This was made up of 250 steam and 57 diesel locomotives. By 1978, diesel locomotives had peaked to 219. But by December 1986, the number had gone down to 189.0ut of the 188 locomotives still operational, 87 have exceeded the normal life span of 20 — 25 years.

As for passenger coaches, only 440 are effectively working as at 31st March, 1987. To meet passenger demands, or even present scheduled passenger services, the corporation needs at least 720 coaches.

In the books, there are 5,616 wagons for freight loading. Out of this, 3,109, or 60 percent have since passed their lifeexpectancy. For 47 years, they have been in use, whereas normal wagon life is 40 years. Besides, their construction and body work is not suitable for the job they are required to do. What is required are flat container and open wagons for port traffic and transportation of billets and other goods. There have been no new purchase of wagons since 1982, inspite of the increasing volume of goods to be transported.

Similarly maintenance facilities like workshops and tools are archaic and grossly inadequate.

Traffice operations have not fared better. Between 1982 and 1984. passenger traffic increased from 11.6 million to tifteen million.

But the depletion of passenger stock and reduced availability of diesel locomotives has made it impossible to maintain the increase in passenger traffic. By 1986 only 9.90 million passengers were ferried by the railways.

Similarly, from a peak of 2.1 million tons in 1982, freight traffic declined over the years to 0.9 million tons in 1986.

Between 1955 and 1962/63, the financial position of the Nigerian Railways was stable. During this period, most of its locomotives, coaches and wagons were relatively new. Government policy insisted that civil servants and government goods must be carried by rail.

By 1964, however, the tide had changed. Between 1964 and 1983, the corporation's annual deficits rose from N0.6\$ million to about N62.70 million. In 1978, the total revenue of NRC was N31.91 million while its total expenditure was N74.68 million. Operating deficit in the same year was N42.77 million.

By 1985 the total revenue of the corporation was N96.96 million, while total expenditure was N96.96 million. There was thus an operating deficit of N92.22 million.

The vastness of Nigeria as a country, its rich endowment of mineral resource, its colossal potentials in agriculture and industry, the size and distribution of population, all give the rail transport mode a strategic position among other modes. This is because it is more suitable for bulk movement of goods and mass transportation of passengers over long distances.



Tarfa: N.R.C.'s Managing Director.

But this strategic importance of the railways has not been appreciated by successive Nigerian governments as is evidenced by the relatively lower emphasis placed on rail transport mode when it comes to financial allocation. The rail transport system got less than 7 percent of all funds allocated for transport in the Fourth National Development Plan 1981-80. Similarly, while under the 2nd National Development Plan, road development got 16.2 percent of Public Sector Development Expenditure, the rail transport sub-sector got only 2.14 percent.

Despite the Mass Transit scheme of the Federal Government, nothing has improved in the NRC. Instead you have a myriad of uncoordinated, half-hearted and media-directed catch-phrases. We hear from the transport

Minister, Idika Kalu, that Government has approved plans for the purchase of 50 locomotives, 160 self-generating coaches, 63 deluxe coaches, 64 sub-urban coaches, 325 openable roof wagons, and 100 brake vans under a financial arrangement still being discussed

We also hear that under the Nigerian/Romanian Debt Settlement Agreement the NRC will receive 200 wagons and workshop equipments. It was even reported that in March this year, wagons and workshop machinery equipments worth \$12,827,164 were delivered to the NRC under this agreement. Again, the Minister has said that under the Japanese Technical Aid Programme 302 Japanese built passenger coaches and 12 power cars are to be rehabilitated.

An amount of \$17.9 million has been made available to the corporation to purchase spare parts under the World Bank assisted parastal project. This would enable the NRC to rehabilitate 70 North American-built locomotives and improve its management information and accounting system.

Good and fine. But these patch-patch projects in themselves cannot move the corporation out of the morass it has found itself in. Until and unless the railways workers, passengers and other customers are given greater organised role in the management of the day-byday business of the corporation; and until the centrality of railway transportation in the country's economy is recognized and accordingly given a pride of place in our transport system, all these programmes would just end up being gold mines for kleptomanic public servants and their contractor agents.

By: Olu Yusuf with reports from Muhammed Hussaini.

THE NEPA STAFF TRIALS ACID TEST FOR THE REGIME

One of the platforms, perhaps the only platform, on which the present administration stood when it came to power in 1980 was that of promoting fundamental human rights. Because the government took every opportunity to affirm it, some Nigerians gave president lbrahim Babangida the benefit of the doubt.

However, certain actions of the government have long since chipped away from this human rights platform. One such action is the on-going trial of 10 NEPA staff before the Jos Zone of the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal (MOT) sitting in Kaduna. Those standing trial are Messrs M. A. Odedina, S. F. Dawomi, G. M. Okafor, C. E. Dotie, E. O. Kuye, and J. Kolatunde. Others are D. A. Olatoke, Ben Boye, K. Okafor, M. N. Olotu, E. O. Ogwokegbe, O, Ijaola, M. O. O.Igedu, D. A. Olaiya and I.T.T. Atiegbu.

They are standing trial on a 6 count charge of conspiracy and sabotage. They are alleged by the prosecution to have on or about 26/9/1988, in Lagos, conspired together to unlawfully interfere with works belonging to NEPA designed for transforming electricity, contrary to section 3 (a) of the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences). Decree 20 of 1984, as amended

The NEPA senior staff strike itself was sequel to an earlier triennial delegates conference of the Senior Staff Association of NEPA. At the end of this conference a communique was issued demanding for the commercialisation of NEPA before October 1 and demanding further "that pending the actualisation of NEPA's commercialization, an

interim award by upward movement of one grade level of all workers in the authority be implemented with effect from July 5." The communique also demanded "that the result of the 1980 promotion interview be released."

On 5/10/1988, there was a nation-wide black-out which resulted from the strike action embarked upon by members of the Senior Staff Association of NEPA. Three days later, the action was called-off after agreement had been reached on certain demands. According to the president of the Association, Mr M. A. Odedina, agreement had been reached on a fifty percent across the board salary increase with effect from July 5 this year. But this 'agreement' did not stop the authorities from rounding up the leaders of the strike and subsequently putting them on

From the beginning the trial has been wading through one tangle after another. The trial was to have first of all been carried out by the Kaduna Zone of the Special Military Tribunal (SMT) presided over by Mr Justice V. J. O. Chigbue. However on 27/10/88, an order of nolle prosequi was served on the tribunal by the Attorney-General of the Federation and Commissioner for Justice, Prince Bola Ajibola, asking the presiding Judge to transfer the case to the Jos Zone of the Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal. The order was obeyed.

Similarly, there also was the tangle over the granting of bail to the accused. Heated arguments arose over the conditions under which bail could be granted to the accused. At the Kaduna Zone of the SMT, the presiding

Judge, Mr V. J. O. Chigbue ruled that the Chief of General Staff signed the order detaining them according to Decree No. 2 of 1984 and that only the CGS could therefore sign an order for their bail.

When the detainees appeared before the Jos Zone of MOT, the defence counsel argued that since the accused are being tried under Decree No. 20 of 1984; they could be granted bail. The defence further averred that since Decree 2 was promulgated in February 1984, and Decree 20 in July of the same year, the rule of precedence and supercession should be applied. However the tribunal was unimpressed by these arguments and the detainees were refused bail at the Jos Zone of MOT on the ground that they were being detained under Decree 2 but are being tried under Decree 20.

There has also been some mild drama over the decision of the Tribunal to obtain evidence from some witnesses in camera. Protesting that the accused could not be guaranteed fair hearing if the Tribunal sat in camera, the four

President Babangida:

How now 'human rights'?

defence counsels withdrew from the tribunal.

The NEPA staff trials have been dogged by so many disturbing questions For instance, does Decree 20 of 1984, as amended by Decree 22 of 1986, envisage the case of trade union organisations embarking on or contemplating of embarking on a strike? In other words, can Decree 20 of 1984, as amended by Decree 22 of 1986, be used to legally stop strike action by an agrieved, legally constituted trade union or association? Should a strike action by a legally recognised trade union or association be said to constitute an act of conspiracy and sabotage? What is the legal cut off point between legitimate trade union activities of workers and subversion?

The defence counsels have contended that even if the accused persons were assumed to have committed the 'offences' in question, the Trade Dispute Act of 1976, provides for a Trade Dispute Tribunal that should adjudicate on such a case.

Describing the 6 count charge as 'invariably bad, bad in the sense that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to try the accused persons," one of the defense counsels, Mr Adesanya, argued that the evidence of the 12 prosecution witnesses "stands to nothing, since some of the prosecution witnesses have been shown to be tainted," while their evidence were uncorroborated. Citing the case of the 11th prosecution witness who admitted, before the tribunal that he was giving evidence only "to save my skin," Mr Adesanya cautioned the tribunal against accepting uncorroborated evidence of such witnesses in the interest of justice.

When *The Analyst* asked Mr Adesanya to elaborate on the allegation of psychological, mental and physical torture allegedly inflicted on the accused persons by security agents, the defence counsel explained that he indeed was aware that the Police do use such methods but unfortunately the judges do not always investigate.

Another defence counsel, Mr Chioma Okwuanyi, however confirmed that besides mental and psychological strain, the living condition of the accused persons in jail was so bad that "we had to intervene and sought the intervention of the tribunal's chairman to make things easier for them." According to Chioma, one of the concessions they got was for a separate feeding arrangement for the accused persons who were initially fed on Eba and raw palm oil by the prison authorities.

The allegation of torture was further re-affirmed by another defence counsel, Mr Ena Ojugo, in his closing submission.

The Analyst understands that at an earlier sitting of the tribunal, held in camera, a certain Major Agbo of the SSS, who is also a prosecution witness, was identified by one of the accused as one of those who tortured them.

The detained NEPA staff claimed they were tortured through beatings, being striped naked, left in the cold etc etc. One of the accused, Mr Olotu Jonathan, alleged that he was slapped so badly that he nearly lost one of his eyes.

However, these tortures do not seem to have done much to dampen the combative spirit of most of the detainees. One of them, Mr M. A. Odedina, who is also the National Chairman of the NEPA SSA, when asked by *The Analyst* whether he

had any message or appeal, simply said, "Go and tell them to organise...organise...organise." Since their arrest NEPA has stopped the salaries of the affected staff, and their dependents have been left high, and dry.

The defence counsels have made their final submissions and what is now being awaited is the tribunal's judgement. But whichever way this goes, the NEPA staff trials represents one more acid test of this regime's human rights claims.

By: Olu Yusuf with reports from Rabi'u Hassan.

NIGERIA

THE SOKOTO SULTANATE

ENTER THE MONEY-BAGS



Sultan's Palace, Sokoto: No sanctuary for paupers.

After all the fury and fire, and after all the killings and maiming, the battle for the Sultanate of Sokoto has finally been won, and lost.

Like it or not, Ibrahim Dasuki now sits pretty on the throne as the very first descendant of the Buhan me to be crowned. But just as he snatched the crown, so has Dasuki smashed a number of very powerful myths. But more of that later.

The announcement of Dasuki's selection in the afternoon of Sunday, 6th November 1988, was greeted with violent, popular protest. The anti-riot police failed to quell the protests, and armed troops in battle formation had to be drafted into the city. Check points were set up all over, and passers-by were frisked by grim-faced soldiers. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed by the state's visibly worried military governor, Colonel Ahmed Daku. By the time the smoke cleared, the official count gave thirteen as dead; and many others injured. But more plausible, though unofficial, reports spoke of as many as between 30 and 50 dead. Scores of buildings, cars and other vehicles were also burnt in the course of the protests.

To the new Sultan, Ibrahim Dasuki, and the government, the demonstrators were 'hooligans out to loot'. But when THE ANALYST visited Sokoto, while the flames were

still licking the streets, it was quite evident that the entire city was in a mourning mood — an indication that even if the arson was actually perpetrated by a mob, the protest had the general sympathy of the vast majority of the city's inhabitants.

Yet, in spite of this clear demonstration of the man's unpopularity, the authorities, with the full might of gunwielding soldiers and tear-gas-happy anti-riot police, went ahead and rushed Dasuki's installation ceremony. Contrary to customary practice, the Sultan-elect turned up at the Palace for the installation ceremony already turbanned, and in full regalia, under heavy military escort. Of course, time had to be saved!

But time is already against Sultan Dasuki. And the tottering feudal institutions in the country.

Hitherto, one of the most enduring myths about the Sultanate of Sokoto has been the claim made out to the effect that the Sultan enjoys religious and political suzerainty over the territory covering the former caliphate established by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. If nothing else, Dasuki's grabbing of the title has finally shattered that myth, exposing it for what it is. For, in fact, the caliphate finally ceased to exist on Saturday, 27th July 1903. Appointing Attahirun Alu as the first Sultan of Sokoto (mark you, not as caliph), Lugard had this to say:

"The Fulani in old times under Danfodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do, now pass to the British. Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers of the state will be appointed by the High Commissioner throughout this country."

It is, indeed, one of the greatest ironies of history that the turbanning of Sultan Attahirun Alu had interesting parallels with that of Ibrahim Dasuki. Just as Dasuki, in loud contrast to tradition, was not physically turbanned in full public view at the palace but rather came to the palace already turbanned, so was

it that Attahirun Alu, also in contradiction to established custom, was given a turban, a gown, and an appointment letter by Colonel Lugard (see box). Previously, it was the caliph as the Amir-al-mumineen, who gave out gifts to subordinate emirs on such occasions. Thus, the caliph who used to be the authority that appointed emirs, was himself issued with a letter of appointment by the High Commissioner, Lugard, thereby reducing him to the level of any emir or chief.

It is therefore little wonder that the relevant legislation which was invoked in the appointment of Dasuki, i.e., the Chiefs' (Appointment and Deposition) Edict of Sokoto State, had its origins in Lugard's proclamation. just one person — Shehu Usman Dan Fodio. Contrary to the clearly laid down Islamic principles of succession to leadership, the person who becomes Sultan is thus not necessarily the most knowledgeable, or the most upright, or the most humble. He becomes Sultan just because he is the son of his father.

Secondly, the same hereditary myopism applies to those who nominate the Sultan, i.e., the so-called king makers. Their selection is not subject to popular choice. Or to any criteria of merit. They are all hereditary.

Thirdly, to further compound matters, the coterie in the state Council of Chiefs which advises government on the selection exercise it again itself made up of people who owe their positions to inheritance. So





Dasuki, Maccido: Money's the game.

Indeed, even the very procedure by which Dasuki himself was supposedly selected, which required the king makers to present the names of three nominees to the government, is itself a British colonial invention. In the past, the king makers did not engage in such dilly-dallying — they actually made the king by selecting just one name out of several contenders.

But this is not the only myth that has now been shattered by Dasuki's coup de grace. The other broken myth is the popular conception that the process of making a new Sultan is a democratic one, which allows for the people's choice to emerge. Nothing could be further from the truth

To begin with, the choice of the Sultan is limited to the descendants of

what sense does it make to talk of popular choice and popular participation in relation to these bankrupt and undemocratic institutions?

Therefore, if before now anybody had any illusions that these so-called traditional institutions had anything to do with religion, or tradition, or even popular aspirations, then — thanks to Dasuki — these illusions have now been put to rest. It is now as clear as crystal that the whole noise over these titles is just noise over money, power, and more money. Money is the name of the game.

So, enter Sultan Dasuki. Welcome the moneybags!

By: Sa'idu Adamu, Alkasum Abba, Richard Umaru, Rufa'i Ibrahim and Bala Usman.

SULTAN ATTAHIRU'S APPOINTMENT LETTER (March 2nd, 1903)

"Praise be to God, the one God".

From the Representative of His Majesty the English King (May Goa prolong his days) Sir Frederic Lugard the Governor of Northern Nigeria:

To the presence of Muhammadu Attahiru son of Ali Baba, Sarkin Musulmi and Emir of Sokoto salutations and peace.

Whereas Abdulla [Abdurrahman] the deceased son of Atiku, Sarkin Musulmi in the truth entered into a covenant with the Royal Niger Co., a covenant binding on his successors, and whereas the present Government of His Majesty the English King are the inheritors (assigns) of this covenant, and whereas in spite of this Attahiru son of Mohammadu Atiku the late Sarkin Musulmi did in truth declare that nothing but war and enmity could exist between him and the authority of the Governor, and whereas he raised forces against the Governor, now I the Representative of His Majesty the English King the Governor for that very reason do denounce that treaty and declare that it is void and of no effect for the future.

Now I in very truth select you Mohammadu Attahiru son of Ali Baba as Emir of Sokoto and Sarkin Musulmi as from the 22 day of March 1903 in the year of the Messiah; and under these conditions which I in truth made known to you clearly and explicitly in the presence of Major Burdon, Resident, Captain Abadie and Colonel Morland, and in the presence of the chiefs of the land as follows; that is to say, Muhammadu Buhari [Bukhari] Waziri, Muhammadu, Marafa, Shehu Galadima and others. Ana the principal conditions are as follows:

1. The authority and power over the land which you have inherited from your ancestors the Filane [Fulani] acquired by the edge of the sword, are now acquired entirely by the Government of His Majesty the English King by right of conquest of the land.

And His Majesty the English King he is the suzerain of the land, and the alternate power and authority over the land is in the hands of His Majesty the English King and his successors, and his Representative the Governor.

2. The plenitude of power over the land belongs to the Governor who may do with it what he pleases, likewise the imposition and collection of taxes, the selection of the principal chiefs and the chiefs that follow them; [their deputies] and the authority over all mines, and the authority over the laws, and changing of them or the additing to them is in truth from now in the hands of the Governor and the Governor select you Mohammadu as Sarkin Musulmi and Emir of Sokoto on the condition that you obey the authority of the English King and the orders of his Representative the Governor.

In truth the Governor has full power over the land and also on account of the acts of Mohamadu Attahiru the deceased the Governor has declared that the whole of the country of Sokoto is in the hands of the Governor as it is written in the Proclamation whose name is the Governor of the land.

But for all this it is not the intention of the Governor to strip you of all authority, but in the contrary he wishes to rule together with you, to strengthen your authority and that of the law of the land and to perpetuate the customs of the people in so [far] as this does not stand in the way of what is just, and in that of good Government; and [in so far as] it tends to humanity, that is to say the duty of one man to another.

But taxes you have no power to collect them except those which the Governor agrees to, and with his consent; and the Governor has power to assign a part of them to be sent to the Treasury [so] that he may pay the people who govern the land, [country] and that he may defray the expenses of improving


the country.

Again you have no power to appoint chiefs except with the consent of the Governor. And in the assessment of taxes, and the establishment of Native Courts in the cities, and the procedure in them, and in all other matters in the Government of the land, it is your duty to follow the orders of the Resident,

that is to say the Christian Judge.

You have no power or authority of any kind over that piece of land which has been portioned off for the abode of the officials who attend to the Government.

If the Governor appropriates any piece of land for houses or for any other purpose it will be his care to respect the rights



Frederic Lugard: Mopped up remnants of the suitanate.

of those living on the piece of land. Any man from a foreign country who wishes to obtain the right to land, it is necessary that he obtains a title from the Governor.

War is forbidden you and also you are not allowed to do anything that will disturb the peace of the country.

And I by this letter in the name of His Majesty the English King Edward VII, (May God prolong his days) do promise you protection as long as you shall adhere to the conditions of your appointment and remain faithful to His Majesty the King; and further I guarantee that there will be no interference with your religion as long as there is no point in it which will cause acts contrary to good government and humanity (that is to say the duty of one man to another); or will bring about acts of oppression of the people.

Given under my hand and with the seal of the Government of His Majesty the English King in the district of Nigeria the Northern [Northern Nigeria] the year of the Messiah the 22nd March 1903, i.e. 24th Dzulkeda 1321.

THE ANALYST, Vol. III, No. 6, November-December, 1988.

BCCI: THE COCAINE CONNECTION

'Dogon Daji House'. It is imposing. It is posh. It is, in fact, the Sokoto home of the fast-rising 'Third. World's' first multinational banking empire: the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).

But the 'Dogon Daji House' is more than just these - it is also owned by Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, the multimillionaire businessman and Nigerian Chairman of the BCCI, who only last month was turbanned as the new Sultan of Sokoto.

Little wonder, therefore, that this posh, solid-looking storey building was one target that attracted some of the most vicious batterings in the protests that accompanied the imposition of Ibrahim Dasuki on the people of Sokoto emirate as their new Sultan. The building's doors, windows and glasses were shattered.

But even as this BCCI local headquarters was being battered and burned in Sokoto, its parent company - the BCCI Holdings S.A. - wat at the receiving end of another kind of battering in the U.S.A.

On Saturday, October 8th, 1988, eleven expensively-dressed executives (nine BCCI officials and three drug barons) were lured by U.S. customs and FBI agents to a phoney society wedding ceremony, at a plush and exclusive Florida hotel. On arrival, they were all arrested by their chauffeurs, who were actually FBI agents. They were subsequently indicted by a U.S. Federal Grand Jury for involvement in a complex network for laundering drug sales proceeds, amounting to a whopping \$32 million. A two year undercover operation, code-named 'Operation C. Chase', had come to a successful end.

Amongst those indicted were Mr. Gonzalo Mora, a Colombian financier and U.S.-based agent of the notorious 'Medellin Cartel', which is said to be responsible for 80 per cent of all cocaine shipments to the U.S. Also indicted with Gonzalo were nine BCCI officials, two of them in fairly high executive positions, namely: Mr. Amjad Awan, BCCI's Miami-based Assistant Director of the Latin American Division, and Mr. Nazir Chinoy, the bank's Regional General Manager for Europe and Africa.

The BCCI itself, alone, was said to have laundered up to \$14 million of the cocaine money involved, although the bank has strenuously denied any corporate knowledge of the deal. This denial, however, has cut no ice, given the fact that its officials had previously been under strong suspicion of cooperation with cocaine dealers. Indeed, just a couple of weeks before the Florida arrests, Mr. Amiad Awan was subpoenaed by a U.S. Senate subcommittee, in connection with his close links with Panama's strongman General Noriega. Noriega's involvement in the drugs business is an open secret. And the General kept between \$20 and \$25 million at any one time in a BCCI account in London.

The laundering of drug proceeds - i.e., the conversion of the 'dirty' money proceeds collected from sidewalks and city slums into 'respectable' legitimate money, and its eventual transfer abroad - is a very critical aspect of the entire drugs business. This is particularly so since U.S. laws provide that the banks operating in the country must statutorily provide information about any transactions of more than \$10,000.

Usually, the laundering process involves the drug syndicate employing the services of a legitimate firm which,

for a commission, will pass the money through its books and subsequently return it to the synidcate in cheques cashed overseas on foreign accounts. In the case of the BCCI deal, the drugs proceeds would first be deposited in their Tampa (Florida) branch. The BCCI would then transfer it to its head office in Luxembourg. From there the money would be sent to London. In London it would be converted into a certificate of deposit. This would then be used as security for a loan which the BCCI would give to a phoney firm in, say, the Cayman Islands or Panama, or Lagos or Rio. From there, the money can safely be returned to the U.S. or Colombia as respectable and legitimate money.

Nowadays, money laundering is a source of colossal 'profits' for banks in particular. It is estimated that the BCCI officially takes a 1.5 per cent commission on all funds laundered by

The bank itself was founded in 1972 by Mr. Agha Hassan Abedi, a London-based, Indian-born, Pakistani business man. Today, the secretive Mr. Abedi is the President of the BCCI. Mr. Abedi, a graduate of law and English literature, started his banking career with the Habib Bank in India, leaving the bank in 1959 to set up the



Dogon Daji House

United Bank of Pakistan. On the coming to power in Pakistan of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and his government's threats of nationalisation, Abedi left the United Bank of Pakistan in 1972. That same year he set up the BCCI, with the assistance of the Bank of America, which took up 25 per cent of equity shareholding, and wealthy Saudi Arabian families, the leading one of whom was the Bin Mahfouz family, owners of Saudi Arabia's largest bank.

On its founding, the BCCI had a capital base of \$2.5 million. But it has had such a phenomenal growth that as at the end of 1987 the bank had total assets of up to \$20 billion, and capital

speak volumes about what the bank may afterall, be up to. It is an open secret that Abedi was very chummy with the late Pakistani dictator, General Zia ul-Haq. Indeed, it has been alleged that Abedi was one of the financiers of Zia's 1977 coup against Bhutto. In addition, BCCI's sinister connections extend to the apartheid regime in South Africa, with whose approval it serves as the central bank of Swaziland. Interestingly enough, the king of Swaziland, a South African puppet, is a shareholder in BCCI's branch in Swaziland.

Abedi was also very friendly with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and with Carter's Budget Director,

established in 1979, on the eve of the return to civil rule. And here too, in barely a decade, it has repeated the miraculous growth which its parent company has come to be known for. Its initial capital when it started business in the country in November 1979 was just N3 million. But in 1980, i.e., one year after its establishment, its profits after tax, were N1.72 million. In 1981 this rose to N7.84 million. Then to N14.26 million, N18.59 million, N21.75 million, N20.18 million, and N26.8 million in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 respectively!

Of course, a sizeable chunk of this phenomenal growth was due to the

If You Have Crooks For Customers...

On the day BCCI was taken to court at Tampa, Florida, that is on Tuesday 11th October, 1988, the United States Commissioner of Customs, William von Raab, issued this statement:

"Six years ago, I came to Florida concerned about sleazy practices among bankers. Today I am back, and I'm sorry to say that nothing seems to have changed. For some international banks, their sleaze factor is higher than their interest rates.

Operation C-Chase is the most important money-laundering case in U.S. Customs history. It is the first time an entire international financial institution and its top managers have been indicted. BCCI alone laundered \$14 million in illegal drug proceeds.

Operation C-Chase involved over two years of under-cover investigation by more than 20 agents of the Customs Service. These agents were able to infiltrate an extremely important money-laundering syndicate, which included the Gonzalo Mora organization, the Robert Alcaino organization, the Don Chepe organization, and BCCI.

Operation C-Chase brought us the first fruits of an international money-laundering initiative with the customs services of France and Great Britain. Over the past week-end, we made 39 arrests here and abroad, and we expect the potential seizure

of millions of dollars in bank accounts and real property. You might say that, in the last 72 hours, the Customs Service performed its first corporate raid. We have given new meaning to the term "hostile takeover".

These people will have to learn that civilized governments will no longer put up with the notion that business is just business. I'm putting the banking industry on notice — business with crooks is crime.

As long as there is an international web of deceit crafted by those who launder drug trafficking profits, the drug problem cannot be solved. People sell drugs for one reason and one reason only — that is, to make money. After these drugs are sold and our society corrupted, there is only one way for these profits to leave America, and that is illegally.

The gates for drug smugglers are closing around the world. Great Britain, France, and even Switzerland are improving their money-laundering laws. International bankers, take note: There are fewer places where you can hide.

What is the bottom line? The bottom line is that whatever kind of financial institution you are, if you have crooks for customers, then you are a crook.

What is my message to international bankers? Read my lips — your check has bounced."

of \$1.5 billion. It had \$17 billion in deposits but only \$9 billion of loans.

No wonder one of the bank's pet claims has been that it is the fastest growing multinational bank in the world. Its posh and over-polished offices around the world no doubt attest to the fact that it has been doing very well.

But at whose expense? The cocaine scandal in which it has landed itself has now begun to give a clue to this. The BCCI officials interrogated by the U.S. investigators say they were laundering the drug money not for their own personal benefit, but in order to broaden the capital base of the company. The associates of the bank's president, Mr. Abedi, also

Bert Lance, who was subsequently to stand trial for fraud. Similarly, Abedi's close friend and confidant, the editorin-chief of his magazine, South, Mr. Altaf Gauhar, was accused by the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in the latter's death cell, of being a spy for a foreign power. The executed Pakistani leader had earlier on been accused by Gauhar, in a Guardian (London) article, of being a drunk dictator. Bhutto, characteristically, did not mention which foreign power it was, but the close connections between Abedi's BCCI, the powers-that-be in Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the U.S. financial and political establishment, leave a very wide trail.

In Nigeria, the BCCI was

heavy patronage which the bank got from the N.P.N. politicians of the Second Republic, and from both the Buhari and Babangida regimes. The bank was, for instance, heavily involved in the rice armada of the Shagari presidency, being responsible for opening many letters of credit in respect of dubious rice shipments.

It is not yet clear what other sources have accounted for this phenomenal growth of the bank's profitability and capital base in this country. But even as we enter another new year, the recent disclosures in the U.S. about the BCCI raise interesting suggestions and give curious leads. Nigerians may soon get to know who their Gonzalos are!

RECOVERING THE LOOT:

The Trial Of Mr and Mrs Marcos

In the early morning of Wednesday, 23rd November, 1988, the news was flashed around the world that the former South Korean President. General Chun Doo-Hwan, who left office in February this year, had made an emotional appearance on South Korean television, confessing to some of his crimes while in office, and announcing that he had surrendered to the government, money and properties worth about \$23 million, which he had looted; he begged for forgiveness, and fled from Seoul. He is wanted by the South Korean parliament to appear before the committees it had established, under intense public pressure spearheaded by militant student organisations, to investigate the corruption and repression of his military regime which ruled the country from 1980 until February, 1988.

Earlier in November, the wire services had carried the sensational story of how the fashionable Mrs. Imelda Marcos, First Lady of former President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, was arrested and dragged before a New York court, fingerprinted, and photographed by the police, and allowed out on bail, as she was facing charges together with her husband, of looting hundreds of millions of dollars belonging to the Philippine government. Her husband, Marcos, only escaped such indignities because he was too ill to travel. But his passport has been seized and he is also to appear in court later on.

THE NIGERIAN PRESS

These two sensational stories of the fall from grace of former heads of state would normally receive headline treatment in the Nigerian press, with its love for stories about how the mighty fall. Moreover, these stories involve large-scale corruption, repression and even foreign exchange racketeering, which normally make the mouths of Nigerian pressmen water.

But, in fact, if these two stories were reported upon at all in Nigeria, they were mostly tucked away in some corners of the newspapers and newsmagazines.

Why this lack of interest by the

Nigerian press in such sensational stories of the rise and fall of the mighty?

Could it be that the lessons contained in these stories sent cold shivers right through to the bones of the civilian and military owners and controllers of the Nigerian press? Could it be that these two stories sent these shivers because they shatter the myth that once you are out of office, you can escape with the loot you made while in office, particularly if you ensured before leaving office that you choose your successors carefully; or that the loot is safely stashed away in banks and in landed property and blue-chip investments abroad?

For the current fate of General Chun Doo-Hwan, who ensured that his successor President Roh Tae Woo was his man; and that of Ferdinand Marcos, who used his legal expertise and experience to hide away billions of dollars abroad, show that popular pressure from democratic forces in Third World countries and in the United States, can bring rapacious dictators - even those who faithfully served American interests - to face trials. If ex-dictators, even generals and seasoned lawyers like General Chun and Marcos, face such dangers, what about governors, ministers, commissioners, top military officers and civil servants and their business patrons and partners, from a country like Nigeria, so severely ravaged by high-level corruption?

The full background to ex-President Chun's confession and flight is still emerging. But details about the New York trial of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos are already available in the library of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

The substance of the criminal charges brought against Marcos, his wife, and five collaborators by lawyers representing the Philippines government, are to be found in the accompanying box. The landed properties involved, which, although worth hundreds of millions of dollars, form only a very small part of the billions of dollars stolen by Marcos from the Philippines government, are located in the choicest parts of New York City. They are:

- The Herald Centre, Sixth Avenue, New York.
- 2. The Lindenmere Estate, Centre Moriches, Suffolk County, Long Island, New York.
- 3. The Crown Building, 730 Fifth Avenue, New York.
- 4. No. 40 Wall Street, New York.
- No. 200 Madison Avenue, New York.

THE FRONT COMPANIES

The Herald Centre was bought by the Marcoses in February 1981, in the name of a company called Voloby





Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos: Nowhere to hide The Loot ...

Ltd., registered in the British Virgin Islands. This company had Mr. Joseph Bernstein, one of the New York lawyers fronting for the Marcoses, as its sole director. But the company itself is not registered as owned by the Marcoses or any of their front men and women. Voloby Ltd. was itself owned by three front companies registered in the Republic of Panama, namely Bedner Development Corp.. Comparal Investment, S.A., and Dicet Finance Investment Corp. These three companies were themselves not owned through normal shares, but through what are called bearer shares, which legally provide that anybody who has them in his or her possession is the owner. This dubious legal arrangement is to make it possible for the real owners to hide themselves almost completely.

In the case of the huge Lindenmere Estate, on the outskirts of New York City, which was also purchased by the Marcoses in February 1981, the original purchase was by a company incorporated in New York in 1980, Luna 7 Development Corporation. The ownership was later transferred to a company registered in the Netherland Antilles, known as Ancor Holdings N.V., one of whose directors is Antonio O. Floirendo, a close friend and business associate of Marcos.

FAKE LOANS


The Crown Building, on the other hand, was bought in September 1981 for \$51 million and renovated with \$60 million. These came from a network of loans from Bank Paribas (Suisse), and an Arabian consortium. The ownership of the buildings was in the hands of another Marcos front company, Lastura Corporation, N.V., registered in the Netherland Antilles, which in turn was owned by three companies registered in Panama, namely, Trade and Commoditta, S.A., Yenell Compagnie Immobiliere, S.A., Porcelanizades, S.A., and Panales which are themselves owned through bearer shares.

The building at No. 40 Wall Street, in the heart of New York's financial centre, was bought in December 1982 for \$70 million, and this involved a series of payments and loans from Citibank and Bankers Trust Bank, which are leading American banks. Its owners are given as Nyland,

N.V., a company registered in the Netherland Antilles, owned by three companies registered in Panama, namely, Beneficio Investment Inc., Bueno Total Investment Inc., and Excelencia Investment Corp., which are owned through bearer shares.

The ownership arrangement for the building at 200 Madison Avenue, involved Glockhurst Corp. N.V., registered in the Netherland Antilles, which is in turn owned by the three Panamanian-registered companies owning Voloby Ltd. mentioned above in connection with the Herald Centre.

This only summarises the intricate network of companies, accounts and "loans" through which the Marcoses tried to control, and still hide, the very small portion of their loot invested in landed properties in New York State.



Reagan: Abandoned Marcos, his old friend.

THE LOOTING

The amount of money Marcos looted from the Philippines government was colossal. He started out as President with a net income of \$62,000 in 1966, made up of \$15,000 Presidential salary, and \$47,000 payments from his legal practice, arising from the previous years before he became President. He owned a house in San Juan, in the Philippines, and some modest land holdings in Nueva Vizcaya, also in the Philippines.

But by 1966-67, Marcos was depositing huge sums of money in the Chase Manhattan Bank. In 1968 he started salting away millions of dollars in Swiss Banks like the Paribas Suisse, under the codename of "William Saunders" for himself, and "Jane Ryan" for his wife, Imelda.

By the early 1980s, his periodic raids on the Central Bank of the Philippines were brought to the attention of the IMF and the World Bank. In 1983, for example, there was a shortfall of \$600 million in the Philippines foreign reserves, which could not be accounted for. In 1984 it was found that up to \$3 billion of foreign credit to the Philippines could also not be traced.

A group of companies owned by Herminio Disini, a relative of Mrs. Marcos, received commissions totalling \$11.2 million from the American energy corporation, Westinghouse, over the nuclear plant they built in the Philippines in 1978.

All this is besides the large-scale seizure of major companies and corporations by Marcos after he declared martial law in 1972. Some of these he placed in the hands of his cronies or relatives, and others were taken over by government agencies, which were then milked by his henchmen.

Thus Ferdinand Marcos, who started his first term as President in 1966 worth less than \$100,000, fled his country after having stolen tens of billions of dollars and salted them away abroad.

And as the criminal charges against him state, he left the Philippines economy in very bad shape, with the level of poverty of the people extermely high. The foreign debt of the country rose from \$2 billion in 1969 to \$30 billion when he fled the country in 1986. The Philippine currency, the peso, had been devalued from four pesos to one U.S. dollar in 1966 to 20 pesos to one U.S. dollar in 1986.

Throughout these ten years he was supported and protected by successive American administrations, as he ensured that the Philippines continued as a big milch cow for U.S. business corporations and others from Japan and Europe. He also ensured the provision of key military bases for the U.S. domination of the Asian and Pacific regions.

But when the patriotic and revolutionary forces in the Philippines united and made it impossible, by 1986, for his regime to continue short of an outright U.S. occupation as happened in Grenada, the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress, held hearings on his dictatorship on 21st, 23rd and 29th January 1986. It was there that some of his

American accomplices started to squeal. This made it easier for the Philippines government to compile the evidence for the charges against him.

ORANGE SQUEEZED DRY

Under United States law, there are clear provisions which enable the U.S. government to intervene in cases against former foreign heads of state and of government and declare that the cases should not be heard because they may harm U.S. interests. These doctrines of the act of state and of head of state's immunity are, however, only used when it suits the interest of particular U.S. administrations.

In the case of Marcos, although he was a faithful servant of the United States and of its business and strategic interests, he did not get this protection. This was because of the Reagan administration's anxiety to be seen to be supportive of Corazon Aquino's government, which was under intense public pressure in the Philippines to seriously pursue and recover the Marcos loot. Imperialism, of the American or any other variety, is

ruthlessly committed to promoting its own interests, and will thus squeeze any Third World leaders serving it dry, and then throw them away like the useless orange-skins.

THE LESSON

Those serving imperialism in Nigeria now, and those preparing to serve it, should never forget this. They should learn from the cold and calculated phrases with which the United States Department of Justice stated its refusal to protect Marcos, because he was no longer useful. In the statement filed on 10th June, 1986, the U.S. Government said:

"The proceedings involve claims that co-defendant Ferdinand Marcos is the beneficial owner of five pieces of real estate in the State of New York, and that the properties were acquired with money wrongfully taken from the plaintiff-apellee, the Government of the Philippines. . . . With respect to the act of state doctrine, the burden is always upon the party asserting the applicability of the doctrine to establish to the court's

satisfaction that adjudication would require review of the sovereign act of another government. Only after this burden is met do other factors relevant to the doctrine's applicability including foreign policy considerations, need to be considered. . . . The district court held that the defendants had not discharged their burden of proving an act of state and, on the basis of the record developed in the case to date, we agree. As to the allegation of head of state immunity, this issue has been raised on appeal by parties who are not competent to invoke the doctrine, even assuming the doctrine has any applicability in these proceedings. We therefore do not submit any views to the court on this issue."

In other words, Mr. and Mrs. Marcos are no longer useful to Uncle Sam, and are left to sink or swim on their own devices. Their trial in New York is a clear signal that there is increasingly no sanctuary anywhere in the world for the looters of our national wealth.

THE CRIMINAL CHARGES

"The defendant Ferdinand Marcos (herein after Marcos) became President of the Philippines in 1966 and on September 21, 1972 declared martial law. From and after the declaration of martial law, Marcos was the dictator of the Philippines and personally controlled its government and economy. Marcos fled his country on February 25, 1986 when it became evident through the overwhelming reactions of the Philippino people that they would no longer accept his rule.


"During the entire period of his reign and particularly after the commencement of his dictatorship, Marcos, in addition to engaging in a variety of activities constituting a gross denial of human rights, including murder, torture, summary incarceration and execution, control of the media, and disappearances, also participated in widespread purloining of funds and properties which were and are the property of the Philippino Government and people. The said taking of Government properties was effected by a range of techniques, including but not limited to the following: accepting payments, bribes, kickbacks, interests in business ventures, and other things of value in exchange for the grant of government favors. contracts, licenses, franchises, loans, and other public benefits: outright expropriation of private property for the benefit of persons beholden to or fronting for the defendant Marcos, the said expropriation being at times effected by violence or the threat of violence or incarceration; arrangement of loans by the Philippine Government to private parties beholden to and fronting for the defendant Marcos; direct raiding of the public treasury; diversion of loans, credits and advances from other governments intended for use by the Philippine Government: creating public monopolies placed in the hands of persons beholden to and fronting for the defendant Marcos. The said

actions of the defendants were not only in violation of the laws of the Philippines, but also caused a massive drain upon the funds of the Philippine Government. The level of poverty at the end of Marcos rule is extremely high and, on information and belief, amounts purloined by Marcos are of such significance as to affect the general economic conditions of the Philippine Government and people, and may even equal or exceed the national debt of the Government of the Philippines. which is approximately 30 billion dollars. An essential part of the plan of the defendant Marcos was that after looting the government and people of the Philippines in the manner aforesaid he would cause assets derived from such looting to be placed in foreign countries, including the United States, where he would make investments in the name of nominees who would hold such investments for him. The defendant Marcos engaged in the foregoing foreign investment activities in conspiracy with other persons, including but not limited to the defendants Imelda Marcos, Ralph and Joseph Bernstein, Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista, Antonio Floirendo and numerous other persons. Pursuant to the said conspiracy, many of the assets and properties acquired by or for the benefit of Marcos were placed with individuals or corporations throughout the world, including the United States. Pursuant to the foregoing conspiracy, a number of valuable pieces of real property located in the state of New York have, on information and belief, been purchased for the benefit of the defendant Marcos, from the proceeds of monies and assets purloined from the Philippine Government.'

Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York; Index No. 4776/86; March 2, 1986.

COMPAORE EXPOSED A Review Of 'SANKARA SPEAKS', Published by PATHFINDERS

This 260-page volume, a collection of some of Thomas Sankara's most important speeches interviews, published in 1988, can hardly have come at a better time than now. For one, there is the fact that in concerned and progressive circles all over the world there has been - since Sankara's murder a year ago - growing hunger for more concrete information than sentimental and sensational halftruths being peddled by the media about this young man, who, in the four years that he led his poor, landlocked country, made waves around the world and became one of the most articulate spokesmen of this generation of African youths. For another and more importantly - there are the lies, slander and distortions by the new regime in Burkina Faso Sankara's ideas, commitment, and his actual role in, and contributions to, the struggles to transform Burkina. Since it took over power in a most bloody counter-revolutionary coup on October 15, 1987, the Blaise Campaore regime in Burkina has spared no effort to belittle, or even deny, Sankara's immense contributions to the revolutionary process in Burkina - and Africa as a whole. The



Campaore regime clearly seems obsessed to paint Sankara as an opportunist lacking in ideological clarity who, once in power, not only abandoned the first principles of the August 4 Revolution but also turned it into a one-man show run purely on his whims and caprices.

With this collection of speeches. the world can now see through all the lies about Sankara being dished out from Ouagadougou and echoed around the world by reactionary media organs. For, from the pages of this collection, Sankara comes forth to us not as someone confused, unclear and incoherent, but as a revolutionary with a clear grasp of issues, originality of thought and depth. In fact, it is impossible to read through the speeches and interviews contained in this collection and fail to be struck by the remarkable degree of consistency, clarity of thought, and understanding of issues that run through them - such depth of understanding that is surprising from someone of Sankara's profession even in a country like Burkina where there is a fairly high level of political awareness and a tradition of radical politics even within the military.

But it is to this that the collection, for the most part, owes its appeal and significance. The originality of Sankara's thoughts and the frankness with which he expresses them, which shows in every page, passage and sentence, make the collection a most valuable study of Burkina's attempt at national democratic revolution (1983-1987) and his place and role in it. Now readers around the world can get to read about and understand better the August 4 Revolution in Burkina its history, the conditions that gave rise to it, the ideas and struggle that shaped it and gave it its particular character, the goals it set itself, the problems encountered, the achievements and failures recorded and, of course, its limitations. Such a task is greatly facilitated by the arrangement of the speeches and interviews

contained in the collection in a chronological order — giving the events a historical sequence — and by the wide range of subjects covered by the speeches and interviews — which puts the events in a clearer perspective and places them within the wider context of struggles on the African continent.

The August 4 Revolution, we are told, is one with a dual character: it is a democratic and popular revolution. Its democratic character flows from the tasks it set itself to "liquidate imperialist domination and exploitation and cleanse the countryside of all social, economic and cultural obstacles that keep it in a backward state". It derives its popular character from "the full participation of all the (Burkina) masses in the revolution and their consistent mobilization around democratic and revolutionary slogans that express in concrete terms their own interests. . . . ", as well as from the fact that one of the revolution's tasks is to replace the old state machinery with a new one that "will guarantee the democratic exercise of power by the people and for the people". Such exercise of power is to be done through the structures created by the revolution: the Committees for



the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). The CDRs form the core or basic structures of the revolution which — the abuses to which they have been subjected notwithstanding have been most useful as a way of giving practical expression to the concept of peoples power.

"The People'. 'Peoples Power'. 'Political Organization'. These are the most recurrent themes that crop up in every speech and interview of Sankara in this collection. They form the core of his concerns, whatever the subject of his speech, and there is nothing

organized such that they can consciously seize power from their exploiters and use it to shape their own destiny, to build a new society, and a new future. This was why, for him, no amount of energy devoted to, or attention given to, the question of political organization would be considered too much. And the CDRs were at the top of the list of government priorities under his leadership. As he said during his closing speech at the First National Conference of the CDRs at Ouagadougou in March/April 1986: "No! We could never agree to

as the basic structures for such a task, that led to the rift between him and some of his colleagues in the National Council of the Revolution (CNR) and ultimately to the bloody counterrevolutionary coup in which he was assassinated. But this collection does not owe

its significance just to being an account of the August 4 Revolution in Burkina and Sankara's place in it. There is much more to it than this. In its own right, the collection deserves to be seen and treated as a major statement on the African condition, and an invaluable addition to the growing stock of radical literature in Africa. For Sankara was himself an internationalist, and especially so where internationalism has a bearing on the Burkinabe situation; and he had a lot to say, even in this collection, on other revolutions and struggles for freedom and democracy around the world - e.g. the Nicaraguan Revolution, the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, and the struggle for a Palestinian state.

It is not so much the novelty of his ideas that give this collection its significance as the fervour, sincerity, forthrightness and freshness of his style, as well as his unwavering commitment to these ideas.

But ideas alone do not make a revolution — even a national democratic revolution. As the bloody coup by Campaore and his gang has demonstrated, for those ideas to be translated into revolutionary action, the oppressed classes must be organized and armed to conquer power and defend it. There was no doubt that in Burkina Faso on October 15, 1987, the people wanted to fight to defend even the limited gains of the August 4 Revolution. But the Burkinabe army, which remained essentially an unreconstructed neocolonial army, remained at the centre of the state and the entire political system. The life and death of Sankara brings out clearly the possibilities and limitations of even the most sincere military-led attempt at a national democratic revolution.

Thomas Sankara Speaks is a must for all sincere progressives and foreward looking Africans who have the future of Africa at heart.

By: Rufa'i Ibrahim.



Sankara: Speaking in Managua, Nicaragua, November 8, 1986.

whatsoever in this collection, whose contents cover such a wide range of subjects - from the question of who are the enemies of the people, to the issues of political orientation and organization, non-alignment, African unity, and the women question - that casts any doubts on his sincerety in this regard. For him, after all, August 4 "is simply the logical outcome - the concretization - of the popular will. . . ." An act of the people, so to say. It was his belief that to give August 4 concrete meaning, the people must be educated, conscientized and

put aside the CDRs. There are not two Burkina Fasos. There is one single Burkina Faso - the Burkina Faso of the CDRs. Our country begins and ends with the CDRs. This is why CDRs must rapidly be formed wherever they do not yet exist."

But more than any other thing, it is Sankara's belief in the Burkinabe people, his overriding concern to see that they are politically educated, mobilized and organized enough to have confidence in their own ability to change their conditions, plus his unwavering commitment to the CDRs

THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE(11)

In THE ANALYST, Vol.3, No.4, of July-August 1988, we brought to you the first part of this assessment of the historic battle of Cuito Cuanavale, whose outcome earlier this year decisively changed the balance of forces on the Angola-Namibia battle front of the frontline in Southern Africa. This edition carries the second, and concluding, part of the article, which, due to pressure on our space, we could not carry in the last issue. This second part was written, and even typeset,

together with the first part, as one article, in June 1988. And, in spite of the apparently dramatic developments at the diplomatic level in that region, so loudly touted by the BBC, VOA, Radio France Internationale, and other Western media organs, we find no reason for changing any part of it, including the conclusion.

We think that it is a dangerous illusion, deliberately generated by these sophisticated propaganda organs of the West, to believe that with the signing of agreements between Angola, South Africa and Cuba over Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops, peace will soon prevail in Angola and Namibia. We shall soon bring to you a factual, in-depth, and comprehensive analysis of the current situation in Angola and Namibia and the whole of Southern Africa. We shall expose the lies, half-truths and massive doses of dis-information fed to Africans daily from the West, about what is taking place in that region of our continent so crucial to our future. Meanwhile, read on:


FAPLA'S OFFENSIVE

By mid-1985 FAPLA was ready to launch a major offensive to deal with the Unita bandits. In August the offensive was launched, and it took back Mavinga, in Cuanda Cubango Province, which the South Africans had conquered and made into a Unita base in September 1980. FAPLA succeeded so well that SADF was faced with the prospect of all Unita bases in Moxico and Cuanda Cubango provinces being wiped out. So elite South African units were sent in, backed by massive air, artillery and armour. These met effective Angolan resistance with skilled use of helicopter gunships, anti-aircraft defences, tanks, and other advanced weapons. Mig-23 combat aircraft, flown by Angolan pilots, for the first time, made their mark in the Battle of Mavinga, and during the rest of the 1985 FAPLA offensive. South Africa was so surprised by the effectiveness of the Angolans in using advanced weapons that they started screaming about the presence of a whole Soviet infantry batallion and Soviet pilots in Angola.

However, the South African counter attacks were so massive that FAPLA had to retreat, saving the Unita bases.

Reagan raised the level of U.S. aid to Unita and by 1986 was giving them Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and advanced anti-tank weapons. Mercenaries from all over Southern Africa, America and Europe, and units of the South West African Territorial Force were given Unita emblems and sent out to wreak





havoc all over southern and central Angola. The Angolans in the Unita bands increasingly became conscripts. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, under William Casey, actively pursuing the key element of the Reagan Doctrine — Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) against "Communist" governments - poured tens of millions of dollars into the war against Angola. Some of this was raised from the Saudi Arabian government and other Arab reactionary regimes, who since the 1970s have funded American surrogate forces in Angola and Mozambique.

FAPLA CONSOLIDATES

The Angolan government responded to this by further intensifying the training and equiping of its armed forces. It particularly concentrated on building up its air defence capability and its armour

and artillery. It even bought trucks, weapons, communications and other equipment from Brazil, France, Britain and Switzerland. FAPLA also intensified its coordination with PLAN and the ANC forces of Umkhonto We Sizwe, whose main bases are in Angola and were increasingly coming under South African attack.

An effective air defence system of radar, combat aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft guns, was built from the port of Namibe on the coast, through Lubango to Memongue and south-eastwards to the town of Cuito Cuanavale. This was made an important communications base for FAPLA, located as it was 150 kilometres from the Unita base at Mavinga, on the other side of the Lomba River.

In August, 1987, FAPLA launched a major offensive against

Mavinga. It severely defeated the Unita bandits, in spite of the mercenaries and the Stingers of the CIA. It appeared by October 1987 as if FAPLA would easily take Mavinga and move to take Jamba in the far south-eastern corner of Angola, where Savimbi claims to have his headquarters.

South Africa reacted by massing up to 30,000 troops, 435 tanks, and 400 pieces of artillery and hundreds of Mirage, Cheetah, Impala and other combat aircraft, in its bases near the Angolan border.

By November, 3,000 South African troops, backed by armoured vehicles and heavy artillery, were fighting FAPLA, which, before crossing the Lomba Riber, retreated back towards Cuito Cuanavale. But before retreating, FAPLA used its newly improved combat capability to inflict heavy casualities on the South African troops. The 101 Battalion of the South West African Territorial Force even mutinied because of the high casualty rate. The number of white conscript soldiers killed rose so high and morale fell so low that many white South African parents became frightened about what may happen to their sons in Angola. In November 1987, President P.W. Botha himself had to personally travel to address some of the troops inside Angola.

PLAN, the army of SWAPO, was active inside Namibia, and on 2 November, 1987 SADF had to admit to losing ten of its soldiers in battles with PLAN in Ovamboland, northern Namibia.

As FAPLA continued in its organised retreat back to Cuito Cuanavale, a stronghold in the line of defence already prepared, the South Africans thought they could move in and rout FAPLA, seize Cuito Cuanavale, and establish Unita there and win a major psychological victory, given the importance of the town in the whole of the Angolan line of communication and defence.

This is where the racists fell into the Angolan trap. The South Africans brought up their long-range G-5 and G-6 artillery, large numbers of Scorpion tanks and AML-90 armoured cars. They rapidly expanded their air bases in Namibia and a large part of the 30,000 troops they had put on alert

there moved to support their frontline units fighting to take Cuito Cuanavale.

The South Africans also brought in their Mirages, Cheetahs, and Impalas to pound the Angolan defences. They reached up to about 12 kilometres to Cuito Cuanavale. And then FAPLA, with Cuban reinforcements brought in from mid-January 1988, started pounding them hard. Angolan MIG-23s knocked out the older and slower South African Mirage, Impala and Cheetah aircraft. Angolan armour and artillery and anti-tank weapons also smashed up the much more exposed South African units. The effective air defence system completely denied the South Africans the air superiority they were used to.

On January 23rd, 1988, the South Africans accounced that they had captured Cuito Cuanavale. But they had not. They had only got themselves further trapped — politically and psychologically — in a battle they could not win, but which they could not easily terminate.

As their casualties rose to 320, with about 40 of their aircraft shot down, and many of their artillery and armour damaged, the South Africans realised that they had been brought to fight a battle at a place and time, in a terrain, and with weapons chosen by FAPLA, whose air defences were not only more effective, but who were able to maintain their supply lines to Menongue. The G-5 and G-6 artillery which has a shelling range of 25 miles, and all the bombs, could not smash the heavy system of bunkers already built by the Angolans.

Having tied down large SADF forces at Cuito Cuanavale, powerful FAPLA and Cuban units started from mid-March to move south and south-eastwards to attack SADF units near the Namibian border and reinforce Menongue. By mid-April 1987, the SADF units at Cuito Cuanavale were clearly defeated and began withdrawing, carrying back with them their devastated vehicles, armour, and artillery, and a shattered morale. Part of this devastation was tied up with their racism and contempt for the Angolans and Cubans, many of whom are black

or mulatto. As the equally racist British newspaper, the Sunday Telegraph, pointed out: "For the first time Black African pilots have been taking their South African counterparts in the air, pitting advanced Mig—23s against the older and slower Mirages which form the backbone of the South African air-force."

In fact, the Chief of Staff of the South African Air Force insisted in an interview with the BBC on 27th April, 1988, that the pilots were "Russian" and that they were faced with the best missile air defence system set up by the Soviet Union outside the Warsaw Pact countries. The South African white racists cannot accept the fact that an African army of blacks and mulattoes, supported by darkskinned Cubans, could defeat them so decisively, using such brilliant manoeuvering, and with such high resilience to massive bombardment.

As Angolan and Cuban combat units moved down to the River Cunene, which forms the border between Angola and Namibia, Botha realised that his troops were in no condition to stand up to fight again. His main fear was that FAPLA would move across into northern Namibia, where already the South West African Territorial Forces were highly demoralised and mutinous, and where PLAN is active, and SWAPO strong.

The racists realised by March 1988 that they needed time to recoup and rebuild their whole position on the Angolan-Namibian battlefront. Thus they readily agreed to the standing Angolan offer for negotiations, which involves the crucial issue of the independence of Namibia.

This round of hectic talks are not intended by Botha and his NATO backers to bring about independence for Namibia and an end to South African aggression and American intervention in Angola. They are intended to buy time after the South African defeat in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale marks a strategic shift in the balance of forces in southern Africa, and has taken us some more kilometres forward on the long and hard road towards the total liberation of our continent.

The Passing Away Of A Comrade

On Tuesday, November 15, 1988, between the hours of 10 and 12.00 p.m., Nigeria lost one of its most exemplary sons: a teacher, a scholar, and a patriot. Dr. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur, in the prime of his life, at the age of 44, tragically passed away.

To us in THE ANALYST, the death of this friend, compatriot and comrade has been particularly painful. Not only was Dr. Tukur, as a member of the Editorial Advisory Committee of THE ANALYST and FITILA and the Board of Directors of Dansa Publications Limited, part of the collective conscience which inspired and sustained the tasks we set for but his stubborn ourselves, commitment to the principles that he believed in was a priceless asset.

Unlike many of his age and privileged position, the late Dr. Tukur was a very simple man indeed—always at home in his bare living room, contented with local and ordinary food, and always wearing his simple safari dress. Indeed, so simple was he that many a visitor to his house, on seeing him among his sheep and goats, mistook him for a houseboy. This simplicity and humility is what earned him the name 'Mallam Mahmud' from his friends and associates.

But this humility, this remarkable simplicity, only hid a rare intellect. As a scholar, a teacher, and a student of society, he was widely read. He brought this rich knowledge, this expansive grasp of issues, events and phenomena to his teaching at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. He would always illustrate events that happened, say, in Stalingrad, some 50 years ago, with events happening today in Lagos, Kano, Calabar or Port Harcourt. Apart from the many young minds whom he has helped to mould, giving them a direction for positive contributions to progress, Dr. Mahmud Modibbo Tukur has left behind some of the most incisive intellectual productions of his generation. For instance, his 1977 seminal paper, "The Historian, the Jurist and the Sokoto Jihad" will for many years be a reference point for historians and other social scientists. But the Mahmud Modibbo quintessential Tukur remains his Ph.D. dissertation



Mahmud Modibbo Tukur.

on the British conquest of Northern Nigeria, titled The Imposition of British Colonial Domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and Neighbouring States, 1897-1914: A Reinterpretation of the Colonial Sources.

But not for Mahmud scholarship for scholarship's sake. Like the true patriot that he was, he believed that when all has been said and done, the goal of scholarship should be to change society. To make this world, this society, this life, a better one than we met it. In life, as in death, Mahmud lived his belief to the end.

At a time when it was the vogue among many campus radicals and armchair socialists to shun engaging in class struggle outside the safe cocoons of their lecture theatres and offices; on the infantile excuse of not wanting to engage in petty-bourgeois politics, Mahmud did the contrary. Amidst belicose and cowardly cries of 'reactionary', reactionary', Dr. Tukur, along with a number of other comrades from A.B.U. in 1979, took the correct decision of joining the People's Redemption Party (PRP). A decision which enabled him to participate actively in shaping the political direction of that party and the governments it controlled. For instance, in 1981 he was called upon by the Kano State Government to study and write an in depth analysis of the Maitatsine disturbances, in Anthony reaction to Justice Aniagolu's cover-up.

However, Mahmud was not just a political activist in his later life. Even

as a young school boy, his leadership qualities could not but be noticed. Between 1958-59, he was the Headboy at the Senior Primary School, Yola. And when Nigeria became independent in 1960, the late Mahmud, then just a form one student at Adamawa Provincial Secondary School, Yola, was nominated to represent the school at the ceremonies in Kaduna. He later became a House Captain and the school's Headboy for three years.

But it was as President of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), between 1981 and 1986 that his leadership qualities came to full bloom. He led that union with such commitdeftness. sophistication, ment and selflessness as had never before been witnessed. Not only did ASUU, under Mahmud's leadership. become well established and respected in every corner of Nigeria and outside, but the Union came to be identified with the struggle for democracy and social justice.

He was able to carry along with him ASUU membership at all times, and knew what the Union could do and what it could not do within the Nigerian environment. He was guided by two basic principles: (i) ensuring ASUU's survival and (ii) its relevance to the needs of academics and the rest of the Nigerian people.

For instance, in a letter he wrote to members of the National Executive Council (NEC) of the Union, dated April 10, 1985, in response to moves to arrest him, he instructed thus:


"If that happens [arrest], I would like the Union to be active over the issue but to remain calm and to avoid taking steps that will put the survival of the Union as such in jeopardy."

It was under such principled and tactful leadership that Mahmud was able to steer the affairs of the Union successfully for about five years.

Mallam Mahmud is no longer with us, but the struggle he has so much contributed to is continuing, and his example will always be a source of inspiration.

May his soul rest in perfect peace.

Reach out... for real satisfaction



W1.30 per bottle Liquid content only



ONE COUNTRY, TWO NATIONS



THE CALL OF NATURE

Nigerians — great lovers of euphemisms that they are — like to refer to it as "the call of nature". In plainer, even if cruder, language it is simply called 'shitting."

Well, everyone — big or small, rich or poor — must answer this "call of nature," at one time or another. Afterall, what goes into the mouth must come out through the anus.

For the majority of Nigerians, like the young man in the picture above, answering this "call of nature" is a

daily nightmare. In order to secure a spot on which they can squat to discharge the unwanted rubbish begging to be let out of their rumbling bowels, they must daily wade through pools of putrefying excreta and maggots.

On the other side of the social divide are the rich and powerful, who have olympic — size toilets, fully equiped with gold chandeliers, snowwhite marble tiles and heated baths.

But then, this is Nigeria: one land, two nations!